Machiavelli’s historical writings, notably the Discourses on Livy and the Florentine Histories, continued the tradition of the humanist historical enterprise. They were informed by th...

The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science —as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradition which aimed to develop (...) a coherent philosophical view of science, qua a part of culture with distinctive epistemic features and a distinctive relation to reality. But, second, this tradition went through some important conceptual shifts which re-oriented it and made it more sensitive to the actual development of science itself. The historical narrative focuses on three such moments: the defining moment, associated with Aristotle, and two major conceptual turns, related to Kant and Duhem. The pressures on the very idea of a general philosophy of science that followed the collapse of the macro-models of science that became popular in the 1960s, the pressures that lay all of the emphasis on fragmentation and not on integration, can be dealt with by a new synthesis within general philosophy of science of the constitutive and the historical, in light of the intellectual tradition that has defined it. (shrink)

This chapter examines the tension between philosophical construction and classical interpretation. It analyses Zhu Xi’s very specific philosophical interpretations of early classics, such as the Four Books. As an example of the cross-cultural disputes among the East Asian Confucians, Huang introduces the middle-Tokugawa Confucians’ criticisms of Zhu’s abstract interpretations.

This paper challenges a near universal assumption regarding the third treatise of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality : that its main concern is to explain the attraction or power of the ascetic ideal. I argue that GM III’s main concern is normative rather than descriptive-explanatory. An earlier paper argues that GM III’s leading question – What is the meaning of the ascetic ideal? – is equivalent to the question: What is the value of the ascetic ideal? In the present (...) paper, I interpret an aspect of GM III ignored in the earlier paper: the will to power principle of GM III 7, which seems to claim that all human behavior is to be explained in terms of the will to power. I argue that the principle’s true function is normative rather than explanatory: to indicate how philosophers are best or ideally or healthily constituted, in particular, regarding sexuality. I also offer a normative account of what Nietzsche means by ‘interpretation’ in GM III and an argument against the surprisingly well-accepted view that a Nietzschean philosopher would either have little interest in sexual activity or would resist whatever interest he or she had in it. I end with brief suggestions as to the positive contribution Nietzsche thinks sexuality makes to philosophy. (shrink)

In Nietzsche scholarship, little has been done regarding Nietzsche’s reflections on penology and criminology. This dissertation aims to critically examine Friedrich Nietzsche’s thoughts on justice, punishment, and the criminal and to show that his interest in these topics runs throughout his writings. Nietzsche attacked the tradition of Western justice theory and the idea that justice consists in giving each their due. I argue that in place of this notion of justice, he puts forth a non-metaphysical, naturalistic account of justice that (...) refuses to judge and hold man accountable. In addition, I explicate Nietzsche’s passionate critique of punishment, which stops short of calling for its complete abolition, and the various alternatives he sets forth in place of punishing. Finally, I demonstrate that Nietzsche’s reflections on criminality amount to a defense of the criminal whom he considers a valuable and essential feature of society. Nietzsche’s reflections on justice, punishment, and the criminal are important and warrant closer consideration for several reasons. First, these topics intersect with several major themes within Nietzsche’s work, such as causality, freedom, responsibility, guilt, ressentiment, hierarchy of rank, and greatness, or nobility. Second, a thorough understanding of punishment, and its relationship to justice and revenge are essential to understanding why Nietzsche rejects traditional morality and the values he wishes to call forth in its place. Third, his rejection of the traditional notion of justice as revenge, and his affirmation of mercy, as well as his insistence upon overcoming the desire to punish, undermines the idea that he is a champion of violence and cruelty. Fourth, these topics contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of what Nietzsche means by greatness and advances our knowledge of his ideal-types and moral exemplars. Finally, a thorough understanding of Nietzsche’s treatment of justice, punishment, and the criminal lends a coherent dimension to his positive ethics, his political theory, and his vision for society. While some critics have claimed that Nietzsche’s reflections on justice and punishment yield nothing of practical use, this dissertation demonstrates that Nietzsche not only provides valuable critiques but also valuable philosophical and psychological insights concerning justice, punishment, criminal law, and criminal justice reform. (shrink)