A typical scientist has no responsibility other than to explain how a natural event occurred. However, when a philosopher asks about the conditions under which a scientist’s explanation is true, he is, in fact, raising an ultimate question, the concept which Karl Popper used for the first time. Answering this question requires that no elements are neglected in the explanation, and no significant factors in the explanation are overlooked. In other words, in explaining a phenomenon, at any level of its (...) explanation, there should be no remainder. These require-ments can be achieved through the full explanation. In the present article, by drawing on concepts such as theory-ladenness of observation, underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the role of models and metaphors in developing a scientific theory, it is illustrated that a complete explanation includes both a scientific explanation and personal explanation. A per-sonal explanation comprises mental properties such as belief, desire, and intention, which are irreducible to physical properties. Therefore, we cannot provide a personal explanation while restricting ourselves to scientific methods. Consequently, it is argued in this article first, the personal explanation is irreducible to a scientific explanation. Second, the personal explana-tion is inevitable in order to provide a full explanation. Third, (methodological) naturalists claim that the ultimate judgment of what is natural and unnatural is possible only by scientific inquiry. Finally, accepting these three premises entails the inability of a naturalist to answer ultimate questions. (shrink)

The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World is my attempt to explain whether and how existential meaning is possible in a material world, and how such meaning is best conceived naturalistically. Neuroexistentialism conceives of our predicament in accordance with Darwin plus neuroscience. The prospects for our kind of being-in-the-world are limited by our natures as smart but fully embodied short-lived animals. Many find this picture disenchanting, even depressing. I respond to four criticisms of my relentless upbeat naturalism: that (...) naturalism can make no room for norms, for values; that I overvalue truth at the expense of happiness; that I underestimate the extent to which supernaturalism has made peace with naturalism; and that I can give no account for why humans as finite animals should want to overcome our given natures and seek impersonal, self-transcendent value. (shrink)

In recent years the science-and-religion/spirituality/theology dialogue has flourished, but the impact on the minds of the general public, on society as a whole, has been less impressive. Also, religious believers and outspoken atheists face each other without progressing toward a common understanding. The view taken here is that achieving a more marked impact of the dialogue would be beneficial for a peaceful survival of humanity. I aim to argue the why and how of that task by analyzing three possible purposes (...) of the dialogue and their logical interdependence, suggest conceivable improvements of the quality and extent of the current efforts toward a negotiated action plan, and consider an enlargement of the circle of the actors involved. The dialogue that has been carried on between science and religion/spirituality/theology could be expanded and usefully applied to some major problems in the present world. (shrink)

In “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber identifies a trajectory within modernity of increased rationalization, which results in a dangerous loss of meaning, a marginalization of religion, and a disenchanted view of the world. Weber’s misunderstanding of religion as premodern and “magical” results in his underestimating how religion can contribute to “re-enchanting” a field of knowledge, specifically medicine. This article proposes to turn to a theology of the Holy Spirit as “giver of life” for resources to “re-enchant” medicine. Re-enchantment does (...) not require returning to a magical view of the world but retrieving a real sense of God at work in the world, thereby enabling the health care worker and scientist to arrive at a deeper understanding of vocation. (shrink)

According to Greek Mythology, the Muses were the nine goddesses who inspired artists and writers. As qualitative researchers we are inspired, shaken, and moved by the phenomena that we study. They are our companions on our journeys of exploration, binding us to our research participants who contribute to our understanding in sharing their stories with us and revealing something of their lives. The Greeks knew that they did not have mastery of the Muses; similarly, the phenomena we study are not (...) in our grasp. However, as children of this age, enchanted with technology and its promise of control, we are apt to delude ourselves into thinking that with sufficient effort mastery might be within our reach. In exploring this notion of the phenomenon as Muse, I turn to the accounts of researchers, both my own and those of colleagues. I aim to give words to the evolving and often difficult dialogue with our topics, that is present in a powerful and yet typically tacit way as we undertake our task. This dialogue touches us intimately as we reflect on the dimensions of human life that capture our attention and lead us to places that we could not have imagined. As this process unfolds, questions arise and remain. For example, we wonder what openness really means and what role methods play in our work. Thus, although we may think we are done with our Muse when our project is completed, much of the time she is not done with us. (shrink)

This article engages with John Haught's views on original sin. It offers a brief orientation to discourse on sin in the context of theological debates on human evolution. This is followed by a thick description of Haught's so-called note on original sin. A series of five observations and questions regarding Haught's position is offered. It is observed that Haught's way of telling the story of sin and salvation follows a classic Roman Catholic plot, namely one based on grace elevating nature. (...) This is contrasted with the more typically reformed plot of restoration. (shrink)

In A Third Window Robert Ulanowicz exposes the explanatory weaknesses of both classical and statistical methods in scientific inquiry. His book, however, does much more than that. While being completely grounded in empirical science, it also outlines a worldview, or a metaphysics, that renders intelligible the fact of chance and emergent novelty. Ulanowicz establishes his position by comparing his third window onto nature with two others conventional scientific approaches. The purpose of this essay is to point out the value of (...) Ulanowicz’s approach for improving the quality of conversation between science and theology. (shrink)

In a scientific context such as ours, a true understanding of faith needs a correct approach to its relationship with science. Defending religious belief in the modern age dominated by scientific learning is the main preoccupation expressed by Pope Benedict XVI in some of his own speeches. Tackling this task means changing the nature of our ideas on both science and faith. The belief in God is compatible with science, only if we demarcate the limits of the scientific discourse. The (...) idea that science is the framework for all kinds of cultural inquiry proves incorrect and represents a considerable risk for humanity. Moreover, a naturalist approach cannot respond to the exigency of finding a more profound meaning in natural reality. (shrink)