This article examines the philosophical sources for Kant's interpretation of Plato's Republic and its impact on his conception of the ideal state. I argue that Kant's knowledge of Plato was not derived from Plato's writings, but from secondary accounts. More specifically, I focus on four authors whose discussions of Plato influenced Kant's understanding of the perfect republic: Brucker, Cicero, Wolff, and Rousseau. Two main claims emerge. First, I show that Kant's appeal to the Republic intervenes in a longstanding debate about (...) the irrational and “enthusiastic” character of Platonic idealism. Second, I emphasize Rousseau's role in instigating Kant's interest in Plato and shaping his conception of the perfect, fully self‐legislating republic that serves as the regulative norm of the state which existing regimes can and should strive to emulate. The result of my analysis is a better understanding of Kant's relationship to Plato and Rousseau, as well as the philosophical motivations behind his version of the ideal republic. (shrink)

This essay argues that Kant’s conception of regulative ideas of practical reason introduced in the Critique of Pure Reason serves an important twofold function in his political philosophy. First, Kant’s version of the ideal, Platonic republic acts as the a priori paradigm of a rightful state to which existing regimes can and should conform. Second, Kant frames the regulative status of such practical ideas as a resolution of the conflict between the extremes of dogmatism and skepticism. In his principal political (...) writings from the 1790s—i. e., “Theory and Practice,” “Perpetual Peace,” and the Doctrine of Right—Kant draws on his account of practical ideas in the Critique to articulate a counterfactual norm of popular sovereignty that distinguishes his political standpoint from opponents on the left and the right. Radicals repeat the error of the dogmatists by affirming that the norm of collective self-legislation is completely attainable in experience. By contrast, conservatives make the mistake of the skeptics by denying that rational political standards can be applied to reality at all. I show that Kant reconciles these extremes through his model of gradual, non-violent political reform guided by the regulative ideal of a perfectly self-legislating state. (shrink)

In quest’articolo, articolo prenderò in esame i passi in cui Kant descrive la monadologia leibniziana come un “concetto platonico” del mondo, ossia come una descrizione del mondo intelligibile che non ha nulla a che vedere con la spiegazione del mondo fenomenico. In generale, vorrei mostrare che quest’interpretazione non va contrapposta a quella che lo stesso Kant aveva dato nella prima Critica, dove la monadologia era caratterizzata come un “sistema intellettuale del mondo”. Per fare ciò, risponderò a due domande. La prima (...) riguarda le ragioni che possono aver indotto Kant, in diverse occasioni, a presentare Leibniz come un precursore della teoria della soggettività dello spazio. La seconda riguarda il motivo per cui Kant associa costantemente la monadologia alla teoria platonica delle idee, mostrando come, in entrambi i casi, Kant intenda criticare qualsiasi possibilità di un transito dal mondo sensibile a quello intelligibile. Infine, cercherò di mostrare che, dietro questa lettura deflazionista della monadologia, c’è anche un’implicita autocritica alle tesi che Kant stesso ha sostenuto nella Dissertatio del 1770. (shrink)

Minha comunicação pretende apresentar um estudo da figura do gênio em Schopenhauer. A preocupação fundamental será a questão da especificidade da obra de arte em Schopenhauer como modo de conhecimento, a saber, “como metafísica do belo”. Nessa via analisaremos a característica própria do gênio em Schopenhauer, buscando estabelecer suas referências ao gênio em Kant, e questionando as afinidades e contrastes entre ambas as concepções. Trata-se de inquirir, por meio da filosofia da arte de Schopenhauer, se o gênio, na concepção pós-kantiana, (...) guarda as mesmas características que as que lhe foram atribuídas por Kant na terceira Crítica. A intenção é a de pesquisar o alcance dessa questão diante da acusação de uma volta de Schopenhauer a uma posição pré-crítica.This presentation consists in a study on the notion of genius in Schopenhauer. To this purpose I concentrate attention on the specificity of the author’s conception of the work of art as a mode of knowledge, i.e., “as a metaphysics of beauty”. Within this scope I analyze the proper characteristic of genius in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, targeting to establish his references to genius as conceived by Kant. Such analysis makes it possible to consider the affinities and contrasts existing between both conceptions, which by its turn allow us to inquire – through Schopenhauer’s philosophy – whether the post-Kantian conception of genius preserves the characteristics that Kant attributed to it in the third Critique. My general intention is to explore the possibilities of this question as one of the keys to evaluate the accusation done to Schopenhauer that he would have retrogressed to a pre-critical position. (shrink)