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  1. Risk Sensitive Credit.Maura Priest - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):703-726.
    Credit theorists claim to explain the incompatibility of luck and knowledge and also what makes knowledge valuable. If the theory works as well as they think, it accomplishes a lot. Unsurprisingly, however, some epistemologists remain unsure. Jennifer Lackey, for instance, proposes a dilemma that suggests credit theories are either too strong or too weak. Her criticism has been hard to overcome. This paper suggests a modified account of knowledge as credit for true belief that allows credit theorists to better counter (...)
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  • Evidentially embedded epistemic entitlement.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4907-4926.
    Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are indeed basic beliefs with default entitlement status, (...)
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