By way of a reply to Charles Parsons's paper in the Nagel Festschrift, Kant's notion of intuition (Anschauung) is examined. It is argued that for Kant the immediate relation which an intuition has to its object is a mere corollary to its singularity. It does not presuppose (as Parsons suggests) any presence of the object to the mind. This is shown, e.g., by the Prolegomena § 8, where the objects of intuitions a priori are denied by Kant to be so (...) present. They yield knowledge, not in virtue of their immediacy but in virtue of their ideality. (shrink)

Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis. One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox. But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, logic is a theory of inference, or validity suffices for rational inference; (...) a, b, and c are false. (shrink)

(1) If a deductive argument is valid, then the conclusion is not novel. (2) If the conclusion of an argument is not novel, the argument is not useful. So, (3) if a deductive argument is valid, it is not useful. This conclusion, (3), is unacceptable. Since the argument is valid, we must reject at least one premise. So, should we reject (1) or (2)? This puzzle is usually known as the ‘scandal of deduction’. Analytic philosophers have tried to reject (1) (...) but have assumed premise (2). I argue here that Aristotle would deny (2). Aristotle thinks that at least some deductive arguments are useful, even though they present no new conclusions. Thus, Aristotle’s view contrasts with analytic philosophers of logic, who assume that all useful deductive arguments present novel conclusions. I don’t claim that Aristotle ‘solves’ the problem: it was never posed in Aristotle’s time. Rather, I suggest that Aristotle does not face the problem because he assumes deductions can be useful, without presenting novel conclusions. Aristotle’s view of deduction tames the scandal. (shrink)

A philosophically important but largely overlooked cognitive theory is examined, one that provides information on which inferences an agent will make from his beliefs. Such a theory of feasible inferences is indispensable in a complete cognitive psychology, in particular, for predicting the agent's actions on the basis of rationality conditions and attributed beliefs and desires. However, very little of the feasibility theory which applies to a typical human being can be shown a priori to apply to all agents. The logical (...) competence required of a rational agent seems to have a cluster structure: it cannot be the case that an agent is able to make no inferences, but an agent can be unable to make any particular one. (shrink)

In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.