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  1. What Happens When the Zygote Divides? On the Metaphysics of Monozygotic Twinning.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (4):336-353.
    It is often argued that certain metaphysical complications surrounding the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning force us to conclude that, prior to the point at which twinning is no longer possible, the zygote or early embryo cannot be considered an individual human organism. In this essay, I argue, on the contrary, that there are in fact several ways of making sense of monozygotic twinning that uphold the humanity of the original zygote, but also that there is no easy answer to what (...)
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  • Examining When Life Begins by Explaining Fission and Fusion in the Human Organism.Derek M. Doroski & Caleb L. Estep - 2021 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 21 (4):619-632.
    The question of when human life begins is critical in debates related to life issues. While there are a variety of proposals as to how an organism should be defined, many biologists and ethicists, particularly Catholics, have approached this issue by arguing that fertilization defines the beginning of a new organism. Examining the processes of fission and fusion, which take place before gastrulation, provides strong evidence for when human life beings and therefore how it should be defined. Among the four (...)
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  • Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418.
    Psychological accounts of personal identity claim that the human person is not identical to the human animal. Advocates of such accounts maintain that the definition and criterion of death for a human person should differ from the definition and criterion of death for a human animal. My contention is instead that psychological accounts of personal identity should have human persons dying deaths that are defined biologically, just like the deaths of human animals. Moreover, if brain death is the correct criterion (...)
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