Although the COVID-19 pandemic is a serious public health and economic emergency, and although effective vaccines are the best weapon we have against it, there are groups and individuals who oppose certain kinds of vaccines because of personal moral or religious reasons. The most widely discussed case has been that of certain religious groups that oppose research on COVID-19 vaccines that use cell lines linked to abortions and that object to receiving those vaccine because of their moral opposition to abortion. (...) However, moral opposition to COVID-19 vaccine research can be based on other considerations, both secular and religious. We argue that religious or personal moral objections to vaccine research are unethical and irresponsible, and in an important sense often irrational. They are unethical because of the risk of causing serious harm to other people for no valid reason; irresponsible because they run counter to individual and collective responsibilities to contribute to important public health goals; and in the case of certain kinds of religious opposition, they might be irrational because they are internally inconsistent. All in all, our argument translates into the rather uncontroversial claim that we should prioritize people’s lives over religious freedom in vaccine research and vaccination roll out. (shrink)

Non-consensual organ procurement from prisoners in China raises serious questions regarding the ethics of Chinese transplant research. In their article, published in this issue of JME, Higgins and colleagues address these questions through the lens of publication ethics. They argue that, ‘while there are potentially compelling justifications for use [of unethical research] under some circumstances, these justifications fail when unethical practices are ongoing’.1 Consequently, they recommend non-publication of Chinese transplant research and call for a mass retraction of the articles identified (...) in their review.2 To support their argument, Higgins and colleagues appeal to internationally recognised guidelines from the WHO3 and the World Medical Association, which assert that ‘executed prisoners must not be considered as organ and/or tissue donors’ due to the inability to acquire valid consent.4 Failing to declare an immediate publishing moratorium for transplant research involving prisoners in China, they argue, ‘undermines efforts to stop transplant-related human rights abuses, taints the evidence base, and renders those who publish and use the research complicit in the continuing harm’.5 We agree with Higgins and colleagues that non-consensual organ procurement from prisoners in China is a crime against humanity. Ongoing human rights violations in Chinese prisons are well documented and universally condemned. We also agree that the subsequent use of data acquired from unethical research is morally complex. Nonetheless, Higgins and colleagues’ arguments leave us with three …. (shrink)

Higgins’ et al recent paper1 presents a well-thought ethical analysis of the problems associated with the publication of unethical transplant research. More generally, research ethics committees never allow the use or reuse of data that has been collected without their required approval. Similarly, in many judicial settings, evidence is generally inadmissible when it is gathered illegally.2 Thus, journals and other publishers should follow in their footsteps and also roadblock any associated publications. Moreover, unethical organ donation and transplantation research is rife (...) with integrity issues, which violate publication norms (eg, fabrication or falsification of the source of the donor organs; absent informed consent of living donors or donor families; funder conflict of interest). If these normally accepted exclusions3 are ignored, then publishers are turning off their moral compass and facilitating an attitude of ‘anything goes’ in the conduct of research. Table 1 presents a timeline of scholarly responses to the problem of publishing unethical transplant research. As shown, since 2007 there has been a slow evolution of changing publisher practices, yet more …. (shrink)

We thank Goldstein and Peterson, Caplan, and Bramstedt for engaging with our paper on the ethics of publishing and using Chinese transplant research that involves organs procured from executed prisoners.1–4 In that paper, we examine consequentialist and deontological arguments for and against using data from unethical research. Goldstein and Peterson question the relationship between the social and scientific value of the research and the decision to publish the results. They argue that the failure to publish scientifically valid and socially valuable (...) Chinese transplant research results in potential repetition of the research and subsequent exposure of new participants to research risks for data that already exists. This argument has intuitive appeal, in both its positive form (the data are already there so let’s use them) and negative form (by not using the data we subject future participants to avoidable research risks). Prima facie, failure to use the data does seem to breach a fundamental principle of research ethics, that of only exposing people to risks in research to produce novel and socially valuable knowledge. However, this point relies heavily on the assumption that data from unethical research are valid and valuable. This is a useful assumption to make in a theoretical argument as it clarifies the challenge of weighing up the potential utility of the …. (shrink)