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Frege's Principle

In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics. Kluwer Academic Publishers (1995)

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  1. Fregean abstraction, referential indeterminacy and the logical foundations of arithmetic.Matthias Schirn - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (2):203 - 232.
    In Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Frege attempted to introduce cardinalnumbers as logical objects by means of a second-order abstraction principlewhich is now widely known as ``Hume's Principle'' (HP): The number of Fsis identical with the number of Gs if and only if F and G are equinumerous.The attempt miscarried, because in its role as a contextual definition HP fails tofix uniquely the reference of the cardinality operator ``the number of Fs''. Thisproblem of referential indeterminacy is usually called ``the Julius Caesar (...)
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  • Julius Caesar and Basic Law V.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (2):161–178.
    This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better (...)
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  • Why, in 1902, wasn't Frege prepared to accept Hume's Principle as the Primitive Law for his Logicist Program?Kazuyuki Nomoto - 2000 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 9 (5):219-230.
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  • The Consistency of predicative fragments of frege’s grundgesetze der arithmetik.Richard G. Heck - 1996 - History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2):209-220.
    As is well-known, the formal system in which Frege works in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik is formally inconsistent, Russell’s Paradox being derivable in it.This system is, except for minor differ...
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