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  1. Continental Philosophy of Science.Babette Babich - 2007 - In Constantin V. Boundas (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to the Twentieth Century Philosophies. Edinburgh. University of Edinburgh Press. pp. 545--558.
    Continental philosophies of science tend to exemplify holistic themes connecting order and contingency, questions and answers, writers and readers, speakers and hearers. Such philosophies of science also tend to feature a fundamental emphasis on the historical and cultural situatedness of discourse as significant; relevance of mutual attunement of speaker and hearer; necessity of pre-linguistic cognition based in human engagement with a common socio-cultural historical world; role of narrative and metaphor as explanatory; sustained emphasis on understanding questioning; truth seen as horizonal, (...)
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  • Towards a Critical Philosophy of Science: Continental Beginnings and Bugbears, Whigs, and Waterbears.Babette Babich - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):343-391.
    Continental philosophy of science has developed alongside mainstream analytic philosophy of science. But where continental approaches are inclusive, analytic philosophies of science are not–excluding not merely Nietzsche’s philosophy of science but Gödel’s philosophy of physics. As a radicalization of Kant, Nietzsche’s critical philosophy of science puts science in question and Nietzsche’s critique of the methodological foundations of classical philology bears on science, particularly evolution as well as style (in art and science). In addition to the critical (in Mach, Nietzsche, Heidegger (...)
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  • L’hommage de Stephen Jay Gould à l’évolutionnisme de Nietzsche.Barbara Stiegler - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):409-453.
    En 2002, le paléontologue américain Stephen Jay Gould a rendu un surprenant hommage à l’évolutionnisme de Nietzsche. J’explique ici leur proximité critique, déjà annoncée par Daniel Dennett en 1995, de trois façons différentes. Je montre d’abord qu’elle permet à Gould de se départir du partage dualiste entre sciences de la nature et sciences humaines et sociales, dans lequel Dennett essaie de l’enfermer. Je montre ensuite qu’elle ouvre, loin de toute tentation d’instaurer de nouveaux «crochets célestes», des voies fécondes et inattendues (...)
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