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Perspectives on time and memory: an introduction

In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: issues in philosophy and psychology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-33 (2001)

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  1. Remembering-that: Episodic vs. semantic.Andrew Naylor - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):317 - 322.
    In a paper "The intentionality of memory," Jordi Fernández (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way of drawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.
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  • On being stuck in time.Christoph Hoerl - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):485-500.
    It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental (...)
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  • Tensed Belief.Vasilis Tsompanidis - 2011 - Dissertation, University of California Santa Barbara
    Human beings seem to capture time and the temporal properties of events and things in thought by having beliefs usually expressed with statements using tense, or notions such as ‘now’, ‘past’ or ‘future’. Tensed beliefs like these seem indispensable for correct reasoning and timely action. For instance, my belief that my root canal is over seems inexpressible with a statement that does not use tense or a temporal indexical. However, the dominant view on the nature of time is that it (...)
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  • Remembering events and remembering looks.Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):351-372.
    I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the (...)
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  • Are Events Things of the Past?Julian Bacharach - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):381-412.
    A popular claim in recent philosophy of mind and action is that events only exist once they are over. This has been taken to have the consequence that many temporal phenomena cannot be understood ‘from the inside’, as they are unfolding, purely in terms of events. However, as I argue here, the claim that events exist only when over is incoherent. I consider two ways of understanding the claim and the notion of existence it involves: one that ties existence to (...)
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  • Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (...)
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  • The Role of Memory Science in the Philosophy of Memory.Sarah Robins - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (10):e12880.
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  • Une défense de l’approche simulationniste du souvenir épisodique.Denis Perrin - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (1):39-76.
    RÉSUMÉ: Dans cette étude, je propose d’appliquer au cas du souvenir épisodique le débat qui oppose le simulationnisme à l’approche théorie-théorique. Après avoir critiqué l’approche théorie-théorique, je défends une solution simulationniste du problème du rapport entre la phénoménologie du souvenir épisodique et la conscience de soi qui s’y manifeste. Je soutiens que la subjectivité s’introduit dans le contenu même du souvenir épisodique, mais qu’elle le fait non pas en tant qu’élément du contenu mais sous la forme du caractère perspectif qu’elle (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Minimalist Approach to the Development of Episodic Memory.James Russell & Robert Hanna - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):29-54.
    Episodic memory is usually regarded in a Conceptualist light, in the sense of its being dependent upon the grasp of concepts directly relevant to the act of episodic recollection itself, such as a concept of past times and of the self as an experiencer. Given this view, its development is typically timed as being in the early school-age years. We present a minimalist, Non-Conceptualist approach in opposition to this view, but one that also exists in clear contrast to the kind (...)
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  • Belief from the Past.Andrew Naylor - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):598-620.
    Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor (...)
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  • Remembering without storing: beyond archival models in the science and philosophy of human memory.Ian O'Loughlin - 2014 - Dissertation,
    Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and (...)
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  • (1 other version)A Minimalist Approach to the Development of Episodic Memory.Robert Hanna James Russell - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (1):29-54.
    Episodic memory is usually regarded in a Conceptualist light, in the sense of its being dependent upon the grasp of concepts directly relevant to the act of episodic recollection itself, such as a concept of past times and of the self as an experiencer. Given this view, its development is typically timed as being in the early school‐age years (Perner, 2001;Tulving, 2005). We present a minimalist, Non‐Conceptualist approach in opposition to this view, but one that also exists in clear contrast (...)
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  • Factors affecting conscious awareness in the recollective experience of adults with Asperger’s syndrome.Dermot M. Bowler, John M. Gardiner & Sebastian B. Gaigg - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):124-143.
    Bowler, Gardiner, and Grice have shown a small but significant impairment of autonoetic awareness or remembering involved in the episodic memory experiences of adults with Asperger’s syndrome. This was compensated by an increase in experiences of noetic awareness or knowing. The question remains as to whether the residual autonoetic awareness in Asperger individuals is qualitatively the same as that of typical comparison participants. Three experiments are presented in which manipulations that have shown differential effects on different kinds of conscious awareness (...)
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