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  1. On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...)
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  • Comprehending the Whole Person: On Expanding Jaspers' Notion of Empathy.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - forthcoming - In Aaron Mishara, Marcin Moskalewicz, Michael A. Schwartz & Alexander Kranjec (eds.), Phenomenological Neuropsychiatry: How Patient Experience Bridges Clinic with Clinical Practice. Springer.
    In this chapter, we explain how Karl Jaspers’ concept of empathy can be expanded by drawing upon the tradition of philosophical phenomenology. In the first section, we offer an account of Jaspers' concepts of empathy and incomprehensibility as he develops them in General Psychopathology and “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology.” In the second section, we survey the recent literature on overcoming Jaspers' notion of incomprehensibility and expanding his concept of empathy. In the third section, we outline the levels of investigation (...)
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  • Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.
    In contemporary philosophy of mind and psychiatry, schizophrenic thought insertion is often used as a validating or invalidating counterexample in various theories about how we experience ourselves. Recent work has taken cases of thought insertion to provide an invalidating counterexample to the Humean denial of self-experience, arguing that deficiencies of agency in thought insertion suggest that we normally experience ourselves as the agent of our thoughts. In this paper, I argue that appealing to a breakdown in the sense of agency (...)
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  • “An illness of isolation, a disease of disconnection”: Depression and the erosion of we-experiences.Lucy Osler - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Depression is an affective disorder involving a significant change in an individual’s emotional and affective experiences. While the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition mentions that social impairment may occur in depression, first-person reports of depression consistently name isolation from others as a key feature of depression. I present a phenomenological analysis of how certain interpersonal relations are experienced in depression. In particular, I consider whether depressed individuals are able to enter into “we-experiences” with other people. We-experiences (...)
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  • Thought Insertion and the Minimal Self.Hane Htut Maung - 2021 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 14 (2):32-41.
    This paper contributes to the debate in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the relation between thought insertion in schizophrenia and the sense of selfhood. Some scholars have suggested that thought insertion presents a case where the sense of selfhood is lacking. Other scholars have disputed this by proposing that a form of minimal selfhood is a necessary feature of consciousness that is still present in thought insertion, albeit in a disturbed manner. Herein, I argue that the notion of minimal selfhood (...)
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  • crítica desde la fenomenología al análisis de la inserción de pensamiento de John Campbell.Federico Andrés Tovar Avendaño - 2022 - Humanitas Hodie 4 (1):H41a5.
    El creciente interés que han suscitado los fenómenos psiquiátricos en el ámbito académico ha favorecido el desarrollo de análisis interdisciplinarios que combinan la filosofía con campos como el de la medicina, las neurociencias y las ciencias cognitivas. Un ejemplo de esto es el trabajo de John Campbell quien ha intentado analizar el fenómeno de la inserción de pensamiento y la constitución de la agencia del pensamiento a la luz del modelo de la copia eferente desarrollado por Christopher Frith y otros (...)
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  • Phenomenology, Psychopathology, and Pre-Reflective Experience.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I introduce phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology by clarifying the kind of implicit experiences that phenomenologists are concerned with. In section one, I introduce the phenomenological concept of pre-reflective experience, focusing especially on its relation to the concept of implicit experience. In section two, I introduce the structure of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which has been studied extensively by both classical phenomenologists and contemporary phenomenological psychopathologists. In section three, I show how phenomenological psychopathologists rely on an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness (...)
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  • Attentional Structuring, Subjectivity, and the Ubiquity of Reflexive Inner Awareness.Amit Chaturvedi - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (9):3240-3279.
    Some have argued that a subject has an inner awareness of its conscious mental states by virtue of the non-introspective, reflexive awareness that any conscious state has of itself. But, what exactly is it like to have a ubiquitous and reflexive inner awareness of one’s conscious states, as distinct from one’s outer awareness of the apparent world? This essay derives a model of ubiquitous inner awareness (UIA) from Sebastian Watzl’s recent theory of attention as the activity of structuring consciousness into (...)
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  • Methods of data collection in psychopathology: the role of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews.Mads Gram Henriksen, Magnus Englander & Julie Nordgaard - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):9-30.
    Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the (...)
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  • The minimal self hypothesis.Timothy Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.
    For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have (...)
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  • Thought insertion without thought.Shivam Patel - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):955-973.
    There are a number of conflicting accounts of thought insertion, the delusion that the thoughts of another are inserted into one’s own mind. These accounts share the common assumption of _realism_: that the subject of thought insertion has a thought corresponding to the description of her thought insertion episode. I challenge the assumption by arguing for an anti-realist treatment of first-person reports of thought insertion. I then offer an alternative account, _simulationism_, according to which sufferers merely simulate having a thought (...)
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  • Is conscious thought immune to error through misidentification?Manuel García-Carpintero - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of “I”, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (“IEM”); first-personal claims are IEM in the use “as subject”, but not in the other use. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are not strictly speaking IEM; Gareth Evans disputed this. Similar issues have been debated regarding self-ascriptions of conscious thoughts based on first-personal awareness, in (...)
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  • Eidetic Variation: a Self-Correcting and Integrative Account.Jaakko Belt - 2021 - Axiomathes 32 (2):405-434.
    Edmund Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology seeks a priori knowledge of essences and eidetic laws pertaining to conscious experience and its objects. Husserl believes that such eidetic knowledge has a higher epistemic status than the inherently fallible empirical knowledge, but a closer reading of his work shows that even eidetic claims are subject to error and open to modification. In this article, I develop a self-correcting account of Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, arguing that eidetic variation plays a critical role in both (...)
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  • Thinking in schizophrenia and the social phenomenology of thought insertion.Pablo López-Silva - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense (...)
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  • Valoración primordial y corporalidad. Hacia una fenomenología de la afección.Juan Diego Bogotá Johnson - 2021 - Humanitas Hodie 3 (2):H32a2.
    Hay antecedentes del giro afectivo en los desarrollos fenomenológicos tempranos del siglo pasado. Particularmente, investigaciones genéticas llevadas a cabo por Husserl se adentran en la naturaleza del fenómeno afectivo. No obstante, esto se enmarca en un proyecto epistemológico más amplio, que tiene como consecuencia el hecho de que la afección no sea investigada a profundidad. El propósito de este artículo es retomar los descubrimientos de Husserl e ir más allá y aproximarse a una fenomenología sistemática del fenómeno afectivo. Para eso, (...)
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  • Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account.Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson & Louis Sass - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or “minimal self”. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly “essential” or “universal” nature of minimal self with respect to phenomenal awareness and (2) the (...)
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  • Allegedly impossible experiences.Sofia Jeppsson - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they (...)
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  • The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique.Daniel Wehinger - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):167-188.
    The claim that phenomenal consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness, in the sense of _mineness_, has gained momentum in recent years. In this paper, I discuss the main non-phenomenological, theoretical argument for this claim: the so-called “transcendental argument” for universal mineness (Zahavi 2018, p. 711), which, in essence, corresponds to Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of self-consciousness. I point out the potential of the transcendental argument, but most importantly its limitations. And I show that, even if successful, the argument cannot vindicate (...)
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  • Atribuciones de agencia mental Y el desafío desde la psicopatología.Pablo López-Silva - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (147):835-850.
    RESUMEN Una atribución de agencia mental es definida como el acto de asignar el inicio o autoría de un pensamiento en primera persona a un agente específico, esto, con el fin de generar grados suficientes de control sobre nuestra vida cognitiva. Si bien esta estrategia es fundamental para distinguir diferentes tipos de estados cognitivos - tales como deliberaciones, razonamientos, juicios, entre otros -, muchos autores han indicado que también es clave para entender experiencias cognitivas psicopatológicas en psicosis. Este artículo revisa (...)
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