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  1. Abortion Restrictions are Good for Black Women.Perry Hendricks - forthcoming - The New Bioethics.
    Abortion restrictions are particularly good for black women—at least in the United States. This claim will likely strike many as outlandish. And numerous commentaries on abortion restrictions have suggested otherwise: many authors have lamented the effects of abortion restrictions on women, and black women in particular—these restrictions are bad for them, these authors say. However, abortion restrictions are clearly good for black women. This is because if someone is prevented from performing a morally wrong action, it’s good for her. For (...)
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  • The End of (Lockean-Kantian) Personhood.Jason T. Eberl - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (1):27-29.
    As the author of a book entitled The Nature of Human Persons: Metaphysics and Bioethics (Eberl 2020), one might reasonably expect me to lament Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby’s (2024) call to end the use...
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  • Human equality arguments against abortion.Calum Miller - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (8):569-572.
    In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism—equality between non-disabled human adults—implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human—an attribute which fetuses have.
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  • My body, not my choice: against legalised abortion.Perry Hendricks - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (7):456-460.
    It is often assumed that if the fetus is a person, then abortion should be illegal. Thomson1 laid the groundwork to challenge this assumption, and Boonin2 has recently argued that it is false: he argues that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. In this article, I explain both Thomson’s and Boonin’s reason for thinking that abortion should be legal even if the fetus is a person. After this, I show that Thomson’s and Boonin’s argument for (...)
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  • Medical disorder, harm, and damage.Neil Feit - 2020 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 41 (1):39-52.
    Jerome Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder is an influential hybrid of naturalist and normative theories. In order to conclude that a condition is a disorder, according to the HDA, one must determine both that it results from a failure of a physical or psychological mechanism to perform its natural function and that it is harmful. In a recent issue of this journal, I argued that the HDA entails implausible judgments about which disorders there are and how they are (...)
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