In this paper, I argue that Darwin's On the Origin of Species can be interpreted as the culmination of an extended exercise of what Kant called ‘the reflecting power of judgement’ that issued in a form of reasoning that Hegel associates with inference by analogy and that Peirce associates with hypothesis and later assimilates to abduction. After some exegetical and rationally reconstructive work, I support this reading by showing that Darwin's theory of natural selection gave us a way of understanding (...) the purposive character of organic generation and growth that does not rely on an analogy with intentional agency and outlining some of the uses to which this new understanding was put in reasoning about mind and society by American intellectuals in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the process I hope to shed some light on the relationship between mechanistic and purposive explanation in judgements of nature. (shrink)

One of the most interesting debates in Hegel scholarship today comes from the question of how to interpret Hegel’s treatment of contradiction in the Science of Logic.1 Some interpreters claim that Hegel defiantly disregards the basic law of noncontradiction, which states that something cannot both be and not be in the same time, manner, or place, proposing instead that for Hegel true contradictions really do exist, and not only in rational conception but equally in the very fabric of reality. However, (...) other interpreters propose less direct readings of Hegel’s thesis from productive contradiction, either by limiting Hegel’s conception of contradiction to only certain forms, such as only in... (shrink)

In this article I consider the normative and axiological dimension of Simmel’s thought. Building on previous interpretations, I argue that although Simmel cannot be interpreted as a systematic normative theorist, the issue of values and the normative standpoint can nevertheless be traced in various aspects of his multifarious work. This interpretive turn attempts to link Simmel’s obscure theory of value with his epistemological relationism. Relationism may offer a counterweight to Simmel’s value-pluralism, since it points to normative elements (e.g. internal teleology, (...) justice) that can contribute to the reconciliation between incommensurablity of forms and totality. Axiological and normative concerns (of a Hegelian source) survive also in his metaphysics of life, pointing beyond a merely Bergsonian and conservative Lebensphilosophie. I conclude with some thoughts on how this normative rethinking of Simmel’s thought can contribute towards more adequate appreciations of Simmel’s overall theory. (shrink)