O objetivo do artigo é apresentar a discussão entre Fichte e Schelling em torno do conflito entre o idealismo transcendental da doutrina-da-ciência e a filosofia-da-natureza do Identitätssystem. Buscamos compreender, de um ponto de vista fichteano, se e em que medida é possível afirmar que a doutrina-da-ciência é uma filosofia da reflexão, tal como entendida por Schelling. Para tanto, em um primeiro momento, serão expostas as críticas de Schelling a Fichte, como ele progressivamente se afasta em relação à filosofia transcendental e (...) busca consolidar a filosofia-da-natureza. Em um segundo momento, daremos a palavra a Fichte e a seus apontamentos críticos em relação ao projeto filosófico de uma filosofia-da-natureza. Nossa análise limitar-se-á à correspondência entre os dois filósofos e aos textos escritos em torno do período de ruptura entre eles. No caso de Fichte, indo até 1804. The aim of this paper is to present the discussion between Fichte and Schelling around the conflict between the transcendental idealism of the doctrine of science and the philosophy of nature of the Identitätssystem. We seek to understand, under a Fichtean point of view, if and how far it is possible to state that the doctrine of science consists in a philosophy of reflection, such as Schelling states. For this, at first, will be exposed the Schelling’s critiques to Fichte, as the former progressively detaches himself from transcendental philosophy and consolidates a philosophy of nature. In a second moment, we will give the floor to Fichte’s critical notes related to the philosophical project of a philosophy of nature. Our analysis will be restraint to the correspondence between those two philosophers and to the texts written around this period of rupture between them. In the case of Fichte, this goes until 1804. (shrink)

Hegel's influence on post-Hegelian philosophy is as profound as it is ambiguous. Modern philosophy is philosophy after Hegel. Taking leave of Hegel's system appears to be a common feature of modern and post-modern thought. One could even argue that giving up Hegel's claim of totality defines philosophy after Hegel. Modern and post-modern philosophies are philosophies of finitude: Hegel's philosophy cannot be repeated. However, its status as a negative backdrop for modern and post-modern thought already shows its pervasive influence. Precisely in (...) its criticism of Hegel, modern thought is bound up with his thinking. (shrink)

Since the seminal 1955 habilitation by Heidegger's pupil, Walter Schulz, it has become an open secret that Schelling's philosophy, more than that of any of the other German Idealists, is an immediate antecedent to Heidegger's thought. For this reason, it is all the more fascinating that to this day research is still lopsidedly concerned with the interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Schelling's Freedom Essay and that a thorough and overarching investigation into the idealistic inheritance of Martin Heidegger's thought remains wanting. (...) The same applies to the debates that Heidegger's students began in the twentieth century. The traditions of modern nature ethics and the criticism of technology, which derive from Schelling, were interpreted and mediated through Heidegger to his students Hans Jonas, Hannah Arendt, and Günther Anders. This essay attempts to delineate some of the basic features of a more bilateral or dialogical relationship between these two philosophers and to more fully appreciate Heidegger's relationship to German Idealism in general and Schelling in particular. (shrink)

Es conocida la crítica de Schelling de que la doctrina de la ciencia habría aniquilado cualquier concepto de naturaleza viva, reduciéndola a un simple obstáculo que debía ser superado con miras a la realización de los fines morales de la razón. ¿Acaso tiene razón Schelling después de todo? Este artículo pretende refutar esta crítica schellinguiana, mostrando no solo que a la doctrina de la ciencia no se le puede imputar esta falta, sino que ésta deduce, a partir de una estructura (...) propia de la razón, los dominios del saber, del saber fáctico, esto es, de la reflexión sobre sí mismo del yo, sobre todo a partir de la consideración de sus elementos kantianos: Una espontaneidad práctica y su carácter eminentemente reflexionante, algo que no fue entendido por Schelling y sus seguidores. (shrink)