Sometimes we make choices that transform us significantly; they change who we are and what we value. This article looks at such choices and resulting changes from the perspective of control and moral responsibility. While we may have an inclination to think that we possess a good amount of control over these important transformations, a more careful examination reveals that we may have less than ideal control over some fundamental choices and changes in our character. As a result, this brings (...) into question to what degree we can praise and blame people for undergoing big personal transformations. (shrink)

This paper offers a new argument for compatibilism about moral responsibility by drawing attention to some overlooked implications of incompatibilism. More specifically, I argue that incompatibilists are committed to some unsavory claims about pairs of agents in deterministic worlds. These include comparative claims about moral responsibility, blameworthiness, desert, punishment, and the fittingness of reactive attitudes. I argue that we have good reasons to reject such comparisons because they fail to account for key differences between deterministic agents. This provides us with (...) reason to embrace compatibilism and reject incompatibilism. (shrink)