This commentary acknowledges the importance of Davey's biocognitive approach to the uneven distribution of fears on the basis of its contribution to a human model for understanding fear. An integrated heredity-environment and developmental transactional approach based on field/system theory is recommended in place of the mechanistic heredity × environment interactionism that Davey uses to explain behavioral ontogeny.

Most phobias are focussed on a small number of fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders). A review of the evidence supporting biological and cognitive explanations of this uneven distribution of phobias suggests that the readiness with which such stimuli become associated with aversive outcomes arises from biases in the processing of information about threatening stimuli rather than from phylogenetically based associative predispositions or “biological preparedness.” This cognitive bias, consisting of a heightened expectation of aversive outcomes following fear-relevant stimuli, generates and maintains (...) robust learned associations between them. Some of the features of such stimuli which determine this expectancy bias are estimates of how dangerous they are, the semiotic similarity between them and their aversive outcomes, and the degree of prior fear they elicit. Ontogenetic and cultural factors influence these features of fear-relevant stimuli and are hence important in determining expectancy bias. The available evidence does not exclude the possibility that both expectancy biases and specific evolved predispositions coexist, but the former can explain a number of important findings that the latter cannot. (shrink)

In his critique of preparedness theory, Davey does not address the limitations of adaptationism. The purpose of this commentary is to outline problems that arise when one assumes that mental illness (e.g., phobic disorder)musthave had adaptive significance for it to have survived the vicissitudes of natural selection.

Failure to find an obvious or linear relationship between a developmental experiential factor and a developmental outcome often leads investigators to posit concepts such as “biological preparedness” and “evolved predispositions” that allude to hypothetical geneticmechanisms that may not exist. However, experiential nonlinearities alone may explain the development of certain instinctive behaviors, as shown by studies on alarm call responsivity in mallard ducklings.

É surpreendente que o ser humano possa formar representações mentais de objetos e propriedades que os seus órgãos dos sentidos não foram projetados pela seleção natural para registrar. Isto não é apenas referência deslocada, uma capacidade partilhada com algumas outras espécies. Afinal, referência deslocada pode ser referência para observáveis. Defendo a plausibilidade de desenvolver um programa de pesquisa para explorar como essa capacidade se refere o conhecimento por descrição em um sentido mais ou menos russelliano. Como tal, é um desdobramento (...) acidental da faculdade de linguagem, especificamente a capacidade de construir descrições. Ainda mais especificamente, ele requer a capacidade para formar frases quantificadas, como por variantes da teoria das descrições. Os linguistas têm apresentado evidências de uma operação computacional própria para a faculdade de linguagem, Confluir Interno, que liga variáveis. Defendo a razoabilidade de um programa para explorar a forma como a singularidade humana de Confluir Interno contribui para a nossa capacidade de conhecimento por descrição. (shrink)

A review of data concerning the uneven distribution of phobias suggests that nonassociative, ethological models can account for most of tile important findings that cannot be attributed to expectancy biases. The origin of a variety of fears that appear in fixed developmental patterns across divergent cultures and species can best be explained by biological models.

Davey reviews evidence purporting to distinguish between two accounts of selective associations – expectancy bias and evolved predispositions, although these hypotheses largely apply to different levels of causal analysis. Criticisms of primate studies in which subjects lack prior exposure to stimuli seem uncompelling. Expectancies may sometimes serve as proximal mediators in selective associations, but other factors, both proximate and ultimate, are clearly also involved.

Davey's discussion of phobias is criticized because of the lack of distinctions between the various classes of phobias. Psychopharmacological evidence indicates differing pathophysiologies. Clinical psychopharmacological distinctions are not congruent with either a strict phylogenetic preparedness model or with cognitive biases. Davey's critique of the laboratory bred animal studies seems far fetched. His hypothesis concerning the importance of historical significance is clearly ad hoc rather than based on comparative data.

Behavioral research suggests that rule-governed behavior should be less sensitive to environmental changes and thus more resistant to extinction (disconfirmation) than contingency-governed behavior. The opposite is implied in Davey's discussion of ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to fear development. The generality of the behavioral findings and their apparent inconsistency with the present article should be further explored with more sensitive research paradigms.

Davey suggests that increased resistance to extinction of CRs conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli may be due to more persistent expectancies of the UCS following these stimuli. However, this viewpoint is contradicted by existing empirical evidence that fear-relevant CRs survive an extinction trials series producing extinction of expectancies whereas CRs conditioned to non-fear-relevant CSs do not.

The Strange Situation procedure was developed by Ainsworth two decades agoas a means of assessing the security of infant-parent attachment. Users of the procedureclaim that it provides a way of determining whether the infant has developed species-appropriate adaptive behavior as a result of rearing in an evolutionary appropriate context, characterized by a sensitively responsive parent. Only when the parent behaves in the sensitive, species-appropriate fashion is the baby said to behave in the adaptive or secure fashion. Furthermore, when infants are (...) observed repeatedly in the Strange Situation,the pattern of behavior is said to be highly similar, and this pattern is said to predict the infants' future behavior in a diverse array of contexts. After an exhaustive review of the literature, it is shown that these popular claims are empirically unsupported in their strong form, and that the interpretations in terms of biological adaptationare misguided. There is little reliable evidence about the specific dimensions of parental behavior that affect Strange Situation behavior, although there does appear to be some relationship between these constructs. Temporal stability in security of attachment ishigh only when there is stability in family and caretaking circumstances. Likewise, patterns of Strange Situation behavior only have substantial predictive validity in similarly stable families. Implications for future research and theorizing — particularly as they relate to the use of evolutionary biology in psychological theory — are discussed. (shrink)