ABSTRACTIn the Black Notebooks, Heidegger ascribes in 1938/9 to the Jewish race an “empty rationality and calculative ability,” in his view the cause of its “worldlessness.” To assess this characterisation, I present Heidegger’s theories of history as a decline in Being and Time and in his later history of Being. For this purpose, I discuss his notions of Rechnen, Machenschaft, and Geviert, several existentialia from Being and Time, and Heidegger’s identification of modern machination and modern technology. Furthermore, I examine Heidegger’s (...) attitude toward the Jews and the Holocaust. I present his alignment of the unconcealment of modernity and the Jewish race, and compare his theory of machination with the texts “Positionality” and “The Question concerning Technology”. Heidegger’s notes about the Jews in the Black Notebooks after 1944 confirm that he tried “to silence Auschwitz silently,” as I already argued in a paper from 1995. (shrink)

O artigo busca discutir as concepções de ciência nos pensamentos tardios de Heidegger e Heisenberg. Ambos, o físico e o filósofo, sugerem que o mundo técnico-científico nos impõe a tarefa de repensar o posicionamento humano em meio às coisas, sustentando que tal tarefa não poderia ser executada apenas pelo ser humano, devendo antes ser guiada por uma instância mais original da verdade. Entretanto, enquanto Heisenberg acredita que a ciência pode alcançar aquilo que ele denomina de “ordem interna do mundo”, Heidegger, (...) ao contrário, toma a ciência como um pensamento não essencial, na medida em que ela não percebe a sua própria essência e passa ao largo da “verdade do ser”. O artigo encerra com a questão de saber se a desumanização da ciência sugerida por Heidegger e Heisenberg, a pesar da acuidade e profundidade de seus diagnósticos sobre o mundo tecnológico, não impediria um diálogo entre ciência e filosofia. (shrink)

: Catherine Malabou is a professor of philosophy at Paris-Nanterre. A collaborator and student of Jacques Derrida, her work shares some of his interest in rigorous protocols of reading, and a willingness to attend to the undercurrents of over-read and "too familiar" texts. But, as she points out, this orientation was shared by Hegel himself. Arguing against Heidegger, Kojève, and other critics of Hegel, the book in which this Introduction appears puts Hegel back on the map of the present.

Heidegger understands technology as a mode of revealing, i.e., a way of discovering and comprehending reality, which is not merely the result of human invention and operation, but rather a destiny which surpasses and addresses the human being, insofar as its root lay deep in the very advent of philosophy, of the West and it position toward being as a whole. How can we still have interest in such ontological conception of technology as a destiny? What is its topical relevance (...) for the present? What is its contribution to think the transformative action of technology, i.e., the opportunity and threat it brings with it? (shrink)

By drawing on the insights of a number of continental as well as Asian thinkers, this article reflects on the "significance" of comparative philosophy—both in the sense of discussing the "meaning" and in the sense of arguing for the "importance" of this endeavor. Encountering another culture allows one to deepen one's self-understanding by learning to "see oneself from the outside"; this deeper self-understanding in turn allows one to listen to what the other culture has to say. These two moments, or (...) movements, are interdependent and mutually supportive. Without the step back to self-understanding, we unknowingly reduce the other to the unrecognized categories of our own thinking; but without encountering another culture, our understanding of our own culture remains shallow. This article argues that an engagement with non-Western philosophy, particularly with a set of traditions as rich and radically different as those of Asian thought, can and should take place as a hermeneutic circling between self-understanding and openness to encounter: the dialogical step back and step forward are mutually supportive endeavors. For only by way of such dialogue do we attain the concrete freedom and possibility for transformation and change, that is, the ability to critically and creatively develop old customs or modes of thought and to critically and creatively adopt new ones. Moreover, only through such dialogue can we learn to not only let others be, but to share insights with them, and to build together a global community which neither reifies nor abolishes cultural differences. (shrink)

L'envahissement de l'espace par la technique est un fait accompli. Non seulement l'espace physique et l'espace organisationnel, mais aussi l'espace du discours et celui de l'écriture sont déjà bien occupés. La technique est en effet devenue un sujet de conversation quotidien, remplit les colonnes de toutes sortes de journaux et de revues et fait l'objet d'un nombre considérable d'études monographiques. Alors pourquoi ce titre encore qui risque d'aggraver le resserrement des habitants des lieux et hâter leur étouffement?

In his essay, ‘Heidegger's Categories in Sein und Zeit’, Robert Brandom argues that Heidegger, particularly in the notion of Zuhandenheit, anticipates his own normatively pragmatist conception of intentionality. He attempts to demonstrate this by marshalling short passages from right across the relevant sections of Sein und Zeit in such a way that they do seem to say what Brandom claims. But does one reach the same conclusion when one examines, more or less in sentence‐by‐sentence fashion, the large slab of text (...) in which Heidegger introduces the notion of Zuhandenheit? I believe not. First, however, let us look at how Brandom reads Heidegger, in particular, how he interprets the notion of Zuhandenheit, which, in contrast both to Macquarrie and Robinson and to Brandom, I shall translate as ready‐to‐handedness.1. (shrink)

Hay dos frases que quisiera comentar aquí: “No hay naturaleza”, de Jean-Luc Nancy, y “el ser es el Capital”, de Frédéric Neyrat. La intersección de ellas pasa por Heidegger y su idea de Gestell. No es objetivo de este texto hablar “sobre la naturaleza”, como lo hicieron los primeros griegos, ni hacer una historia del concepto; más bien intentaremos realizar un trazo entre naturaleza y técnica utilizando los conceptos de Gestell, Ecotecnia y consumación, de Heidegger, Nancy y Neyrat, respectivamente. Este (...) “entre” (al estilo heideggeriano) indicará una figura epocal: uno de los trazos de nuestro mundo globalizado marca esta fusión de naturaleza y artificio. (shrink)

Im Rahmen der Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Covid-19- Pandemie sind die Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Deutschland und vielen anderen Ländern dazu angehalten, weitestgehend in ihren Privatwohnungen zu bleiben. Wurde der Wert des Privaten in der liberalen Tradition gerade im Rückzug von und als Schutz vor der politischen Öffentlichkeit sowie administrativen Eingriffen gesehen, wird das Private damit nun unmittelbar politischen Anforderungen unterworfen. Indem die Kontrolle über die Gewährung und Verwehrung des Zugangs zum Privaten eingeschränkt worden ist und keinen frei gewählten Rückzugsort (...) mehr darstellt, verändert sich auch die Wahrnehmung lokaler Privatheit. Dabei stellt sich die Frage, ob die lokale Privatheit ihren Wert verliert und hier bereits von einer „Kolonialisierung“ der lokalen Privatheit gesprochen werden muss. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll ausgehend von feministischer Kritik liberaler Verständnisse lokaler Privatheit argumentiert werden, dass die These der strikten Trennung von Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit empirisch unzutreffend und normativ unangemessen ist. Davon ausgehend können Legitimitätsbedingungen öffentlichen Eingreifens in die lokale Privatheit entwickelt und die pandemiebedingten Maßnahmen hinsichtlich ihrer Legitimität überprüft werden. Dabei wird argumentiert, dass sich hierbei zwar nur eingeschränkt von einer Kolonialisierung sprechen lässt, sich die Wahrnehmung der lokalen Privatheit im Zuge der Ausgangs- und Kontaktbeschränkungen jedoch zu Lasten ihres Wertes verändert hat. (shrink)