When he formulated the program of neurophenomenology, Francisco Varela suggested a balanced methodological dissolution of the hard problem of consciousness. I show that his dissolution is a paradigm which imposes itself onto seemingly opposite views, including materialist approaches. I also point out that Varela's revolutionary epistemological ideas are gaining wider acceptance as a side effect of a recent controversy between hermeneutists and eliminativists. Finally, I emphasize a structural parallel between the science of consciousness and the distinctive features of quantum mechanics. (...) This parallel, together with the former convergences, point towards the common origin of the main puzzles of both quantum mechanics and the philosophy of mind: neglect of the constitutive blindspot of objective knowledge. (shrink)

A prominent way through which wave-particle duality has been ascribed to photons is by illustrating their “wave-like” behaviour in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer and “particle-like” behaviour in the anti-correlation experiment. This duality has been formulated in two ways. Some have based the claim on the complementarity principle. This formulation, however, has already been shown to be problematic. Others have made a much simpler duality claim by considering that single-photons are analogous to waves and particles in the above experiments. I criticise this (...) formulation by arguing that the analogies cannot be distinctly established. Thus, this duality claim is found to be unsubstantiated. (shrink)

The theory of quantum mechanics has often been thought to show an affinity with logical empiricism: in both, observation plays a central role, and questions about what is unobservable are dismissed. However, there were also strong tensions between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and implications drawn from quantum physics. In the 1920s and 1930s, many physicists thought that quantum mechanics revealed a limit to what could be known scientifically, and this opened the door to a wide range of (...) speculations, in which quantum mechanics was connected with free will, organic life, psychology, and religion—speculations in which many leading quantum physicists were engaged. Members of the Vienna Circle, such as Frank and Schlick, looked at quantum mechanics for a confirmation of their empiricist views, but they were at the same time critical about these wider implications drawn from quantum mechanics, which in their eyes were connected with broader mystical and irrational trends in society. They engaged in particular with the views of Bohr and Jordan, both of whom expressed a sympathy for logical empiricism while at the same time arguing for claims that proved hard to reconcile with the scientific world conception of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)

I argue that instead of a rather narrow focus on N. Bohr's account of complementarity as a particular and perhaps obscure metaphysical or epistemological concept (or as being motivated by such a concept), we should consider it to result from pursuing a particular method of studying physical phenomena. More precisely, I identify a strong undercurrent of Baconian method of induction in Bohr's work that likely emerged during his experimental training and practice. When its development is analyzed in light of Baconian (...) induction, complementarity emerges as a levelheaded rather than a controversial account, carefully elicited from a comprehensive grasp of the available experimental basis, shunning hasty metaphysically motivated generalizations based on partial experimental evidence. In fact, Bohr's insistence on the “classical” nature of observations in experiments, as well as the counterintuitive synthesis of wave and particle concepts that have puzzled scholars, seem a natural outcome (an updated instance) of the inductive method. Such analysis clarifies the intricacies of early Schrödinger's critique of the account as well as Bohr's response, which have been misinterpreted in the literature. If adequate, the analysis may lend considerable support to the view that Bacon explicated the general terms of an experimentally minded strand of the scientific method, developed and refined by scientists in the following three centuries. (shrink)

Interference of more and more massive objects provides a spectacular confirmation of quantum theory. It is usually regarded as support for “wave–particle duality” and in an extension of this duality even as support for “complementarity”. We first give an outline of the historical development of these notions. Already here it becomes evident that they are hard to define rigorously, i.e. have mainly a heuristic function. Then we discuss recent interference experiments of large and complex molecules which seem to support this (...) heuristic function of “duality”. However, we show that in these experiments the diffraction of a delocalized center-of-mass wave function depends on the interaction of the localized structure of the molecule with the diffraction element. Thus, the molecules display “dual features” at the same time, which contradicts the usual understanding of wave–particle duality. We conclude that the notion of “wave–particle duality” deserves no place in modern quantum physics. (shrink)

Einstein's philosophy of physics (as clarified by Fine, Howard, and Held) was predicated on his Trennungsprinzip, a combination of separability and locality, without which he believed objectification, and thereby "physical thought" and "physical laws", to be impossible. Bohr's philosophy (as elucidated by Hooker, Scheibe, Folse, Howard, Held, and others), on the other hand, was grounded in a seemingly different doctrine about the possibility of objective knowledge, namely the necessity of classical concepts. In fact, it follows from Raggio's Theorem in algebraic (...) quantum theory that - within an appropriate class of physical theories - suitable mathematical translations of the doctrines of Bohr and Einstein are equivalent. Thus - upon our specific formalization - quantum mechanics accommodates Einstein's Trennungsprinzip if and only if it is interpreted a la Bohr through classical physics. Unfortunately, the protagonists themselves failed to discuss their differences in this constructive way, since their debate was dominated by Einstein's ingenious but ultimately flawed attempts to establish the "incompleteness" of quantum mechanics. This aspect of their debate may still be understood and appreciated, however, as reflecting a much deeper and insurmountable disagreement between Bohr and Einstein about the knowability of Nature. Using the theological controversy on the knowability of God as a analogy, we can say that Einstein was a Spinozist, whereas Bohr could be said to be on the side of Maimonides. Thus Einstein's off-the-cuff characterization of Bohr as a 'Talmudic philosopher' was spot-on. (shrink)

Einstein's philosophy of physics was predicated on his Trennungsprinzip, a combination of separability and locality, without which he believed objectification, and thereby "physical thought" and "physical laws", to be impossible. Bohr's philosophy, on the other hand, was grounded in a seemingly different doctrine about the possibility of objective knowledge, namely the necessity of classical concepts. In fact, it follows from Raggio's Theorem in algebraic quantum theory that - within an appropriate class of physical theories - suitable mathematical translations of the (...) doctrines of Bohr and Einstein are equivalent. Thus - upon our specific formalization - quantum mechanics accommodates Einstein's Trennungsprinzip if and only if it is interpreted a la Bohr through classical physics. Unfortunately, the protagonists themselves failed to discuss their differences in this constructive way, since their debate was dominated by Einstein's ingenious but ultimately flawed attempts to establish the "incompleteness" of quantum mechanics. This aspect of their debate may still be understood and appreciated, however, as reflecting a much deeper and insurmountable disagreement between Bohr and Einstein about the knowability of Nature. Using the theological controversy on the knowability of God as a analogy, we can say that Einstein was a Spinozist, whereas Bohr could be said to be on the side of Maimonides. Thus Einstein's off-the-cuff characterization of Bohr as a 'Talmudic philosopher' was spot-on. (shrink)

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Following Birkhoff and von Neumann, quantum logic has traditionally been based on the lattice of closed linear subspaces of some Hubert space, or, more generally, on the lattice of projections in a von Neumann algebra A. Unfortunately, the logical interpretation of these lattices is impaired by their nondistributivity and by various other problems. We show that a possible resolution of these difficulties, suggested by the ideas of Bohr, emerges if instead of single projections one considers elementary propositions to be families (...) of projections indexed by a partially ordered set C(A) of appropriate commutative subalgebras of A. In fact, to achieve both maximal generality and ease of use within topos theory, we assume that A is a so-called Rickart C*-algebra and that C(A) consists of all unital commutative Rickart C*-subalgebras of A. Such families of projections form a Hey ting algebra in a natural way, so that the associated propositional logic is intuitionistic: distributivity is recovered at the expense of the law of the excluded middle. Subsequently, generalizing an earlier computation for n x n matrices, we prove that the Heyting algebra thus associated to A arises as a basis for the internal Gelfand spectrum (in the sense of Banaschewski-Mulvey) of the "Bohrification" A̱ of A, which is a commutative Rickart C*-algebra in the topos of functors from C(A) to the category of sets. We explain the relationship of this construction to partial Boolean algebras and Bruns-Lakser completions. Finally, we establish a connection between probability measures on the lattice of projections on a Hubert space H and probability valuations on the internal Gelfand spectrum of A̱ for A = B(H). (shrink)

We relate notions of complementarity in three layers of quantum mechanics: (i) von Neumann algebras, (ii) Hilbert spaces, and (iii) orthomodular lattices. Taking a more general categorical perspective of which the above are instances, we consider dagger monoidal kernel categories for (ii), so that (i) become (sub)endohomsets and (iii) become subobject lattices. By developing a ‘point-free’ definition of copyability we link (i) commutative von Neumann subalgebras, (ii) classical structures, and (iii) Boolean subalgebras.

As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part (...) of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. So the aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations. (shrink)

Is quantum mechanics about ‘states’? Or is it basically another kind of probability theory? It is argued that the elementary formalism of quantum mechanics operates as a well-justified alternative to ‘classical’ instantiations of a probability calculus. Its providing a general framework for prediction accounts for its distinctive traits, which one should be careful not to mistake for reflections of any strange ontology. The suggestion is also made that quantum theory unwittingly emerged, in Schrödinger’s formulation, as a ‘lossy’ by-product of a (...) quantum-mechanical variant of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As it turns out, the effectiveness of quantum theory qua predictive algorithm makes up for the computational impracticability of that master equation. (shrink)