Kantian virtue can be construed as a condition of an agent which secures adherence to the requirements of morality in the face of the ever-present possibility of inner conflict with counter-ethical considerations. This paper claims that this conception of virtue does not fit in well with one essential characteristic of the virtuous agent; that he or she is attentive to the well-being of others. After some preliminary remarks about virtue-related evaluations, the paper criticises the Kantian conception of virtue in the (...) light of certain characteristics of ethical attentiveness. The paper concludes by developing a notion of ethical habituation which includes the training of attention. (shrink)

It is often remarked that Iris Murdoch’s thought deeply influenced the landscape of twentieth-century moral philosophy. It is certainly true that she inspired a generation of Anglo-American philosophers who sought to critique the moral philosophy of their day. However, these philosophers drew almost exclusively from her early philosophical thought, most notably The Sovereignty of Good. When it came to Murdoch’s second book, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (MGM), moral philosophers and scholars alike found it hard to place within contemporary (...) moral philosophy.Our aim in this paper is to offer a reading of MGM that is resolute in its commitment to do justice to the book’s resistance against domestication within standard moral philosophy, while taking Murdoch at her word when she writes that her “whole argument can be read as moral philosophy” (MGM, 740). This commitment allows us to read MGM as an integrated unity. More importantly, it allows us to reassess Murdoch’s place in twentieth-century philosophy and to propose MGM as one of the works seeking to transform it. Our hope is that our reading will interest any philosopher who feels that something essential is missing in current typical practices in the discipline. (shrink)

On dit et répète que, dans la République, Platon a chassé les poètes de la cité. L’affirmation n’est pas fausse, à condition d’ajouter plusieurs réserves et précisions qui, si on les prend au sérieux, donnent une image très différente de l’attitude de Platon envers la poésie. La cité a besoin de poètes : une partie essentielle de l’éducation des gardiens (livres II-III) repose sur la musique-poésie, et c’est bien pourquoi Platon s’attarde longuement sur les règles à respecter en la matière. (...) Cette poésie soumise à la censure n’est pourtant pas la seule admise : vis-à-vis de la poésie existante (Homère, les Tragiques), le philosophe adopte une position nuancée : elle a beaucoup de charme, et si elle a beaucoup de défauts, il n’est pourtant pas impossible de l’accueillir dans la cité pour peu que les citoyens soient munis de l’antidote fourni par l’éducation. C’est à cette dernière qu’on doit apporter tous ses soins, à celle des gardiens mais aussi à celle des citoyens ordinaires. (shrink)

The word «fake» and its several synonyms touch on a number of ontological and mimetic issues that since Plato have led directly to contemporary debates. In the present survey we will try to outline a «grammar of fake» through three points: a) the issue of pseudos in Plato and its impact on contemporaneity; b) the notion of hyperreality as absolute fake; c) the dimension of operative fake, grasped in its postmodern enucleation.

This paper involves constructive exegesis. I consider the contrast between morality and art as sketched in Philippa Foot's 1972 paper of the same name, ‘Morality and Art’. I then consider how her views might have shifted against the background of the conceptual landscape afforded by Natural Goodness, though the topic of the relation of art and morality is not explicitly explored in that work. The method is to set out some textual fragments from Natural Goodness that can be arranged for (...) a tentative Footian ‘aesthetics’. I bring them into conversation with some ideas from Iris Murdoch to elucidate what I think the import may be, for Foot, of depicting human form. (shrink)

This thesis comprises a study of the ethical thought of Iris Murdoch with special emphasis, as evidenced by the title, on how morality is intimately connected to self-improvement aiming at perfection and how the study of fiction has an important role to play in our strive towards bettering ourselves within the framework set by Murdoch’s moral philosophy.

This thesis regards the ancient Pythagorean-Platonic idea of heavenly harmony as a philosophical paradox: stars are silent, music is not. The idea of ‘star music’ contains several potential opposites, including imagination and sense perception, the temporal and the eternal, transcendence and theophany, and others. The idea of ‘star music’ as a paradox can become a gateway to a different understanding of the universe, and a vehicle for a shift to a new – and yet very ancient – form of consciousness. (...) The ancient Greeks had a holistic form of consciousness, which was continually intermingling with a transpersonal dimension. This ancient state of consciousness was related to a musical understanding of the world, the Pythagorean-Platonic experience of the universe as an ordered cosmos. My research is approached from two angles, namely from the history of ideas and from musicianship, exploring how music is reflected in the world of thought. By reflexive re-reading of the sources, new insights into the nature of musical consciousness are explored. The idea of ‘star music’ can be found throughout the history of music and thought in the West, including Plato’s works and that of other ancient philosophers, through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Romantic era and the twentieth century up to contemporary New Age music. As a conclusion, the paradox of ‘star music’ is connected to an experience of a shared transcendent meaning of music, which can be present in the moment of a musical performance. ‘Star music’ is a living paradox. (shrink)

In this thesis I look at possible implications of the philosophical use of sight metaphors as rendered visible in the philosophy of Iris Murdoch. Through Murdoch’s reading of Plato, and together with the perspectives added by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Paul de Man, Carolyn Korsmeyer, and Mats Persson, I argue that some contemporary philosophy as shaped by science and logic might be partially blind to essential aspects of human life and human awareness. I show that this partial blindness becomes visible in an (...) inability to acknowledge and understand the philosophical importance of that which cannot be seen from a distance, and I argue that this may be due to a modern understanding of clarity. I claim that this understanding of clarity essentially differs from that of Plato and that it becomes particularly evident in Plato’s reliance on metaphors and allegories, not as unclear and obfuscating aspects to be untangled, but as depicting essential dimensions of the inexhaustible complexity of life. I finally argue that it is vital to recover and to philosophically consider these obscurer aspects if philosophy is to stay relevant to actual human beings living in the muddle that is everyday life. (shrink)