Christians traditionally hold that we know God as God is revealed to us, but that we do not know God in essence, as God is in himself. But that raises the question of whether God as revealed accurately represents God’s essence. Perhaps, given our cognitive limitations, God logically cannot reveal the divine essence to us. Or perhaps God knows that it would not be good for us were he to do so. Descartes raised the possibility that God is an Evil (...) Genius who systematically misleads us. This paper explores several attempts to build a bridge from GR to GE. All appear to have serious limitations. It concludes that, contrary to much of the tradition, GR does reveal God’s essence to us. (shrink)

Spiritual formation currently lacks a robust epistemology. Christian theology and philosophy often spend more time devoted to an epistemology of propositions rather than an epistemology of knowing persons. This paper is an attempt to move toward a more robust account of knowing persons in general and God in particular. After working through various aspects of the nature of this type of knowledge this theory is applied to specific issues germane to spiritual formation, such as the justification of understanding spiritual growth (...) on an integrative and holistic (heart and mind) model, the reality of hearing God’s voice, and knowing his activity, as well as how such a theory should change the shape of sermons, evangelism, and apologetics. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas has long been understood to have reconciled faith and reason. Typically, he is understood as having provided justification for faith by means of proof, particularly, that the Five Ways prove the existence of God. Under this interpretation, faith becomes a species of justified belief, and the justification for faith rests upon the success of the Five Ways . In this dissertation, I argue that Aquinas' account of faith is not one of justified belief, at least as it is (...) understood in contemporary philosophy. Instead, I argue, faith has its own basis for epistemic "reasonableness"---a reasonableness that does not derive from ordinary evidence nor proof. Rather than requiring evidence accessible to the natural light of reason, Aquinas holds that faith has its own sort of "evidence"---that which results from the light of faith. Aquinas "Aristotelianizes" faith and argues that faith has the Aristotelian epistemic virtue of certitude, and in so doing reconciles faith and Aristotelian reason, at least as Aristotle was understood by Medieval philosophers. This reconciliation resolves important tensions between Aristotelian science and Christian doctrine. Further, I examine three contemporary accounts of what counts as an epistemically "responsible" belief and argue that under Aquinas' account, faith should be counted as rational, and in an important, though modified sense, as justified. (shrink)

In "arguments for the existence of god" and "faith and knowledge", john hick argues for the rationality of religious belief on the basis of an analogy between religious and perceptual belief. i reply that the analogy does not obtain because there is no alternative solipsistic interpretation of perceptual belief possible. this is because (a) hick's phenomenology of dreaming is unsatisfactory and (b) wittgenstein's "private language" argument shows solipsism to be an unintelligible option.

I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be (...) Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts. (shrink)

In recent analytic philosophy of religion, one hotly debated topic is the veridicality of religious experience. In this paper, I briefly trace how the argument from religious experience comes into prominence in the twentieth century. This is due to the able defense of this argument by Richard Swinburne, William Alston, and Jerome Gellman among others. I explain the argument's intuitive force and why the stock objections to religious experience are not entirely convincing. I expound Swinburne's approach and his application of (...) the Principle of Credulity to religious experience. Then I critically examine four major objections to Swinburne. I conclude that the argument from religious experiences is not likely to be conclusive but it should not be dismissed either. (shrink)

Can epistemology be shaped by the Christian faith? Is there anything specific to this faith that can give rise to an equally specific epistemology without compromising the autonomy that the latter requires from faith? In the footsteps of Aquinas's religious epistemology, I first focus on the fact that Christian faith seems to characterize intellectual activity in a way that appears to be irreconcilable with epistemological perspectives that are not shaped by faith. Second, I argue that it is possible to do (...) justice to the irreconcilability in question by making reference to what radically distinguishes the Christian faith from the epistemological reflection. Finally, I focus on two ways in which the specific nature of Christian faith can shape and promote rationality, and give rise to a Christian epistemology. (shrink)

Las críticas que brotan en un medio en que el debate epistemológico parece encabezar los problemas que competen al filosofar, tienen en el negar el sentido de verdad al discurso de índole religiosa la ratificación del estatus de cientificidad. Esta es la apuesta de teóricos inscritos a la tradición analítica surgida en el pasado siglo. No obstante, frente a los discursos neopositivistas y el radical evidencialismo vienen las posiciones de algunos filósofos y teólogos analíticos quienes paralelamente abogaron por la validez (...) y el sentido de lo religioso. (shrink)

The article based on Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, analyses certain aspects of selected cognitive functions of religous beliefs. Our approach is based on the search for angalogy between scientific theories on one hand and systems of religious beliefs on the other hand. Contemporary philosophy of science demonstrates that scientific models are the products of creative analogous immagination, data are theory-laden, theories as a whole are resistent to falsification and it is hard (if at all) (...) to find reliable criterions for the selection of a paradigm. These «subjective features» are more evident within religion, since a wider range of models, greater impact of interpretations on data, greater arduousness in regard to the commitment to a paradigm and more ambiguity in the process of the selection of a paradigm, exist in this area. However, with each of these features, I see the difference between science and religion in their degree and not in absolute contrast. (shrink)

The article discusses a response to Schellenberg’s atheistic ‘hiddenness argument’ that neither objects to its premises nor formulates a new inductive argument in favour of the existence of God. According to the proposed response, it is sufficient for the task of defending theism to reverse Schellenberg’s reasoning and present a theistic meta-argument that takes as its assumption the fact that there are resistant believers in the world. The paper defends the claim that both arguments have similar persuasive power. However, because (...) of their contradictory conclusions both cannot be sound. It is argued that the way to decide the dilemma is to compare the demographics of theism and atheism and to compare accommodation strategies of both arguments. The first comparison favours theism, but it does not exclude the possibility that quantitative proportions between theists and atheists can change in the future. The second comparison refers to accommodation strategies of proponents of A-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in an atheistic world there exist resistant believers and of proponents of T-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in the world governed by an all-powerful and all-loving God there exist nonresistant nonbelievers. The conclusion of the considerations is the claim that the theistic accommodation strategy compares favourably to the atheistic one. (shrink)

Much recent discussion of the epistemology of religious belief has focused on justification of belief in the existence of God. Religious belief, however, includes much more than belief in God. In this paper, it is argued that the justification of belief in God is best seen in the context of other interrelated religious beliefs and practices. Philosophers of religion argue about whether religious belief requires evidence and on the sorts of arguments that have been presented. In this paper, a dialectical (...) approach to the justification of religious belief is suggested that draws upon Hegel, Peirce, and W. E. Hocking. Rational reflection on the nature of experience that provides the solution to the problems of skepticism and solipsism in the Hegelian tradition, a tradition self-consciously developed by both Peirce and Hocking. If reason itself is only manifest in social exchanges, then the rationality of religious belief cannot be a private affair restricted to the subject of experience; rather it is the process of communicative interactions in accord with the overlapping norms of those who participate in them. Finally, some implications of this approach for the problem of religious diversity are sketched. * Professor of Philosophy, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, Qom, Iran. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se explora críticamente el pensamiento del filósofo colombiano Jorge Aurelio Díaz acerca de la religión. En particular, se examina, por un lado, la cuestión del lugar y el papel de la religión en la modernidad, a partir de la pregunta por la racionalidad y el valor cognitivo de la creencia religiosa, y, por otro lado, la diferencia entre misticismo y religión. Se plantearán y discutirán algunos aspectos problemáticos de la manera en que Díaz comprende ambos asuntos. ABSTRACT The paper (...) carries out a critical examination of Colombian philosopher Jorge Aurelio Díaz's philosophical thought regarding religion. Specifically, it examines the place and role of religion in modernity on the basis of the question regarding the rationality and cognitive value of religious belief, as well as the difference between mysticism and religion. The article sets forth and discusses some problematic aspects of the manner in which Díaz understands both of these issues. (shrink)

Se explora cr.ticamente el pensamiento del fil.sofo colombiano Jorge Aurelio Díaz acerca de la religi.n. En particular, se examina, por un lado, la cuestión del lugar y el papel de la religi.n en la modernidad, a partir de la pregunta por la racionalidad y el valor cognitivo de la creencia religiosa, y, por otro lado, la diferencia entre misticismoy religión. Se plantear.n y discutir.n algunos aspectos problemáticos de lamanera en que Díaz comprende ambos asuntos.

این مقاله به بررسی دیدگاه جان هیک - فیلسوف دین تحلیلی معاصر- دربارۀ دلایل وجود تصورات مختلف از خداوند و عدم امکان دست‌یابی به مفهوم خداوند می‌پردازد. ابتدا ضمن اشاره به تفکیک مفهوم و تصور خداوند و ویژگی‌های اساسی تصورات گوناگون از خداوند ‌‌- با تکیه بر مبانی او یعنی تفکیک نومن از فنومن کانت‌‌، «دیدن به عنوان» ویتگنشتاین متأخر و وصف‌ناپذیری خداوند ‌‌- نشان خواهیم داد که با تفکیک کانت تنها می‌توان تفکیک مفهوم خداوند از تصور او را توجیه (...) کرد‌‌ و نمی‌توان از دست‌یابی به مفهوم خداوند دفاع کرد‌‌؛ زیرا طبق آن‌‌، راهی به نومن خداوند نیست. با تکیه بر دیدگاه ویتگنشتاین متأخر نیز هیچ تجربۀ ناب و خالصی نیست که بتوان از مفهوم خداوند سخن گفت‌‌، بلکه همواره تصوراتی از او داریم. وصف‌ناپذیری خداوند نیز مشکل تجربۀ ما را از او دوچندان کرده و باعث تصورات گوناگون از خداوند می‌شود. در پایان نیز به نتایج دیدگاه او مانند توفیق او در تفکیک مفهوم و تصور خداوند و توجیه وجود تصورات مختلف از خداوند‌‌، گشودن راه نقد و بررسی آموزه‌های مسیحی‌‌، دفاع از کثرت‌گرایی دینی و نزدیک شدن او به تصور پنن تئیستی از خداوند اشاره خواهیم کرد. (shrink)

Was Jesus Christ a deluded prophet who expected an imminent collapse of the world followed by the dawning of a kingdom that has never eventuated? Some who reject Christianity think that he was, and as a consequence are highly suspicious about any other claims that are attributed to Jesus. However, other interpretations of the apparently eschatological pronouncements in the New Testament exist, one of which is realized eschatology, this being the idea, roughly, that the kingdom or reign of God was (...) realized in or through the ministry of Jesus itself. Debates surrounding the competing interpretations of New Testament eschatology raise fascinating issues, both exegetical and conceptual. Exploring some of these issues from the perspective of philosophy of religion, informed by theological and biblical studies, this article argues that realized eschatology is a religious option that, contrary to common criticisms, is neither incoherent nor implausibly reductive. (shrink)

The paper offers a historical survey of the emergence of logical formalization in twentieth-century analytically oriented philosophy of religion. This development is taken to have passed through three main ?stages?: a pioneering stage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (led by Frege and Russell), a stage of crisis in the 1920s and early 1930s (occasioned by Wittgenstein, logical positivists such as Carnap, and neo-Thomists such as Maritain), and a stage of rehabilitation in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (led (...) by the Cracow Circle and Quine). (shrink)

In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change, and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support a different (...) kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved. (shrink)

On the assumption that theistic religious commitment takes place in the face of evidential ambiguity, the question arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a doxastic venture beyond one’s evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In this paper I explore the implications for orthodox theistic commitment of adopting, in answer to that question, a modest, moral coherentist, fideism. This extended Jamesian fideism crucially requires positive ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures. I (...) suggest that, even though the existence of horrendous evil does not resolve evidential ambiguity in favour of atheism, there are reasonable value commitments that would preclude those who hold them from satisfying extended Jamesian fideist conditions for committing themselves to classical theism. I then begin a discussion of a possible revisionary theistic alternative (in the Christian tradition) which – one might hope – may meet those conditions. An earlier, shorter, version of this paper was delivered as a keynote address at the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

Short paper about debate on cognitive meaning of religious use of language in early analytic philosophy of religion. Published in Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Janusz Salamon, Cracow: WAM, 2016.