Although true in some aspects, the suggested characterization of today’s science as a dichotomy between traditional science and data-driven science misses some of the nuance, complexity, and possibility that exists between the two positions. Part of the problem is the claim that Data Science works without theories. There are many theories behind the data that are used in science. However, for data science, the only theories that matter are those in mathematics, statistics, and computer science. In this conceptual paper, we (...) add two other philosophy of science tenets, experiments and data, to the discussion to create a more nuanced view of how data science uses theories. Following Ihde’s concept of technoscience and the incessant quest for more precision, magnification, and resolution, we argue that technology-driven science created a need for more technology-driven science, culminating in data science. Further, we adapt Hacking and Galison’s views on physics to argue that data science is also an experimental science, which uses data objects in experiments. Drawing from Heelan, we called these objects “data-objects-for-knowing”. Finally, we conclude that data science is a science to study artificially created phenomena—a science to study the data manipulated by the equations and operations of AI. It disregards the connections between data and the real world that were carefully built by the theories from other sciences. In the experiments of data science, data are the world itself. The knowledge created by data science is purposely disconnected from any theory from other sciences; it is a knowledge for the sake of itself. (shrink)

The hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to the natural sciences has a special interest in the interpretive phases of these sciences and in the circumstances, cognitive and social, that lead to divergent as well as convergent interpretations. It tries to ascertain the role of the hermeneutic circle in research; and to this end it has developed, over the past three decades or so, a number of adaptations of hermeneutic and phenomenological concepts to processes of experimentation and theory-making. The purpose of the present essay (...) is to show how appropriate these concepts are to an important current research program (solar neutrinos) and thus to point out what difference they make to our understanding of science as a whole. This goal is pursued by means of comparison. The program of social constructivism in natural science has produced alternative but parallel concepts, embodied in an alternative and parallel vocabulary. The contrast between this vocabulary and that of hermeneutics and phenomenology reveals, so I argue, the advantages of the latter. But actually it does more: It reveals as well the pre-understanding or prejudgment of science embedded in each approach. (shrink)