I examine how James Baldwin explored white ignorance—as conceived by Charles Mills—in his work. I argue that Baldwin helps us understand Mills’s account of white ignorance more deeply, showing that while only mentioned briefly by Mills, Baldwin provides fruitful insights into the phenomenon. I also consider the resources Baldwin provides to find a way out of white ignorance. My aim is to link these thinkers in ways that have been largely ignored.

This article engages with Johann Arnason’s approach to the entanglements of culture and power in comparative civilizational analysis by simultaneously reframing the themes of the civilizing process and the public sphere. It comments and expands upon some key insights of Arnason concerning the work of Norbert Elias and Jürgen Habermas by adopting an ‘Islamic perspective’ on the processes of singularization of power from its cultural bases and of reconstruction of a modern collective identity merging the steering capacities and the participative (...) ambitions of an emerging urban intelligentsia. The Islamic perspective provides insights into the interplay between civilizing processes and the modes through which cultural traditions innervate a modern public sphere. By revisiting key remarks of Arnason on Elias and Habermas, the Islamic perspective gains original contours, reflecting the search for a type of modernity that is eccentric to the mono-civilizational axis of the Western-led, global civilizing process. While this eccentric positioning entails a severe imbalance of power, it also relativizes the centrality of the modern state in the civilizing process and evidences some original traits of the public sphere in a non-Western context. (shrink)

This article outlines a comparative-civilizational multiple modernities perspective on political sociology. In the context of the major currents within political sociology — modernization approaches, critical and neo-Marxist as well as postmodern and global approaches — it is argued that a comparative-civilizational multiple modernities perspective is defined by several characteristics. First, against functionalist-evolutionist modernization approaches it emphasizes the fragility, contradictions and openness as well as civilizational multiplicity of political modernity and political modernization processes. Second, against critical and neo-Marxist approaches, it insists (...) on the cultural and institutional contradictions of political power, social protest and political conflict. Third, against post-modern and post-colonial micro-sociological approaches, often primarily micro-sociological, it holds to a macro-sociological constructivist orientation. Fourth, against the primarily socio-economic and political-institutional approaches to global political sociology, it again emphasizes the historically changing, culturally contradictory and pluri-civilizational dimensions of international relations and world politics. Though sharing with all these major currents in political sociology some common ground, the outlined comparative-civilizational multiple modernities perspective conceptualizes and analyses, more specifically, the varying impacts of civilizations, empires and world religions on the complex dimensions and levels of the political arena and on power relations in a modernizing and globalizing world. (shrink)

How can the relative inability of social theory to shed light on the horrors of the late twentieth century be reconciled with the fact that both history and social science earlier devoted themselves to arriving at an understanding of war and violence in the modern world? An answer is provided in five steps. First, the disciplinary evolution of the social science disciplines tends to make them oblivious of important parts of their own heritage and opens up a chasm between the (...) social and the historical sciences. Second, the contribution of military experiences to the formation of the policy orientation of modern social sciences renders them less rather than more capable of reflecting upon war as a societal and historical phenomenon. Third, rational choice theory and historical sociology are relatively unable to arrive at an understanding of the cultural constitution of modernity and share a naturalistic conception of war and violence. Fourth, at least five features of war in the late twentieth century transcend the experiences of modernity. Fifth, in order to grasp these features conceptually, social theory has to acknowledge different varieties of modernity seriously, to elaborate a historical phenomenology of the experiences of war and violence, and to arrive at an actionbased explanation of wars in their societal and historical context. (shrink)

The religious borders of Europe, which are more evident and controversial than ever, challenge established forms of political legitimacy and the legal requirements for citizenship. Perhaps covertly rather than overtly, they shape politics and policies. While scholars have once again resorted to Edward Said’s Orientalism to describe the dynamic at play, this article argues that the Orientalism narrative of East and West is too simple to capture the actual complexity of Europe’s borders. There are four religious and thus four cultural-symbolic (...) borders, which are increasingly defining the continent: north-western Europe is Protestant, southern Europe is Catholic, the East is Orthodox and increasingly nationalist, and the South and Near East are Muslim. The cultural purity and the values that Europe craves in search of identity and order are simply not available in a world of global interconnectedness and social diversity. (shrink)

In the course of their disciplinary consolidation during the 19th and 20th centuries, the social sciences came increasingly to be less historically orientated. Analogously, global history became increasingly a marginal concern for professional historical scholarship. At the present juncture, however, there is a coincidence of a rethinking of the formation of modernity in cultural terms and the need to locate European modernity in a global context. Social theory must be able to provide an account of global historical developments that is (...) less constrained and biased than modernization theory, even in the new garb of globalization studies, but significantly more elaborate in conceptual terms than current contributions to global history. A rethinking of the formation of modernity has already contributed to a greater appreciation of processes of cultural and ideational transformations. It has also suggested new ways of studying institutional change. It must, however, also be able to locate the specific European trajectory in a global context. The core element in such a research programme is the analysis of three major periods of global cultural crystallization, namely the Axial Age, the ecumenical renaissance, and the formation of modernity. The rationale and the contours of this research programme are outlined. (shrink)

Islamic culture may be labelled a ‘superculture’ on account of its richness, whose living message goes from the peasants of the Indian subcontinent to Africa, for instance, dating back fourteen centuries in time. The author contrasts with an Islam that is frozen in its medieval form an Islam capable of inventing new solutions. The drama of today’s Muslim populations is living under the sign of a failure to adapt, because there has been no adequate analysis of the demands of their (...) time. But there is a social message in Islam, of brotherhood, justice, effort, liberation, which remains to be translated into a project for joint action for current generations. There is integration, the complementarity of individual action, collective effort and spirituality. But the integration of the sacred into social life is so ‘un-contemporary’ that in Islamic lands an extra effort is required to grasp its true implications. (shrink)