En el presente trabajo proponemos analizar la lectura procleana del pasaje de _Leyes _X 896a y ss. –donde Platón parece hacer descansar todos los actos de los cuerpos en una causalidad de orden divino y psicológico– como una respuesta a lo antes dicho por Plutarco al respecto. El queroneata sostiene que, según Platón, el mal es causado por un alma mala, que en eterna lucha con el alma buena, oficia de causa mecánica y de principio rector del cosmos (_De Iside (...) et Osiride _370b-371a; _De animae procreatione in Plato Timaeo _1014a-f). A nuestro criterio, es contra lo anterior que se centra el esfuerzo procleano para señalar que el mal no existe en su pureza, ni en las entidades superiores (como lo es el alma del mundo o Alma-hipóstasis) aunque sí como una desviación que se da en las almas humanas individuales y que opera como una entidad parasitaria (_De malorum subsistentia _I, 20-23). Aspiramos a esgrimir argumentos que muestren en qué sentido Proclo defiende el principio Uno-Bien, que no puede tener contrarios, y la existencia del mal en las entidades inferiores sin negar la contingencia ni culpar al cosmos del mal. (shrink)

Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake (...) of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The purpose of this paper is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of the all is not identical to the Form of the good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff. (shrink)