The essence of an accident consists in its relationship to a substance. For we should not imagine that an accident is a thing in its own right to which gets attached a relationship or a link to a substance in which that accident exists. For if so, an accident would be something in its own right, dependent on substance only as extrinsic, and on this view, an accident could be cognized apart from the substance. These outcomes are impossible, however. Hence, (...) what an accident is to something of the substance: either a measure, or a state, and so on. Thus, the Philosopher says that an accident has being only because it belongs to something that has being. (shrink)

According to theistic consubstantialism, the universe and God are essentially made of the same stuff. If theistic consubstantialism is correct, then God possesses the essential power to have knowledge de se of the contents of the mind of every conscious being internal to God. If theistic consubstantialism is false, then God lacks this essential property. So either God is essentially corporeal and possesses greater essential epistemic powers than God would have otherwise or God is essentially incorporeal and has a diminished (...) range of essential epistemic powers. In light of this dilemma, I argue that theists should accept theistic consubstantialism. (shrink)