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  1. A Neural Network Framework for Cognitive Bias.Johan E. Korteling, Anne-Marie Brouwer & Alexander Toet - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:358644.
    Human decision making shows systematic simplifications and deviations from the tenets of rationality (‘heuristics’) that may lead to suboptimal decisional outcomes (‘cognitive biases’). There are currently three prevailing theoretical perspectives on the origin of heuristics and cognitive biases: a cognitive-psychological, an ecological and an evolutionary perspective. However, these perspectives are mainly descriptive and none of them provides an overall explanatory framework for the underlying mechanisms of cognitive biases. To enhance our understanding of cognitive heuristics and biases we propose a neural (...)
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  • Adaptively Rational Learning.Sarah Wellen & David Danks - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):87-102.
    Research on adaptive rationality has focused principally on inference, judgment, and decision-making that lead to behaviors and actions. These processes typically require cognitive representations as input, and these representations must presumably be acquired via learning. Nonetheless, there has been little work on the nature of, and justification for, adaptively rational learning processes. In this paper, we argue that there are strong reasons to believe that some learning is adaptively rational in the same way as judgment and decision-making. Indeed, overall adaptive (...)
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  • Assessing the Evidence for Outcome Bias and Hindsight Bias.Mikkel Gerken - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):237-252.
    Outcome bias and hindsight bias are important in philosophical debates and have wide-ranging implications outside of philosophy. Recently, Hedden has articulated a novel line of argumnt that the empirical evidence for what he labels hindsight bias is largely misguided and that empirical researchers who postulate such a bias are engaged in a fallacy fallacy. In this paper, I articulate Hedden’s core insights in terms of two principles and argue that in the relevant empirical research, these principles are often (i) recognized, (...)
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  • Ethical Blindness.Guido Palazzo, Franciska Krings & Ulrich Hoffrage - 2012 - Journal of Business Ethics 109 (3):323-338.
    Many models of (un)ethical decision making assume that people decide rationally and are in principle able to evaluate their decisions from a moral point of view. However, people might behave unethically without being aware of it. They are ethically blind. Adopting a sensemaking approach, we argue that ethical blindness results from a complex interplay between individual sensemaking activities and context factors.
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  • The Revenge of Ecological Rationality: Strategy-Selection by Meta-Induction Within Changing Environments.Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn - 2016 - Minds and Machines 26 (1-2):31-59.
    According to the paradigm of adaptive rationality, successful inference and prediction methods tend to be local and frugal. As a complement to work within this paradigm, we investigate the problem of selecting an optimal combination of prediction methods from a given toolbox of such local methods, in the context of changing environments. These selection methods are called meta-inductive strategies, if they are based on the success-records of the toolbox-methods. No absolutely optimal MI strategy exists—a fact that we call the “revenge (...)
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  • How many hindsight biases are there?Hartmut Blank, Steffen Nestler, Gernot von Collani & Volkhard Fischer - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1408-1440.
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  • Extending the range of adaptive misbelief: Memory “distortions” as functional features.Pascal Boyer, Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):513-514.
    A large amount of research in cognitive psychology is focused on memory distortions, understood as deviations from various (largely implicit) standards. Many alleged distortions actually suggest a highly functional system that balances the cost of acquiring new information with the benefit of relevant, contextually appropriate decision-making. In this sense many memories may be examples of functionally adaptive misbelief.
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