Using tombstoning (jumping from a height into water) as an example, this article claims that public health policies and health promotion tend to assess the moral status of activities following a version of health maximizing rule utilitarianism, but this does not represent common moral experience, not least because it fails to take into account the enjoyment that various health effecting habits brings and the contribution that this makes to a good life, variously defined. It is proposed that the moral status (...) of health threatening activities should instead be defined by a version of act utilitarianism where both maximizing value and method of calculation are decided by individuals. In this account personal responsibility for health is reduced to the obligation to undertake calculations effectively, comprising of two duties; epistemic and reflective. If there is an individual epistemic duty, it is plausible to suggest that health promotion should present information in a way which facilitates it, but despite the prevalent language of autonomous choice, discussion of health promotion messages, for example, related to drinking and smoking demonstrates that this currently does not happen. Health promotion strategies should seek to encourage reflection about the harm our health effecting behaviour causes others. (shrink)

The moral status of business bluffing is a controversial issue. On the one hand, bluffing would seem to be relevantly similar to lying and deception. Because of this, business bluffing can be taken to be an activity that is at least prima facie morally condemnable. On the other hand, it has often been claimed that in business bluffing is part of the game and that therefore there is nothing morally questionable in business bluffing. In a recent issue of this journal, (...) Fritz Allhoff puts forward a novel defence of business bluffing. In this article, I will examine Allhoff’s arguments for the moral acceptability of business bluffing and argue that they are implausible. (shrink)

Ethical decision-making research has centered on Rest’s framework that represents a rational, nonaffective model for ethical decision making. However, research in human cognition suggesting a “dual-processing” framework, composed of both rational and affective components, has been relatively ignored in the ethical decision-making literature. Examining dual-processing literature, it seems affect might be an important factor in decision making when a person’s mood is congruent with the task or situational context frame. Given that ethical decisions are serious and complex tasks, it is (...) proposed here that inducing a negative affective state might produce mood congruence, reinforce the salience of emotion for ethical decision makers, and lead to differences in decision processing. Evidence is presented documenting differences in the decisions made by ethical decision makers in a negative affective state as compared to those in either a positive or neutral affective state. (shrink)

This paper will show that if we take conventional ethics seriously, then there is no moral justification for business profits. To show this, we explore three conventional ethical theories, namely Christian ethics, Kantian ethics and Utilitarian ethics. Since they essentially reject self-interest, they also reject the essence of business: the profit motive. To illustrate the relationship, we will concretize how the anti-egoist perspective expresses itself in business and business ethics. In business, we look at what many businesses regard as proof (...) of their virtue. In business ethics, we look at what many business ethicists say about the relationship between morality and self-interest and, thus, the profit motive. Ultimately, we will argue that conventional ethics can, at most, only justify the means of business, but not the end of business. (shrink)

The paper understands the rise of ethical codes and professional ethics from the point of view of their contribution to the formation of a democratic citizenship. Various aspects of professional ethics are analyzed from the perspective of an agent-based ethics for which goods, norms and virtues are complementary factors for intelligence and individual judgment development. Through a conception of democracy understood as a way of life, professional ethics acquire a renewed meaning as a central element for individual self-realization and social (...) emancipation. In short, under the label of democratic professionalism, and following Dewey’s moral and political philosophy, it is shown that professional ethics are more than a field of application, a constituent element of a civic ethic within the framework of a democratic society. (shrink)

Are sociologists always critical about genetics? Are philosophers always more supportive? This is the impression of many sociologists in the United Kingdom who argue that contemporary British philosophers criticise genetic technologies and applications in ways that scientists and medical doctors can deal with. They emphasise matters like informed consent, but pay less or no attention to the wider social consequences of technologies, practices and policies. Philosophers in their turn may see sociologists as irrationally hostile to science and medical practice. Some (...) of them refuse to criticise genetics, arguing that there is nothing to criticise. Others feel that their criticisms are in fact more accurate than the concerns raised by sociologists. And yet others point out that the impression of uncritical support can only be true of a certain specific group. Philosophers have so many internal disagreements among themselves that the generalisation can hardly be justified. In this paper an attempt is made by a sociologist and a philosopher to understand how sociological and philosophical perspectives on bioethics may differ in discussions about genetics. The paper, which proceeds in dialogue form, is based on our email correspondence on the advantages and disadvantages of genetic technologies and their applications, and on the idea of social consequences as understood by scholars from two different disciplines. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende apresentar a partir de Sandel as teses fundamentais do utilitarismo de Bentham destacando seus aspectos vantajosos e seus déficits do ponto de vista moral. O aspecto deficitário do utilitarismo benthamiano diz respeito à violação do indivíduo à medida em que lhe é demandado o sacrifício em prol do bem-estar da maioria; além disso, há também o problema da uniformização dos valores e dos prazeres. No que concerne aos êxitos do utilitarismo sugere-se o descentramento do racionalismo a partir (...) do binômio prazer e dor e, com isso, a ampliação da proteção ética e legal de animais não-racionais, porém sencientes. (shrink)