Some recent arguments for paternalist government interventions have been based in empirical results in psychology and behavioral economics that would seem to show that adult human beings are far removed from the ideals of rationality presupposed by much of philosophical and economic theory. In this paper it is argued that we need to move to a different conception of human decision-making competence than the one that lies behind that common line of philosophical and economic thinking, and which actually still lies (...) in the background of some of these recent approaches to paternalist interventions. An alternative picture of human decision-making competence is outlined and four criteria for identifying areas where paternalist interventions have a basic moral and political legitimacy are then identified on the basis of this picture. (shrink)

An epistemic account of the circumstances of justice allows one to make three important claims about the Humean and Rawlsian ‘standard account’ of those circumstances. First, and contrary to Hume,...

ABSTRACTThis article shows how Hayek’s understanding of ‘unlimited democracy’ was influenced by the work of Carl Schmitt. It goes on to make the case that ordoliberal ideas informed his suggestions for limiting democracy, made in response to Schmitt’s work. A number of authors have drawn attention to the influence of Schmitt on Hayek’s thought. Similarly, the ordoliberal relationship has been explored. However, these two influences must be read alongside each other in order to arrive at a full understanding of Hayek’s (...) deep ambivalence towards democracy and how that developed from the 1930s through to the 1970s. Finally, the article makes the case that the decisive influence on Hayek’s later authoritarian turn was not the work of Schmitt, as certain authors have argued, but ordoliberal interpretations of dictatorship. It also argues that Hayek’s model constitution is informed by fundamental ordoliberal concerns. (shrink)

SummaryFriedrich Hayek and Michael Polanyi corresponded with each other for the best part of thirty years. They had shared interests that included science, social science, economics, epistemology, history of ideas and political philosophy. Studying their correspondence and related writings, this article shows that Hayek and Polanyi were committed Liberals but with different understandings of liberty, the forces that endanger liberty, and the policies required to rescue it.

The terms ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘knowledge capitalism’ have been used with increasing frequency since the 1990s as a way of describing the latest phase of capitalism in in the process of global r...

In the 1930s, socialist economists used the assumptions of equilibrium theory to argue that a central planner could coordinate supply and demand from above. This argument led Hayek, over the years, to try to explain the limitations of equilibrium theory and, conversely, to explain how capitalism functioned without the assumptions of equilibrium being met. In a changing world of agents who are ignorant of the future, how is a functioning market “order” possible? One answer can be found in Hayek's argument (...) that evolved rules make people's future behavior more predictable and, more to the point, that they contain previously accumulated knowledge that provides the building blocks for future economic growth. Hayek's evolutionary theory was flawed, however, in failing to explain how people can know which rules are responsible for their success or failure so that they persist in using those rules and pass them forward in time. However, markets provide immediate feedback about success and failure through profits and losses. An evolutionary explanation of the economy would have permitted Hayek to dispense with the metaphor of general equilibrium, which was increasingly irrelevant to his understanding of economic order. (shrink)

Bastiat is widely acknowledged as the most effective advocate of free markets, but his status as an economist is widely denied even by prominent Austrian economists who share his literary style and support for liberty. In particular, his theories of value and exchange have been attacked as a labor theory of value. Bastiat is exonerated here from these charges and is shown to fully oppose objective theories of value and to fully endorse the gains from free exchange. In addition, Bastiat (...) viewed economics as a science based on deductive reasoning and he vehemently opposed the use of mathematics. He thus was an important precursor of the Austrian school of economics.Bastiat est très reconnu comme étant le défenseur le plus éloquent du libre marché. Cependant, son statut en tant qu’économiste est amplement nié, et ce, même par les économistes Autrichiens éminents qui sont en accord avec son style littéraire et sa défense de la liberté. En particulier, ses théories de la valeur et de l’échange, considérées comme participant de la théorie de la valeur-travail, ont fait l’objet de critiques. Cet article exonère Bastiat de ces critiques et démontre que ses théories s’opposent radicalement aux théories objectives de la valeur : Bastiat avait une compréhension parfaite des gains découlant des échanges libres. De plus, Bastiat envisageait l’économie comme une science reposant sur un raisonnement déductif et s’opposait résolument à l’emploi des mathématiques. En ce sens, il était un précurseur important de l’école Autrichienne d’économie. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article soutient que la causalité au sens humien (mettant en relief la succession) qui fut la principale cible des critiques du Réalisme Critique de Bhaskar, demeure très présente dans le concept même de “mécanisme”. En effet, le concept de mécanisme implique une abstraction newtonienne du temps ignorée par le Réalisme Critique. Il s’agit cependant d’un problème plus large d’abstraction mécaniste, que cet article analyse simultanément sous l’angle du Réalisme Critique et de la discipline ayant pour objet l’étude des (...) mécanismes, la cybernétique. Comment des descriptions de mécanismes causals peuvent-elles se réconcilier avec leurs propres abstractions? En réponse nous proposons une dissolution du problème du temps au travers de l’expérience vécue. Par ailleurs, nous traitons également des questions liées à la pédagogie de l’enseignement des abstractions, à la mise au point de nouveaux contextes d’interaction et au rôle des technologies dans la mise en place des contextes ludiques. Enfin, nous dégageons des implications plus profondes pour la recherche réaliste, et soulignons la nécessité de traiter conjointement les problèmes d’abstraction et les problèmes pédagogiques et technologiques. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of the Austrian School of Economics has been its emphasis on the entrepreneur as central to the market process. One 20th century Austrian whose work is normally not thought of as making a major contribution to the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship is Ludwig Lachmann. However, a careful reading of his 1956 book Capital and its Structure can tease out a theory of the function of the entrepreneur that is distinctly different from that of Israel Kirzner, (...) yet still clearly situated in an Austrian conception of the market process. In this contribution, I want to emphasize two points that have been raised by previous work on Lachmann, but not explored in any detail. The first is that Lachmann’s conception of entrepreneurship is deeply bound up with the need to engage in monetary calculation thanks to the heterogeneity of capital and uncertainty of the future. For Lachmann, the key function of the entrepreneur is to “specify” the uses of capital goods. Such specification requires the use of money prices and what Mises called monetary calculation. The second contribution is to offer more detail on the way in which entrepreneurs both creatively specify and re-specify the uses of their capital goods in response to profit and loss signals. The constant shuffling and reshuffling of capital goods, of which coming up with new products or new twists to old ones are a part, is the essence of Lachmann’s implicit vision of entrepreneurship. For Lachmann, entrepreneurship is bound up with resource ownership and deployment through the creation and revision of plans in ways that are much more active than Kirzner’s conception of the entrepreneur. (shrink)

In his reply to my critical book review, ?Don't Shoot the Messenger: Caldwell's Hayek and the Insularity of the Austrian Project,? Bruce Caldwell criticizes my account of Carl Menger's ?imaginary goods,? and rejects the line of reasoning I advanced in drawing Keynesian conclusions from Hayekian premises. But Caldwell's proposed methodology for assessing the significance of ?imaginary goods? in advanced market economies is ill conceived; and my pathway from Hayek to Keynes merely pursues a thoroughgoing subjectivism to its inexorable conclusion, which (...) is not, as Caldwell suggests, countercyclical fiscal policy. (shrink)

How management philosophy is conceived depends on if pragmatism is acknowledged or not! After having been under the main domination of management science both research and education has until recently widened its scope from a decision-making to an action-perspective. It seems to be a recent reconnection to pragmatism that makes the 2011 Carnegie report propose to rethink management in liberal arts terms, whilst the vastly influential 1959 Carnegie Pierson report distanced itself from American pragmatism thus focusing on decisions and forgetting (...) actions. Actions may contain decisions and choices but contain more than that. A decision-perspective explains by causal inference modelling choices as calculated or programmed. The action-perspectives strive at understanding intentions of agents by philosophical interpretations of action stories. It is less limited to finding the logics for constructing worlds, to paraphrase Herbert Simon’s favorite philosopher Rudolf Carnap, than embarking on plausible, although not certain, reconstructions of intentions giving meaning to action stories. This can be illustrated by turning to Elizabeth Anscombe’s Wittgensteinian investigation of intentions as Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning. Her constant analytical care to defend a philosophy of action against metaphysical assumptions and taken-for-granted “psychologisms” shows that an action-perspective is as analytic as ever one of decision-making. What differs is that the latter seems constantly attracted by programming inquiry by “scientific methodology” whilst the latter is charmed by philosophical approaches to action welcoming fascinating conundrums, enigmas and human goofs in the reality of managerial practice. Management science wants to reduce management to logics, programs and models for formal decision making whereas management philosophy is closer to spotting the artfully entrepreneurial in actions. The latter points in the direction of engineering tools, the former to appreciate the toys of management as artwork. Finally the argument of Georg Henrik von Wright helps us see that the two are philosophically compatible; for in a pragmatically inspired management philosophy actions may well contain decisions. (shrink)

Public policy makers are calling for all university students to learn entrepreneurial competencies to prepare them to be productive citizens in an unpredictable future. Far more than simply starting up businesses, entrepreneurship is increasingly seen as a student-centric pedagogical technique (teaching through entrepreneurship) for helping students learn desperately needed foundational skills and attitudes such as curiosity, creativity, opportunity spotting, grit, resilience, proactivity, adaptability, empathy, self-efficacy, motivation, and tolerance for uncertainty and risk. This article describes generational trends that make this education (...) increasingly important and provides a Comprehensive Framework for Entrepreneurship Education (CFEE) to help implement best practices to achieve measurable Assurances of Learning (AoL) results at the institutional, degree program, and individual course levels. (shrink)

This paper examines many similarities in the methodological and ontological views of George Soros and Friedrich Hayek.

Carsten Timmerman and Julie Anderson, editors, Devices and Designs: Medical Technologies in Historical Perspective. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 284 pp. £50.00. ISBN 0-333-71492-X. Op...

Friedrich von Hayek’s classical liberalism argued that free markets allow individuals the greatest opportunity to achieve their ends. This paper develops an internal critique of this claim. It argues that once externalities are introduced, the forms of economic knowledge Hayek thought to undermine government action and orthodox utilitarianism also rule out relative welfarist assessments of more or less regulated markets. Given the pervasiveness of externalities in modern economies, Hayek will frequently be unable to make comparative welfarist claims, or he must (...) relax his epistemic assumptions and allow for greater government action than his classical liberalism would wish to accept. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on adherence to social norms. It considers insights from multiple research traditions in an effort to explain how individual learning and action are connected to social norms. One strand of philosophical tradition holds that non-representational learning and skillful coping carried out unconsciously are underestimated by both scientific and philosophical traditions. The present research combines this tradition with the literature on the evolution of social norms and suggests that experienced individuals in a (...) society adhere to social norms better than novice agents do. We explain this phenomenon by unconscious and non-representational cognitive processes. This framework is then used to investigate population-level outcomes of individual learning. (shrink)

What is typical of Hayek's challenge concerning socialism is that he always maintained that this question was for economic theory to decide. Sketching the historical background of what has come to be known as the "socialist calculation debate" (section 1), I try to link this debate with the Menger-Wieser Zurechnungsproblem and show that the Pareto-Barone approach has determined the theoretical form of this economic controversy. I then go on to explore Hayek's 'inapplicability' argument (section 2) and try to show how (...) it is related to Mises' 'logical impossibility’ argument. This is followed by an examination of Hayek's second argument (section 3), which I refer to as 'the evolutionary argument'. I display what is the specific gist of this argument and connect it tightly to the first one. I then discuss certain methodological issues (section 4) pertaining to the allegedly radical difference between Mises' arguments and Hayek's tentative refutation of socialism. Here I challenge the received view that Mises' based his case on the 'impossibility in principle' of socialism, whereas Hayek's own position was to challenge the 'possibility in practice' of a centrally planned economy. This reading (especially by Willem Keizer) of Hayek's contribution to the debate seems to me misguided and unwarranted. I attempt to propose, on the contrary, that both lines of reasoning involve the same kind as arguments since both of them should be interpreted as impossibility theorems. Finally (section 5) I try to give an appropriate and adequate answer to the question raised in the title of this paper. (shrink)