In his political writings, F. A. Hayek faces a classic liberal dilemma: he opposes coercion but recognizes that sometimes the state can help to minimize it. Hayek attempts to resolve the dilemma of the limits of state power by offering a definition of the rule of law that does not depend on a controversial conception of rights. However, his effort to formalize the rule of law fails. Not only does Hayek implicitly rely on an undefended theory of rights, but his (...) rule‐of‐law scheme is limited to the elaboration of general principles of good government, neglecting the need for reforms aimed directly at the political processes that result in the controversial forms of coercion he deplores. (shrink)

Discoverers of “market failures” as well as advocates of the general efficiency of a “true, unhampered market” sometimes seem to disregard the fundamental fact that there is no such thing as a “market as such.” What we call a market is always a system of social interaction characterized by a specific institutional framework, that is, by a set of rules defining certain restrictions on the behavior of the market participants, whether these rules are informal, enforced by private sanctions, or formal, (...) enforced by a particular agency, the “protective state,” in J. M. Buchanan's terminology. (shrink)

If deliberative democracy is to be more than a critique of current practice and achieve the normative goals ascribed to it, its norms must be approximated in practice and combine its two elements, popular deliberation with democratic decision-making. In combining these, we come across a Weberian dilemma between legitimacy and effectiveness. One of the most popular methods for institutionalizing deliberative democracy, which has been suggested, is citizen associations in civil society. However, there has been a lack of precise and detailed (...) discussion about how such a system could link macro deliberations in public spheres with micro and formal decision-making arenas. This paper aims to amend this and offers a dualist model, which ensures that deliberation and decision-making are linked, and an effective balance between the Weberian dilemma is achieved, through the same secondary associations fulfilling both roles. The first part of this strategy focuses on the informal public sphere and its networks and their potential to foster deliberative communication between secondary associations and between these associations and the state that helps transform preferences and set the agenda for decision-making. The second part is mediating forums, organized by quangos, with devolved powers, where representatives from secondary associations assemble to make decisions based upon the norms of deliberative democracy. If deliberative democracy can be approximated in practice then it becomes a more persuasive theory as it means the normative goals attributed to it could actually be achieved, which is why the dualist method is significant. (shrink)

Abstract Hayek assailed the idea of social justice by arguing that any effort to realize it would transform society into an oppressive organization, stißing liberty. Hayek's view is marred by two omissions. First, he fails to consider that the goal of social justice, like the goal of wealth generation, might be promoted by strategies of indirection that do not entail oppressive organization. Second, he underestimates the tendency of the market order itself to generate oppressive organization, and consequently sees advantages in (...) the market order that it may not possess. (shrink)

At the one extreme, social service provision by government may be seen as the work of benevolent professionals, and at the other as that of tyrannical social engineers. This paper examines the views of the libertarian economist, F.A. Hayek, and the British sociologist and philosopher, T.H. Marshall, on such provision. Marshall takes an optimistic view of the development of the professional classes in Britain and elsewhere; he sees social welfare specialists as essential to the preservation of social rights and argues (...) they should be given powers that sometimes supersede democratic preferences. Hayek, however, sees these professionals, in their drive to promote social equality, as a danger to liberty in Western democracies; he thus opposes a democratic system in which such people are allowed to attain influence. Both Hayek and Marshall raise questions about welfare and inequality and about the degree of authority social welfare professionals should be given. However, they take opposing views on the proper role of what Burke called ?natural aristocracy? (shrink)

THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM by F. A. Hayek edited by W. W. Bartley, III Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. 180 pp., $24.95.

Although the concept of Rule of Law has been revived and developed vigorously by mid‐twentieth century conservative political theorists, contemporary legal positivists have not been impressed. The author reviews this confrontation, outlines the logic for a strong theory of Rule of Law, and surveys the leading attempts to provide compelling grounds for such a theory.

Friedrich A. von Hayek influenced many areas of inquiry including economics, psychology and political theory. This article will offer one possible interpretation of the ethical foundation of Hayek's political and social contributions to libertarianism and free market capitalism by analyzing several of his important non-economic publications, primarily The Road to Serfdom, The Fatal Conceit, The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty. While Hayek did not offer a particular ethical foundation for free market capitalism, he argued consistently that free (...) markets are liberating and, for the markets to be truly free and for individuals to participate freely in markets, they should be subject to little control. Beyond some very basic principles, such as the protection of private property, that enable the free market to function properly, individuals are both free to and required to determine their own ethical compass. The central question, then, is what are the ethical principles that underlie Hayek's view of the successful organization and operation of a free market? If formal rules and regulations must be kept to a minimum, then ethical behavior is an individual choice as well as an important foundation for the self-regulating free market. This article will argue that one possible ethical foundation underlying Hayek's libertarian justification for free market capitalism are Friedrich Nietzsche's "will to power" and noble/slave ethics. This article will rely primarily on Nietzsche's On The Genealogy of Morals, Beyond Good and Evil, Zarathustra, and the Will to Power. (shrink)

In Hayek's Social and Political Thought, Roland Kley argues that Hayek's defense of capitalism is instrumentalist: that is, that Hayek sees market societies as efficient mechanisms that have no independent ethical justification. But in fact, Hayek does have such a standard, one that is expressed in the notion of a discipline of freedom. This standard derives from the moral anthropology of the liberal‐conservative tradition.

This paper examines two paths by which F. A. Hayek’s work has influenced the cognitive theory of institutions: cognition and cultural evolution. It argues that there is a relationship between the sensory order and the social order. The explanation of social order begins with the human mind. This is illustrated with ideas relating to understanding culture from a cognitive viewpoint. Human cognition makes cultural evolution an endogenous process. The paper draws on ideas of co-evolution of individuals’ mental models and their (...) actions. Mental models can be modified by feedback from altered perceived reality as a consequence of peoples’ altered actions. A key to understanding cultural evolution is an understanding of how individuals modify their mental models. (shrink)

This paper offers a novel situational approach to study organizational justice in which the proposed unit of analysis is managerial behavior manifested in argumentation rather than employee justice perceptions. The currently dominant theoretical framework in justice research, which is built on justice perceptions, neglects the unique features of organizational order and vulnerability of procedural justice perceptions. As the procedural justice concept belongs chiefly to a spontaneous market order under which the rule of law is made possible, it is inappropriate to (...) transfer this concept to an organization in which the rule of authority is dominant. Therefore, except the limited legal domain in which managerial freedom is restrained by laws, procedural justice in organizations represents a mirage that can give rise to hypocritical managerial actions that can legitimate morally controversial outcomes via eristic tactics. In contrast, interactional justice is of great importance to organizations in that employees and organizations can ensure their rational economic exchanges without deception. However, current formulations of interactional justice often regard interactions as a palliative recipe designed to alleviate reactions to outcomes and not as a constituent of distributive justice. Perelman’s argumentation theory can offer a new conceptualization of interactional justice that addresses this gap. (shrink)

The work of Foucault on liberal government, and that of his followers, is subject to two dangers. The first is to regard the critical character of liberalism (as governing through freedom) as providing safeguards against the despotic potentials of biopower and sovereignty. The second is to regard these heterogenous powers of life and death as somehow simply relocated or reinscribed within the field of liberal governmentality. The latter point is a major methodological error; the former closes the gap between the (...) analytics of government and the normativity of liberalism itself. By working through these dangers, our understanding of the ethos of liberal government is transformed. That ethos today requires us to link governing through freedom to the powers of life and death, the exercise of choice to the sovereign decision, the contract to violence, economic citizenship to moral discipline and obligation, and rights and liberties to enforcement. (shrink)