The well-known behaviorist revolt against consciousness is largely in the past, although that does not mean that the new interest in consciousness is without many unsolved problems. Cognitive psychology, as an alternative, is not necessarily a consciousness psychology, and humanistic psychology, friendly to consciousness, has difficulty in maintaining scientific status. One approach to consciousness is by way of dissociation, the phenomena of which can be found in everyday experience but can be studied in more detail through hypnosis. One aspect of (...) hypnosis research has led to the concept of a “hidden observer,” a metaphor used to indicate that some information is processed and has consequences without being in the focus of consciousness at the time, but is recoverable through hypnosis. The evidence comes mostly from subjects highly responsive to hypnosis, so that generalizations must be used with caution. The divisions of consciousness lead to consideration of its executive and monitoring functions-normal functions, but subject to some alterations through hypnosis. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to some critics, the notion of conscious experience is a good candidate for denoting a distinct and scientifically interesting phenomenon in the brain. I base this claim mainly on an analysis of neuropsychological data concerning deficits resulting from various types of brain damage as well as some additional supporting empirical evidence. These data strongly point to the hypothesis that conscious experience expresses information that is available for global, integrated, and flexible behavior.

This article presents a model of the structure of emotion developed primarily from a consideration of neuropsychological evidence and behavioural data which have bearing on neuropsychological theories. Valence is first considered and highlighted as a defining characteristic of emotion. Next, the use of facial behaviour and autonomic nervous system patterns as defining characteristics of discrete emotions is questioned on empirical and conceptual grounds. The regulation of emotion is considered and proposed to affect the very structure of emotion itself. If there (...) is an invariant pattern of biological activity across different instantiations of the same emotion, it is likely to be found in higher-order associative networks of central nervous system activity, the very same networks that subserve goal-directed behaviour and other cognitive functions. Drawing upon evolutionary considerations, it is argued that what is basic about emotion are the dimensions of approach and withdrawal. The nature of the linkage between such action tendencies and emotion is discussed. (shrink)