This paper argues for the idea that the logic of questions should focus its attention on the analysis of arguments in which questions play the role of conclusions. The relevant concepts of validity are discussed and the concept of the logic of questions of a semantically interpreted formalized language is introduced.

This paper addresses the problem posed by the current split between the two opposed hypotheses in the growing literature on the fallacy of begging the question the epistemic hypothesis, based on knowledge and belief, and the dialectical one, based on formal dialogue systems. In the first section, the nature of split is explained, and it is shown how each hypothesis has developed. To get the beginning reader up to speed in the literature, a number of key problematic examples are analyzed (...) illustrating how both approaches can be applied. Useful tools are brought to bear on them, including the automated argument diagramming system Araucaria, and profiles of dialogue used to represent circular argumentation in a dialogue tableau format. These tools are used to both to model circular reasoning and to provide the contextual evidence needed to properly determine whether the circular reasoning in a given case is better judged fallacious or not. A number of technical problems that have impeded the development of both hypotheses are studied. One central problem is the distinction between argument and explanation. It is concluded that the best way to move forward and solve these problems is to reformulate the two hypotheses in such a way that they might be able to co-exist. On this basis, a unified methodology is proposed that allows each hypothesis to move forward as a legitimate avenue for research using the same tools. (shrink)

Questions are, in many respects, the hallmarks of the philosopher's trade. They are passed down from one generation to the next and yet, throughout history, philosophers have had relatively little to say about questions. In particular, few have asked or tried to answer the question ‘what is a question'. I call this the ‘Question Question’ and I offer an answer to it in this paper, furnishing philosophical analysis with the results of a large online survey, which has been running for (...) more than a decade. (shrink)

I consider two cognitive phenomena: inquiring and justifying, as complementary processes running in opposite directions. I explain on an example that the former process is driven by questions and the latter is a codification of the results of the first one. Traditionally, proof theory focuses on the latter process, and thus describes the former, at best, as an example of a backward proof search. I argue that this is not the best way to analyze cognitive processes driven by questions, and (...) that proof-theoretical analysis of questions can bring mutual benefits for both proof theory and erotetic logic. In the second part of my paper (sect. 6.3) I introduce the structural rules of weakening and contraction. Results concerning their admissibility are discussed. I also sketch an erotetic interpretation of the rule of weakening as reducing information noise, and that of contraction as securing information. (shrink)

The concept of search scenario is explicated in terms of erotetic logic, i.e., the logic of questions. Different kinds of erotetic search scenarios are characterized. The basic logical properties of erotetic search scenarios are analyzed.

The Interrogative Model of Inquiry and Dynamic Epistemic Logics are two central paradigms in formal epistemology. This paper is motivated by the observation of a significant complementarity between them: on the one hand, the IMI provides a framework for investigating inquiry represented as an idealized game between an Inquirer and Nature, along with an account of the interaction between questions and inferences in information-seeking processes, but is lacking a formulation in the multi-agent case; on the other hand, DELs model various (...) operations of information change in multi-agent systems, but the field is lacking a proper integration of question and inference dynamics, along with an application to the investigation of inquiry processes. The goal of this paper is to integrate the two paradigms in such a way as to combine their respective insights. To this end, we develop a formal system called DEL $$_\mathrm{IMI }$$ IMI which aims to represent the interaction between question and inference dynamics in inquiry—as described by the IMI—in a multi-agent setting, and this in such a way as to enable an investigation of inquiry games with multi-agent dimensions. The DEL $$_\mathrm{IMI }$$ IMI system is designed to represent the possible moves of such inquiry games through three types of epistemic actions: agents addressing questions to Nature, agents addressing questions to other agents, agents drawing logical inferences. We then show how the resulting framework can be used to formally define multi-agent inquiry games. We conclude by evaluating the interest of the DEL $$_\mathrm{IMI }$$ IMI system for the IMI and DELs paradigms. (shrink)

Recently, it has become a custom to treat questions as a game between two subjects. Unfortunately, one rarely goesbeyond the scheme of Questioner-Scientist and Answerer-Nature, althoughthe Interlocutor so conceived displays some undesirable features. This paperargues for the idea that logic of questions can be build as a logic of the gamebetween “knowledge resources” persons or theories, rather than errant Scientist and omniscient Nature. To this end the concept of epistemically-possibleworlds is discussed, which is conceived as analogous to that of possible (...) worldsin modal logic. And, furthermore, the concepts of relation of epistemic alternativeness and of epistemically-alternative worlds are introduced. On thisbasis a version of semantics for propositional, three-valued logic of questionsis offered and semantic proofs of some theses are given. (shrink)