Descartes has a Clarity First epistemology: (i) Clarity is a primitive (indefinable) phenomenal quality: the appearance of truth. (ii) Clarity is prior to other qualities: obscurity, confusion, distinctness – are defined in terms of clarity; epistemic goods – reason to assent, rational inclination to assent, reliability, and knowledge – are explained by clarity. (This is the first of two companion entries; the sequel is called, "Descartes's Method for Achieving Knowledge.").

Semen Frank (1877–1950) was one of the first and most ardent advocates of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. He proposed an original interpretation of the ontological argument based on its analogy to Descartes’ Cogito. Frank believed that it is possible to develop Cogito ergo sum into Cogito ergo est ens absolutum. In this paper, I analyze his version of the ontological argument. First, I propose a simple reconstruction of his reasoning, paying attention to its hidden premise. Second, departing (...) from the classical logical interpretations of Descartes’ argument, I show that for Frank the claim that God exists had the same logical properties as Cogito. As a result, it seems that his argument was formally correct, though based on a premise which could hardly be convincing for a non-believer. This should not be surprising, however, since Frank, as most Russian religious philosophers, was not interested in the project of philosophical theology. His main concern was rather the development of philosophy based on religious premises, which might be called “theological philosophy”. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 265 - 286 The author argues that when Lichtenberg recommends saying “It is thinking” instead of “I am thinking”, he is not suggesting that thought might be a subjectless occurrence. Lichtenberg’s point is, rather, that we are often the _passive_ subject or medium of our thoughts. The author further argues that Descartes’ _cogito_ argument is not affected by this point, because Descartes does not claim that we must be the active subject of all (...) our thoughts. Moreover, the author suggests that the _cogito_ argument operates with the notion of a qua-object: it consists in the move from “I am thinking” to “I-qua-thinking am”. Seen in this way, the _cogito_ argument by itself leaves entirely open what might be true of me insofar as I am _not_ thinking. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Les attitudes de se sont généralement considérées comme constituant une classe particulière d’attitudes de re. Cet article propose une analyse différente, qui s’appuie sur la notion d’attitude de objecto et qui évite un engagement ontologique envers le sujet. La proposition élabore l’idée de Hintikka d’une logique épistémique dite de seconde génération, qui introduit un marqueur syntaxique permettant d’exprimer des relations d’indépendance entre certaines constantes logiques. De cette sémantique résulte une conception du Moi, dénotation de «je», comme un objet (...) simplement intentionnel. ABSTRACT: De se attitudes are generally regarded as being a proper part of de re attitudes. In this paper an alternative analysis that avoids ontological commitment to the self is proposed, based on the notion of de objecto attitudes. This proposal develops an idea from Hintikka’s second generation epistemic logic, which introduces a syntactic marker expressing independence relations between certain logical constants. According to this semantic account, the Self, as the denotation of ‘I’, is conceived of as a mere intentional object. (shrink)

Dos preguntas articulan las reflexiones contenidas en el presente trabajo: ¿Cuál es el sentido de nuestra vida? y ¿qué sentidos produce el psicoanálisis? La yuxtaposición de ambos interrogantes no debe darnos la idea de que la respuesta a una sirve de fundamento a la otra. La vecindad tiene por objetivo aquí mostrar cómo el psicoanálisis elabora sentidos. La primera pregunta ha sido considerada por algunos como una pregunta sin respuesta. Sin embargo consideramos que la posibilidad de una respuesta depende del (...) contexto filosófico desde el cual se la plantea y lo que se entiende por sentido. ¿Qué tipo de ontología es la que hace posible esta pregunta? Este trabajo se propone hacer una contribución a la elaboración de tal ontología la cual se presentará fundamentalmente como una ontología social, no como regional sino entendida como filosofía primera. Para ello tomaremos como base las ontologías sociales que a partir de Heidegger y, apartándose de él, desarrollaron Jean-Luc Nancy (2006) y McGuire y Tuchanska (2000). Realizaremos un estudio comparativo entre estas ontologías y las ontologías científicas para mostrar la necesidad de una ontología filosófica que nos permita abordar la cuestión del sentido. En base a esta ontología abordaremos la posibilidad de responder a estas preguntas en los discursos de las teorías psicoanalítica de Freud y de Winnicott. (shrink)