Concerned about widespread incompetence among voters in democratic societies, epistocrats propose quasi-democratic electoral systems that amplify the voices of competent voters while silencing (or perhaps just subduing) the voices of those deemed incompetent. In order to amplify the voices of the competent we first need to know what counts as political competence, and then we need a way of identifying those who possess the relevant characteristics. After developing an account of what it means to be politically competent, I argue that (...) there is no way for the epistocrat to identify such persons. Therefore, epistocracy cannot be implemented. (shrink)

The current coronavirus pandemic has presented many scientific disciplines, including philosophy, with various theoretical and practical challenges. In this paper, we deal with three philosophical issues related to the pandemic and specific approaches to them. The first part of the article is dedicated to the analysis of the term?expert,? whose significance was highlighted at the outbreak of the pandemic. By examining Plato?s ancient and Goldman?s modern understanding of this concept, we will try to emphasize the importance of expert opinion in (...) crisis circumstances. In the second part of the paper, we will deal with the issue of public mistrust of scientific authorities as well as the problem of the flourishing of so-called conspiracy theories. Goldenberg?s and Cassam?s approach to this topic will help us see where the source of these problems might lie and what potentially harmful consequences they can produce. In the third part of the text, we list some of the main moral dilemmas we have faced since the beginning of the pandemic. Special attention is paid to Kant?s moral philosophy in which we find advice on how an individual should act in times of crisis. (shrink)

Epistemic democrats are rightly concerned with the quality of outcomes and judge democratic procedures in terms of their ability to ‘track the truth’. However, their impetus to assess ‘rule by experts’ and ‘rule by the people’ as mutually exclusive has led to a meagre treatment of the role of expert knowledge in democracy. Expertise is often presented as a threat to democracy but is also crucial for enlightened political processes. Contemporary political philosophy has so far paid little attention to our (...) reliance on experts and has not sufficiently addressed the question of how expertise can be used to improve the epistemic quality of democratic decision making. We believe this lack of interest is spurred by a too hasty acceptance of arguments dismissive of the political role of experts. The article examines a series of often-cited epistemic objections and concludes that several of them are overstated or misconceived, yet they all reflect real difficulties that need to be addressed. On this background, we tentatively outline a set of mechanisms that can contribute to alleviating the irreducible problem of epistemic asymmetries and ensuring that experts really are experts and use their expertise in the right way. (shrink)