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  1. The interpretation of uncertainty in ecological rationality.Anastasia Kozyreva & Ralph Hertwig - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1517-1547.
    Despite the ubiquity of uncertainty, scientific attention has focused primarily on probabilistic approaches, which predominantly rely on the assumption that uncertainty can be measured and expressed numerically. At the same time, the increasing amount of research from a range of areas including psychology, economics, and sociology testify that in the real world, people’s understanding of risky and uncertain situations cannot be satisfactorily explained in probabilistic and decision-theoretical terms. In this article, we offer a theoretical overview of an alternative approach to (...)
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  • Influence of an Intermediate Option on the Description-Experience Gap and Information Search.Neha Sharma, Shoubhik Debnath & Varun Dutt - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • The rare event: Epistemology and complexity.Carlos Eduardo Maldonado - 2016 - Cinta de Moebio 56:187-196.
    Rare events have happened ever since the beginning of this universe. However, they have very recently become the subject of study and a category. This paper studies what rare events are and explores a series of epistemological consequences, thereafter, along with its complexity. The paper introduces a brand new understanding about the sciences of complexity, namely the study of unpredictable phenomena. Unpredictability is the ground, the problem, and the support for complexity as such, something that has never been openly set (...)
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  • Framing From Experience: Cognitive Processes and Predictions of Risky Choice.Cleotilde Gonzalez & Katja Mehlhorn - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (5):1163-1191.
    A framing bias shows risk aversion in problems framed as “gains” and risk seeking in problems framed as “losses,” even when these are objectively equivalent and probabilities and outcomes values are explicitly provided. We test this framing bias in situations where decision makers rely on their own experience, sampling the problem's options and seeing the outcomes before making a choice. In Experiment 1, we replicate the framing bias in description-based decisions and find risk indifference in gains and losses in experience-based (...)
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  • Modeling decisions from experience: How models with a set of parameters for aggregate choices explain individual choices.Neha Sharma & Varun Dutt - 2017 - Journal of Dynamic Decision Making 3 (1).
    One of the paradigms in judgment and decision-making involves decision-makers sample information before making a final consequential choice. In the sampling paradigm, certain computational models have been proposed where a set of single or distribution parameters is calibrated to the choice proportions of a group of participants. However, currently little is known on how aggregate and hierarchical models would account for choices made by individual participants in the sampling paradigm. In this paper, we test the ability of aggregate and hierarchical (...)
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  • The role of information search and its influence on risk preferences.Orestis Kopsacheilis - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (3):311-339.
    According to the ‘Description–Experience gap’, when people are provided with the descriptions of risky prospects they make choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events; but when making decisions from experience after exploring the prospects’ properties, they behave as if they underweight such probability. This study revisits this discrepancy while focusing on information-search in decisions from experience. We report findings from a lab-experiment with three treatments: a standard version of decisions from description and two versions of decisions from (...)
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  • A normative inference approach for optimal sample sizes in decisions from experience.Dirk Ostwald, Ludger Starke & Ralph Hertwig - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:132679.
    “Decisions from experience” (DFE) refers to a body of work that emerged in research on behavioral decision making over the last decade. One of the major experimental paradigms employed to study experienced-based choice is the “sampling paradigm”, which serves as a model of decision making under limited knowledge about the statistical structure of the world. In this paradigm respondents are presented with two payoff distributions, which, in contrast to standard approaches in behavioral economics, are specified not in terms of explicit (...)
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  • Risks Seem Low While Climbing High: Shift in Risk Perception and Error Rates in the Course of Indoor Climbing Activities.Martina Raue, Ronnie Kolodziej, Eva Lermer & Bernhard Streicher - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  • Life and Death Decisions and COVID‐19: Investigating and Modeling the Effect of Framing, Experience, and Context on Preference Reversals in the Asian Disease Problem.Shashank Uttrani, Neha Sharma & Varun Dutt - 2022 - Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (4):800-824.
    Prior research in judgment and decision making (JDM) has investigated the effect of problem framing on human preferences. Furthermore, research in JDM documented the absence of such reversal of preferences when making decisions from experience. However, little is known about the effect of context on preferences under the combined influence of problem framing and problem format. Also, little is known about how cognitive models would account for human choices in different problem frames and types (general/specific) in the experience format. One (...)
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  • Violations of coalescing in parametric utility measurement.Andreas Glöckner, Baiba Renerte & Ulrich Schmidt - 2020 - Theory and Decision 89 (4):471-501.
    The majority consensus in the empirical literature is that probability weighting functions are typically inverse-S shaped, that is, people tend to overweight small and underweight large probabilities. A separate stream of literature has reported event-splitting effects and shown that they can explain violations of expected utility. This leads to the questions whether the observed shape of weighting functions is a mere consequence of the coalesced presentation and, more generally, whether preference elicitation should rely on presenting lotteries in a canonical split (...)
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