Immanuel Kant is, famously, not only the major philosopher of European enlightenment, but also one of the first philosophers to develop a philosophical theory of “human races”. How do these two sides of Kant relate to each other? What is the significance of race in Kant’s philosophy? In this article, we aim to discuss these questions by taking a close look into the conceptual and philosophical presuppositions underlying Kant’s understanding of race; relating them to the concept of teleology as developed (...) by Kant in the Critique of Judgement and to the idea of natural history that can be derived from there. In the last two chapters, we intertwine both perspectives in such a way that, on the one hand, we can determine the philosophical significance of race for Kant, and, on the other hand, show how a race-sensible perspective gives new and critical insight into Kant’s concept of reason. (shrink)

In the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment. Just (...) as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom. This interpretation makes sense both of Kant's claim that he overcomes the “incalculable gulf” between nature and freedom in the third Critique, and also of the location of this argument, as following after and relying on the results of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment. (shrink)

Martin Mees | : Cet article propose une réévaluation de la notion d’« événement » en matière d’esthétique, ce qui nécessite de s’interroger plus spécifiquement sur la temporalité propre au concept de « sublime », associé traditionnellement à une fulgurance, un instant sidérant qui ferait justement événement. Le développement s’appuie sur l’Analytique kantienne du sublime qui, en diverses occasions, met en avant le caractère paradoxal d’un sublime qui ne semble pouvoir se déployer qu’au prix d’une temporalité double, qualifiée ultimement de (...) régressive. Je défendrai ici la thèse que le sublime renvoie en réalité à une expérience esthétique de l’événement comme tel, à même de nous faire penser une certaine « Idée esthétique » du temps. Une telle expérience semble d’ailleurs pouvoir trouver forme dans différentes productions poétiques de notre modernité. | : This article proposes a re-evaluation of the notion of “event” in the field of aesthetics, which requires to question the specific temporality of the concept of “sublime”, traditionally associated with a flash, a staggering moment, which precisely constitutes an event. The development leans on the Kantian Analytic of the sublime which, on diverse occasions, highlights the paradoxical character of a sublime that only seems able to fulfil itself at the price of a double temporality, ultimately named regressive. I shall defend here the thesis that the sublime refers actually to an aesthetic experience of the event per se, allowing us to conceptualise a certain “aesthetic idea” of time. Such an experience, as a matter of fact, seems to be embodied in different poetic productions of our modernity. (shrink)