Delusions are often portrayed as paradigmatic instances of incomprehensibility and meaninglessness. Here we investigate the relationship between delusions and meaning from a philosophical perspective, integrating arguments and evidence from cognitive psychology and phenomenological psychopathology. We review some of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to two claims about delusions and meaning: delusions are meaningful, despite being described as irrational and implausible beliefs; some delusions can also enhance the sense that one’s life is meaningful, supporting agency and creativity in some circumstances. (...) Delusions are not incomprehensible representations of reality. Rather, they can help make sense of one’s unusual experiences and in some circumstances even support one’s endeavours, albeit temporarily and imperfectly. Acknowledging that delusions have meaning and can also give meaning to people’s lives has implications for our understanding of psychotic symptoms and for addressing the stigma associated with psychiatric conditions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe distinction between minimal self and narrative self has gained ground in recent discussions of selfhood. In this article, this distinction is reassessed by analysing Zahavi and Gallagher’s account of selfhood and supplementing it with Husserl’s concept of person. I argue that Zahavi and Gallagher offer two compatible and complementary notions of self. Nevertheless, the relationship between minimal self and narrative self requires further clarification. Especially the embeddedness of self, the interplay between passivity and activity, and the problems of uniqueness (...) and persistence are better understood with Husserl’s analysis of person and its central concepts of position-taking, habitualities, and overall style. The embeddedness of self is elucidated by outlining how person is related to its environment, to other people, and to its past. This relational notion of self is both passively constituted and actively shaped: person mediates between minimal self characterized by perspectival ownership... (shrink)

IntroductionIdeas of reference are frequent in psychopathology, mainly in psychotic disorders. The frequency of IR and preoccupation about them are related to the psychotic dimension, and to a lesser extent, to negative or emotional disorganized dimensions. Aberrant salience, has been proposed as an indicator of the onset of psychosis, particularly of schizophrenia. This study analyzed the mediating role of AS, disorganized symptoms and preoccupation about IR in the relationship between IR and the psychotic dimension.MethodThe sample consisted of 330 participants, 62.4% (...) of whom were women aged 18–79. The Referential Thinking Scale, the Aberrant Salience Inventory, and the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale were administered.ResultsEvidence of a partial mediation model showed that the relationships between IR and the psychotic dimension were mediated jointly by AS and the disorganized dimension, and preoccupation about IR no longer had a role. This relationship was significantly influenced by participant age. The variables in the model explained 54.16% of the variance.ConclusionThe model proposed enabled a set of vulnerabilities to be predicted that could lead to a high-risk general pathological state and proneness to psychosis in particular. These findings are discussed with regard to early detection and prevention of psychosis. (shrink)