Despite the significant number of critical analyses devoted to the subject, the precise definition of the famed crisis-notion that lies at the heart of Husserl’s last work remains controversial. The aim of this article is to defend and expand the account of Husserl’s notion of the crisis of philosophy and of the resulting crisis of the European sciences that I have developed in a number of publications. This will be done by further exploring the notion of the meaningfulness of the (...) sciences for life as well as its relation to their scientificity. Based on this result, I will then respond to some objections advanced against my proposal, and I will present further arguments to the effect that the crisis of philosophy consists in the collapse of its pretension to be scientific, and the consequent crisis of the European sciences consists in the resulting enigmatic character of their scientificity. (shrink)

Kultūrinių objektyvacijų dinamiką Husserlis įvardija sedimentacijos terminu, kuris apima atrastos prasmės formulavimą materialiose juslinėse išraiškose ir šių pasyviai egzistuojančių reikšmių reaktyvavimą. Šiame straipsnyje analizuojama sedimentacijos samprata susiejant ją su Husserlio apmąstymais apie kultūros krizę. Skirtingai nuo įprastų Husserlio kultūros filosofijos interpretacijų, teigiančių, kad mokslų krizė kyla dėl jų moksliškumo neadekvatumo ir negebėjimo spręsti gyvenimo prasmės problemų, aš teigiu, kad krizė gali būti suprasta kaip sedimentacijos dvilypumo rezultatas. Sedimentacijos ne tik išsaugo žinias, bet ir sukuria iliuziją, kad žinios atkuria pačios save. (...) Husserlis apmąstydamas kultūros krizę nuo teorinės filosofijos gręžiasi į praktinę filosofiją. (shrink)

Phenomenologists usually insist that their approach involves going “back” to and “starting” with technoscientific experience—that is, returning to the actual existing or living through of technoscientific life—after centuries of privileging the analysis of how things are “objectively” known and denigrating accounts of how they are “subjectively” lived with. But then who says this and how is this understood? “Who” is really a phenomenologist, when so many diverse thinkers claim the title? This paper considers some of the reasons why this is (...) such a difficult question and argues that it is wrong to look for The Answer to it. (shrink)

The paper deals primarily with the standard question in what exactly, according to Husserl, consists the crisis of the European sciences. In the literature so far, there have been two tendencies on this question, one focusing on the loss of the sciences’ meaningfulness for life, the other emphasizing the inadequacy of their scientificity. Instead of arguing for one of these two options or for some sort of combination of both, another interpretation of this topic will be suggested. The focus will (...) be on Husserl’s notion of historicity and its connection with the concept of life-world. It will be argued that it is the historical detachment of sciences from ideas and consequently the sphere of meaning altogether which lies at the core of their ill state. On this basis, it will show that Husserl’s approach to science in Crisis is actually double. For one, it is an attempt to supplement science with a philosophical justification. The other is a historical de-construction of scientific objectivism as a misleading metaphysical claim concerning the lived world. This second, historical approach is developed exclusively in the Crisis. However, it does bring out questions leading to rethinking the meaning and goals of transcendental phenomenology itself. (shrink)