Most anti-paternalists claim that informed and competent self-regarding choices are protected by autonomy, while ill-informed or impaired self-regarding choices are not. Joel Feinberg, among many others, argues that we can in this way distinguish impermissible “hard” paternalism from permissible “soft” paternalism. I argue that this view confronts two related problems in its treatment of ill-informed decision-makers. First, it faces a dilemma when applied to decision-makers who are responsible for their ignorance: it either permits too much, or else too little, intervention (...) to satisfy its proponents. Second, the most promising rationales in favor of the view ignore the distinction between an agent’s voluntarily bringing about some state of affairs, on the one hand, and an agent’s voluntarily assuming a risk, on the other. I conclude that a decision-maker’s ignorance is irrelevant to the permissibility of intervention on her behalf. If it is permissible to intervene in a given ill-informed choice, it would be permissible to intervene in an otherwise similar but informed choice, at least provided that intervention would produce similar benefits in both cases. This shows that we should sometimes accept straightforwardly paternalistic rationales. (shrink)

H. L. A. Hart in his Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) defended the view that legal paternalism and legal moralism can be clearly distinguished from each other. Hart also stated that while legal moralism is always unacceptable, paternalistic laws are often justifiable. In this paper it is argued that Hart held the right view for the wrong reasons. Hart defended legal paternalism by claiming, against J. S. Mill, that for various psychological reasons individuals do not know their own interests best. (...) It will be shown in the paper that if this view is taken, it is impossible to reject legal moralism. The fact that paternalism is sometimes justifiable while moralism is not can be more firmly founded on a distinction made by C. L. Ten (1971). Ten's point is that in matters which concern only the individuals themselves, their actions cannot be legitimately restricted by appeals to the consequences of their action alone. Paternalistic control can be justified only if the decision-making abilities of the controlled individual are temporarily diminished. (shrink)

This essay argues that Dworkin, Feinberg and others who claim exceptions against the principle of paternalism for the sake of preventing seroius physical harm are forced to treat mature adults as mental incompetents and that they are forced to do so by the prevailing concept of paternalism itself. The essay then shows how we can get around this dilemma by re-thinking paternalism as part of distinctly paternal relationships of domination and inequality.

This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, (...) in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis. (shrink)

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...) despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored. (shrink)

What I wish to do in this paper is to look at a part of John Stuart Mill's ‘one very simple principle’ for determining the limits of state intervention. This principle is, you will remember, that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’.

This paper scrutinizes the tension between individuals’ rights and paternalism. I will argue that no normative account that includes rights of individuals can justify hard paternalism since the infringement of a right can only be justified with the right or interest of another person, which is never the case in hard paternalism. Justifications of hard paternalistic actions generally include a deviation from the very idea of having rights. The paper first introduces Tom Beauchamp as the most famous contemporary hard paternalist (...) by outlining his moral theory (principlism) and showing why it, as it stands, has to allow for hard paternalism. Secondly, the paper focuses on the notion of rights within principlism. I will employ traditional theories of rights to make sense of rights in principlism. Unfortunately, this attempt fails. In the third part, then, I claim that rights can only be limited with reference to the rights or interests of others. This structure is the very point of rights, it is their bite. I will argue for this claim and show its implications. The most important implication is that not only principlism, but every normative theory that includes rights of individuals, has to abolish hard paternalism. (shrink)

Among fundamental, widely shared values, there are two which often come into conflict, creating a serious moral dilemma, viz., the value of individual well-being and the value of individual self-direction. These values issue in two fundamental moral principles, one which prescribes the protection of others from harm, and one which proscribes interfering with a person's right to direct his own life and actions. When an individual is doing or choosing something which subjects him to harm or significant risk of harm, (...) the question of paternalistic interference arises.Since John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, there have been a number of attempts to say when such protective interference with adults is morally acceptable. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the commonly held view that paternalism is all things considered wrong when it interferes with a person’s autonomy. I begin by noting that the plausibility of this view rests on the assumption that there is a morally relevant difference in the normative reasons concerning an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions. I demonstrate that this assumption cannot be grounded by wellbeing reasons, and that autonomy-based reasons of non-interference (...) also cannot adequately explain the difference. Following this, I propose that the difference in the reasons related to an intervention in a person’s self-regarding actions and an intervention in his other-regarding actions can be explained by the value of holding a person responsible for his choices. Nonetheless, this does not result in paternalistic behavior that interferes with autonomy being all things considered wrong. Instead, I show that the reason to hold a person responsible for a diminution of his wellbeing does not necessarily defeat the wellbeing reasons that count in favor of paternalistic behavior. (shrink)

In 1987, Machan provided a libertarian case against the right to occupational safety. Since before Machan’s essay appeared, many business ethicists and legal scholars have given considerable attention to the overall position Machan endorses: the acceptance of employment at will and the rejection of employee rights. No one yet has given adequate attention, however, to the fact that Machan’s argument against the right to occupational safety actually stands or falls independently of his overall position on employee rights. His argument ultimately (...) rests on two values: the promotion of employee interests and anti-paternalism. Insofar as those who support the right to occupational safety share those values, they must find a strategy for opposing Machan’s argument that preserves those values. In this paper, I demonstrate why Machan’s argument ultimately rests on the promotion of employee interests and anti-paternalism. Then, I develop an objection to Machan’s argument that preserves those values. (shrink)

What I wish to do in this paper is to look at a part of John Stuart Mill's ‘one very simple principle’ for determining the limits of state intervention. This principle is, you will remember, that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’.

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...) despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored. (shrink)