According to Rainer Forst, a critical theory of power must break with the tendency of political theorists to conceive of power in opposition to normativity. Appropriately, Forst proposes a noumenal definition according to which power is normative: It works through recognition of reasons and is thereby open to critical assessment. In this discussion note, I first clarify the normativity of power in Forst’s noumenal theory by means of Donald Davidson’s theory of action and then explain how theory of action leads (...) to a different understanding of force and violence from Forst’s noumenal theory. In doing this, I find reason to endorse a non-normative definition of power on the lines proposed by Robert Dahl and endorsed by most authors in analytical political theory. This definition nevertheless remains faithful to Forst’s methodological guideline that a theory of power must keep in view the relations between power and normativity. (shrink)

The deliberative model of democracy, as presented by Jürgen Habermas and others, claims to reconstruct the normative content of the idea of democracy. However, since it overemphasises the epistemic facet of decision‐making, the model is unable to take into account other valuable aspects of democracy. This is shown in reference to two concrete phenomena from political reality: majority voting and the problem of the dissenter. In each case, the deliberative model inevitably fails to account for several normatively desirable features of (...) democracy, such as formal political equality and proper respect for the judgement of each citizen. (shrink)

Consulting the public about the ethical approaches underlying health policies can seem an appealing means of addressing concerns about limited public participation in development of health policy. However ambiguity surrounds questions of whether, or how consultation can really contribute to more defensible decisions about ethical aspects of policy. This paper clarifies the role and limits of public consultation on ethics, beginning by separating different senses of defensibility in decisions on ethics. Defensibility of ethical decisions could be understood either in the (...) sense of legitimacy in virtue of reflecting the opinions of the public whose interests are affected, or in the sense of being able to withstand and respond to challenges presented in ethical debate. The question then is whether there are forms of consultation which have the potential to realise more defensible decisions in either of these senses. Problems of adequately accounting for the views of those affected by policy decisions casts doubt on the plausibility of using consultation as a means of determining the opinions of the public. Consultation can have a role by bringing new ideas and challenges to debate, although it is uncertain whether this will increase the defensibility of any decision on ethics. (shrink)

Realism criticizes the idea, central to what may be called ‘the priority view’, that philosophy has the task of imposing from the outside general norms of morality or standards of reasonableness on politics understood as the domain of power. According to realism, political philosophy must reveal the specific standards internal to the political practice of handling power appropriately and as it develops in actual circumstances. Framed in those terms, the debate evokes the idea that political power itself is lacking normativity (...) until such time as norms are devised that govern its use. In contrast, this essay identifies a normative dimension internal to power. Power depends on recognition and support in the form of belief. This dependence explains how an interest in power introduces a responsiveness to normative considerations into the domain of politics. (shrink)