- Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.details
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“Is” and “ought” in cognitive science.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):344-345.details
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Kyburg on practical certainty.Willam L. Harper - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):251-252.details
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To err is human.Maya Bar-Hillel & Avishai Margalit - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):246-248.details
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Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.details
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Mental models: Rationality, representation and process.D. W. Green - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):352-353.details
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Architecture and algorithms: Power sharing for mental models.Robert Inder - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):354-354.details
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Mental models and nonmonotonic reasoning.Nick Chater - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):340-341.details
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Deduction by children and animals: Does it follow the Johnson-Laird & Byrne model?Hank Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):344-344.details
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On rules, models and understanding.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):345-346.details
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Précis of Deduction.Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):323-333.details
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Competence, performance, and ignorance.Robert W. Weisberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-358.details
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Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.details
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Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.details
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Illusions in Reasoning.Sangeet S. Khemlani & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (1):11-35.details
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Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.details
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Conjunctive bliss.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):254-255.details
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Nonsentential representation and nonformality.Keith Stenning & Jon Oberlander - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):365-366.details
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Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.details
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Mental models or formal rules?Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Ruth M. J. Byrne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):368-380.details
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Unjustified presuppositions of competence.Leah Savion - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):364-365.details
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Models for deontic deduction.K. I. Manktelow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):357-357.details
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Mental models and the tractability of everyday reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.details
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Deduction and degrees of belief.David Over - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):361-362.details
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Deductive reasoning: What are taken to be the premises and how are they interpreted?Samuel Fillenbaum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):348-349.details
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On modes of explanation.Rachel Joffe Falmagne - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):346-347.details
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Mental models cannot exclude mental logic and make little sense without it.Martin D. S. Braine - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):338-339.details
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The persistence of cognitive illusions.Persi Diaconis & David Freedman - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):333-334.details
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Performing competently.Lola L. Lopes - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):343-344.details
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Can any statements about human behavior be empirically validated?Baruch Fischoff - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):336-337.details
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The importance of cognitive illusions.Peter Wason - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):356-356.details
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Independent forebrain and brainstem controls for arousal and sleep.Jaime R. Villablanca - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):494-496.details
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Human rationality: Essential conflicts, multiple ideals.Jonathan E. Adler - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):245-246.details
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Rational belief.Henry E. Kyburg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231-245.details
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Normative theories of rationality: Occam's razor, Procrustes' bed?Lola L. Lopes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255-256.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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Mental models, more or less.Thad A. Polk - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):362-363.details
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More models just means more difficulty.N. E. Wetherick - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):367-368.details
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Tractability considerations in deduction.James M. Crawford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):343-343.details
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On defining rationality unreasonably.J. St B. T. Evans & P. Pollard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):335-336.details
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Unphilosophical probability.Sandy L. Zabell - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-359.details
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Cohen on contraposition.N. E. Wetherick - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):358-358.details
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Psychology and the foundations of rational belief.Ryan D. Tweney, Michael E. Doherty & Clifford R. Mynatt - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):262-263.details
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Scientific thinking and mental models.Ryan D. Tweney - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):366-367.details
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L. J. Cohen, again: On the evaluation of inductive intuitions.Amos Tversky - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):354-356.details
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Rational animal?Simon Blackburn - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):331-332.details
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Can children's irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?Sam Glucksberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):337-338.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Inferential competence: right you are, if you think you are.Stephen P. Stich - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):353-354.details
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