Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity.Peter Olen - 2016 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    While Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy is often depicted in an ahistorical fashion, this book explores the consequences of placing his work in its historical context. In order to show how Sellars’ early publications depend on contextual factors, Peter Olen reconstructs the conceptions of language, psychological, and social explanation that dominated American philosophy in the early 20th century. Because of Sellars’ differing explanations of language and behaviour, Olen argues that many of Sellars’ early commitments are incompatible with his later works. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • From Formalism to Psychology: Metaphilosophical Shifts in Wilfrid Sellars’s Early Works.Peter Olen - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (1):24-63.
    When discussing Wilfrid Sellars’s philosophy, very little work has been done to offer a developmental account of his systematic views. More often than not, Sellars’s complex views are presented in a systematic and holistic fashion that ignores any periodization of his work. I argue that there is a metaphilosophical shift in Sellars’s early philosophy that results in substantive changes to his conception of language, linguistic rules, and normativity. Specifically, I claim that Sellars’s shift from a formalist metaphilosophy to one more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Pragmatic validity in Mannheim and Dewey: a reassessment of the epistemological critique of Ideology and Utopia.Rodney D. Nelson - 1995 - History of the Human Sciences 8 (3):25-45.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Less Said The Better: Dewey, Neurath, and Mid-Century Theories of Truth.John Capps - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (1):164-191.
    John Dewey’s theory of truth is widely viewed as proposing to substitute “warranted assertibility” for “truth,” a proposal that has faced serious objections since the late 1930s. By examining Dewey’s theory in its historical context – and, in particular, by drawing parallels with Otto Neurath’s concurrent attempts to develop a non-correspondence, non-formal theory of truth – I aim to shed light on Dewey’s underlying objectives. Dewey and Neurath were well-known to each other and, as their writing and correspondence make clear, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations