The following article presents preliminary reflections on a processual theory of health and disease. It does this by steering the discussion more toward an ontology of organisms rather than conceptual analysis of the semantic content of the terms “health” and “disease.” In the first section, four meta-theoretical assumptions of the traditional debate are identified and alternative approaches to the problems are presented. Afterwards, the view that health and disease are constituted by a dynamic relation between demands imposed on an organism (...) and individual presuppositions for adequate response is developed. In the last section, the paper takes stock of three possible objections to and clarifies some implications of this approach to the notions of health and disease. (shrink)

This article approaches the ethical dilemma of healthcare allocation and rationing from the perspective of pragmatist ethics, mainly following John Dewey’s ethics. The moral dilemma of healthcare allocation arises whenever we allocate limited resources, and rationing is a necessary option for distributing available resources. In a broader sense, the moral problems of healthcare allocation also encompass the issue of access to primary healthcare, especially for low-income sections of communities. In this sense, allocation always entails rationing – denying service to someone (...) for the benefit of others. Such aspects of allocation and rationing and the relational aspect of disease and health make the problem morally controversial, which makes it difficult to agree on a principle or principles of allocation and rationing applicable across different contexts. Hence, this paper argues that moral challenges of healthcare rationing ought not to be addressed through the appeal to principles, but rather through deliberation that embraces a more pragmatic and democratic approach to negotiating health resource allocation and rationing. However, this does not mean that moral principles and values are insignificant in healthcare allocation. (shrink)

This article investigates five kinds of vagueness in medicine: disciplinary, ontological, conceptual, epistemic, and vagueness with respect to descriptive-prescriptive connections. First, medicine is a discipline with unclear borders, as it builds on a wide range of other disciplines and subjects. Second, medicine deals with many indistinct phenomena resulting in borderline cases. Third, medicine uses a variety of vague concepts, making it unclear which situations, conditions, and processes that fall under them. Fourth, medicine is based on and produces uncertain knowledge and (...) evidence. Fifth, vagueness emerges in medicine as a result of a wide range of fact-value-interactions. The various kinds of vagueness in medicine can explain many of the basic challenges of modern medicine, such as overdiagnosis, underdiagnosis, and medicalization. Even more, it illustrates how complex and challenging the field of medicine is, but also how important contributions from the philosophy can be for the practice of medicine. By clarifying and, where possible, reducing or limiting vagueness, philosophy can help improving care. Reducing the various types of vagueness can improve clinical decision-making, informing individuals, and health policy making. (shrink)

Philosophers of medicine have formulated different accounts of the concept of disease. Which concept of disease one assumes has implications for what conditions count as diseases and, by extension, who may be regarded as having a disease and for who may be accorded the social privileges and personal responsibilities associated with being sick. In this article, we consider an ideal diagnostic test for coronavirus disease 2019 infection with respect to four groups of people—positive and asymptomatic; positive and symptomatic; negative; and (...) untested—and show how different concepts of disease impact on the disease and sickness judgements for these groups. The suggestion is that sickness judgements and social measures akin to those experienced during the current COVID-19 outbreak presuppose a concept of disease containing social harm as a component. We indicate the problems that arise when adopting this kind of disease concept beyond a state of emergency. (shrink)

This section welcomes submissions addressing literature as a means to explore ethical issues arising in healthcare. “Literature” will be understood broadly, including fiction and creative nonfiction, illness narratives, drama, and poetry; film studies might be considered if the films are adaptations from a literary work. Topics include in-depth analysis of literary works as well as theoretical contributions, discussions, and commentary about narrative approaches to disease and medicine, the way literature shapes the relationship between patients and healthcare professionals, the role of (...) speculative fiction as a testing ground for future scenarios in healthcare, and so on. Articles discussing the uses of literature for bioethics education and outreach will be particularly appreciated. Research on literature not originally written in English will be considered as long as it has also been published in translation. Submissions should include an abstract and should conform to theCQGuidelines for Contributors. To submit an article or discuss a suitable topic, write to Antonio Casado da Rocha [email protected].:This article proposes a concept of narrative autonomy to supplement existing accounts in healthcare ethics. This is done by means of a comparison between three end-of-life scenarios: Tolstoy’sThe Death of Ivan Ilyichand two related contemporary stories by Lorrie Moore and Bernhard Schlink, which explore some problems arising when extremely individualistic notions of patient autonomy are put into practice. It is argued that the best model for palliative care is a cooperative one in which patient autonomy is understood as essentially social, and that involves decisional, executive, informational, and narrative dimensions. (shrink)

A fundamental aim in caring practice is to understand patients' experiences of ill‐health. These experiences have a qualitative content and cannot, unlike thoughts and beliefs with conceptual content, directly be expressed in words. Nurses therefore face a variety of interpretive challenges when they aim to understand patients' subjective perspectives on disease and illness. The article argues that theories on social simulation can shed light on how nurses manage to meet these challenges. The core assumption of social simulationism is that we (...) do not understand other people by forming mental representations of how they think, but by putting ourselves in their situation in a more imaginative way. According to simulationism, any attempt to understand a patient's behavior is made on the basis of simulating what it is like to be that patient in the given context. The article argues that this approach to social interpretation can clarify how nurses manage to achieve aims of patient understanding, even when they have limited time to communicate and incomplete knowledge of patients' perspectives. Furthermore, simulation theory provides a normative framework for interpretation, in the sense that its theoretical assumptions constitute ideals for how nurses should seek to understand patients' experiences of illness. (shrink)

It is fundamental assumption in nursing theory that it is important for nurses to understand how patients experience states of ill health. This assumption is often related to aims of empathic understanding, but normative principles of social interpretation can have an important action‐guiding role whenever nurses seek to understand patients’ subjective horizons on the basis of active or passive expressions of meaning. The aim of this article is to present a philosophical theory of concept possession and to argue that it (...) can shed light on how nurses should seek to understand patients’ subjective perspectives on the meaning of illness. The two basic ideas in the theory are that patients’ beliefs and thoughts about their experiences involve concepts and that concepts can be communicated on the basis of shared implicit conceptions of what they mean. These conditions of understanding have a striking application: nurse‐patient communication is limited by many contextual factors, but it is often possible for nurses to detect shared implicit conceptions of the meaning of concepts of disease and illness. Furthermore, by acting as sympathetic linguistic experts and creating an atmosphere for dialogue, nurses can make patients feel comfortable about deferring to medical explanations of meaning that can constitute a communicative platform. The last part of the article uses a number of cases studies to show how these implications can be implemented as conceptual tools for securing meaningful communication about illness experiences in patient dialogue. (shrink)

In contrast to the “normativist” view, “naturalist” theorists claim that the concept of health refers to natural or normal states and propose different characterizations of healthy and diseased conditions that are meant to be objectivist and biologically grounded. In this article, we examine the core concept of these naturalist accounts of disease, i.e., the concept of biological malfunction, and develop a new formulation of the notion of malfunction following the recent organizational approach to functions in the philosophy of biology. We (...) focus on the notions of adaptive regulation and functional presupposition to develop a new conceptual framework that justifies the ascription of malfunctional behaviors to biological systems according to the embodied normativity of biological organizations. (shrink)

In 2012, the symposium "Christopher Boorse and the Philosophy of Medicine" was held at the University of Hamburg. The initial ideas presented at this event, which celebrated Chris's contribution to the development of what is now a vibrant area of research, especially to the theory of disease, form the core of the papers published in this issue. Similarly to what Robert Nozick once said about John Rawls's work, it can be demanded that philosophers of medicine must now either work within (...) Boorse's theory or explain why not. It is simply the main contender in the so-called naturalist camp of contributions to the theory of disease. All of the papers in this issue address his approach in some respect, and all of them are friendly toward his theory up to a point. In this brief introduction, I try to extract common threads. In doing so, I focus on three issues that have the capacity to determine future debates. The first is the methodology of developing a theory of disease, especially what conceptual analysis amounts to and what it may achieve. The second is the issue of value-ladenness of the concepts of health and disease, a topic that has been at the forefront of the philosophical debate, but which -- to my mind -- has often been misunderstood. The third issue is the problem of the unity of medical terminology. We can ask whether there is only one core medical concept, be it "disease," "pathology," "disorder," "malady," or something else. Alternatively, we might propose different concepts for different purposes. (shrink)

Influential holistic analyses of patient perspectives assume that the concepts that patients associate with medical terms are formed by their total social and cultural contexts. Holistic analyses presuppose conceptual role semantics in the sense that they imply that a medical term must have the same role for a nurse and a patient in order for them to associate the same concept with the term. In recent philosophy of mind, social externalism has emerged as a non‐holistic alternative to conceptual role theories. (...) According to social externalism, a nurse and a patient express the same concept by a term if they both have a minimal or better understanding of the term. Three arguments in favour of social externalism are presented in connection with nurse–patient interaction. The first concerns successful communication, the second focuses on belief reports made by patients and the third centres on the need for including medical terms in medical discourse. Finally, the practical implications of the arguments are clarified. The most important of these is that, in cases of misunderstanding, a nurse should not conform to a patient's idiosyncratic understanding, but instead correct the mistaken applications of the term in question. (shrink)

There is a profound paradox in modern medical knowledge production: The more we know, the more we know that we (still) do not know. Nowhere is this more visible than in diagnostics and early detection of disease. As we identify ever more markers, predictors, precursors, and risk factors of disease ever earlier, we realize that we need knowledge about whether they develop into something experienced by the person and threatening to the person’s health. This study investigates how advancements in science (...) and technology alter one type of uncertainty, i.e., temporal uncertainty of disease diagnosis. As diagnosis is related to anamnesis and prognosis it identifies how uncertainties in all these fields are interconnected. In particular, the study finds that uncertainty in disease diagnosis has become more subject to prognostic uncertainty because diagnosis is more connected to technologically detected indicators and less closely connected to manifest and experienced disease. These temporal uncertainties pose basic epistemological and ethical challenges as they can result in overdiagnosis, overtreatment, unnecessary anxiety and fear, useless and even harmful diagnostic odysseys, as well as vast opportunity costs. The point is not to stop our quest for knowledge about disease but to encourage real diagnostic improvements that help more people in ever better manner as early as possible. To do so, we need to pay careful attention to specific types of temporal uncertainty in modern diagnostics. (shrink)

Adaptation to illness, and its relevance for distribution in health care, has been the subject of vigorous debate. In this paper I examine an aspect of this discussion that seems so far to have been overlooked: that some illnesses are difficult, or even impossible, to adapt to. This matters because adaptation reduces suffering. Illness severity is a priority setting criterion in several countries. When considering severity, we are interested in the extent to which an illness makes a person worse-off. I (...) argue that no plausible theory of well-being can disregard suffering when determining to what extent someone is worse-off in terms of health. We should accept, all else equal, that adapting to an illness makes the illness less severe by reducing suffering. Accepting a pluralist theory of well-being allows us to accept my argument, while still making room for the possibility that adaptation is sometimes, all things considered, bad. Finally, I argue that we should conceptualize adaptability as a feature of illness, and thereby account for adaptation on a group level for the purposes of priority setting. (shrink)

How can we draw the line between health and disease? This crucial question of demarcation has immense practical implications and has troubled scholars for ages. The question will be addressed in three steps. First, I will present an important contribution by Rogers and Walker who argue forcefully that no line can be drawn between health and disease. However, a closer analysis of their argument reveals that a line-drawing problem for disease-related features does not necessarily imply a line-drawing problem for disease (...) as such. The second step analyzes some alternative approaches to drawing the line between health and disease. While these approaches do not provide full answers to the question, they indicate that the line-drawing question should not be dismissed too hastily. The third step investigates whether the line-drawing problem can find its solution in the concept of suffering. In particular, I investigate whether returning to the origin of medicine, with the primary and ultimate goal of reducing suffering, may provide sources of demarcation between health and disease. In fact, the reason why we pay attention to particular phenomena as characteristics of disease, consider certain processes to be relevant, and specific functions are classified as dys-functions, is that they are related to suffering. Accordingly, using suffering as a criterion of demarcation between health and disease may hinder a wide range of challenges with modern medicine, such as unwarranted expansion of disease, overdiagnosis, overtreatment, and medicalization. (shrink)

Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology.While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader (...) purview offered by social epistemology opens up opportunities to address new topics such as the role of consensus conferences, epistemic injustice, the value of medical knowledge, continuing medical education, and industry funding. This article situates and summarizes the contributions to this special issue. (shrink)

Norway provides total social welfare coverage for organ transplantations, including free immunosuppressive medication and prepaid life-long follow up for both recipients and donors. Despite these benefits the proportion of living kidney donors has in recent years declined from around 40% of all kidney transplantations to 24%. This study suggests harnessing patient- and donor-narratives as a tool for addressing the current fall in donation rates. The hospital records of 18 recipient/donor dyads were compared with patient and donor accounts elicited in semi-structured (...) interviews. Narratives afford a pertinent supplement to the primarily biomedical and technical information stored in medical records. Even in condensed form, the messages embedded in narratives contribute to a ‘thicker’ understanding of the complexity of living kidney donation -decisions. Narratives represent a source of education for referring-nephrologists wishing to deepen their evaluation skills and avoid making decisions based on insufficient insight into patients’ and potential donors’ values and life-situation. Recipients’ and donors’ unedited accounts of their motivations, worries, doubts and expectations afford a revealing and edifying supplement to the primarily biomedical and technical information stored in medical records. In narratives, the predicaments and dilemmas surrounding LKD become visible and debatable and can serve as support for future donors, recipients and the nephrologists responsible for evaluation–conclusions. Generating narratives raises a number of practical, epistemic and normative challenges. (shrink)

Recent developments in the study of our brain and neurochemical maps have sparked much enthusiasm in some scholars, making room for speculations over the possibility to shape our morality from within ourselves rather than through [failed] socio-political projects. This paper aims at criticising the prospected scenario put forward by some scholars supporting a specific version of Moral Enhancement as an overly optimistically described manipulative tools. To do so, I will focus on a specific version of Moral Enhancers, namely Emotional Enhancers. (...) By looking from close at this group of enhancers and the potential results of their implementation, I will underline the risks that those could pose to sexual minorities, and I will use this analysis to support a much more cautious assessment of these drugs and a broader assessment of what their social acceptance would mean. (shrink)

In his influential theory of health Nordenfelt bases the concepts of health and illness on the notions of ability and disability. A premise for this is that ability and disability provide a more promising, adequate, and useful basis than well-being and suffering. Nordenfelt uses coma and manic episodes as paradigm cases to show that this is so. Do these paradigm cases (and thus the premise) hold? What consequences does it have for the theory of health and illness if it they (...) do not? These are the key questions in this article, which first presents the relationship between pain and disability in Nordenfelt’s theory and the paradigm cases he uses to argue for the primacy of disability over pain. Then, Nordenfelt’s concepts of illness are outlined, highlighting its presumptions and arguments. The main point is that if you do not have an action-theoretical perspective, it is not obvious that disability is the core concept for illness. The compelling effect of the paradigm cases presupposes that you see ability as the primary issue. To those who do not share this presumption, people in coma may not be ill. There are alternative well founded arguments for the primacy of first person experiences for the concept of illness. Hence, we need better arguments for the primacy of disability over first person experiences in illness, or first-person experience should be more primarily included in the concept of illness. (shrink)

The concepts of health and disease are crucial in defining the aim and the limits of modern medicine. Accordingly it is important to understand them and their relationship. However, there appears to be a discrepancy between scholars in philosophy of medicine and health care professionals with regard to these concepts. This article investigates health care professionals’ concepts of health and disease and the relationship between them. In order to do so, four different models are described and analyzed: the ideal model, (...) the holistic model, the medical model and the disjunctive model. The analysis reveals that each model has its pros and cons, and that health care professionals appear to apply more than one models. Furthermore, the models and the way health care professionals’ use them may be helpful for scholars in philosophy of medicine with regard to developing theories and communicating them to health care professionals. (shrink)

“Iatrophilosophy” is defined as the translational discipline between medicine and philosophy that has a double objective, theoretical and practical. It is presented a model of practical iatrophilosophy applied to chronic pain associated with depression and stress—depresalgia—, that expands Phenomenologic, Hermeneutic, Dynamic Psychotherapy (PHD) to the general medical field. It starts from the general model of the medical triad - disease, illness, and sickness- and, in the horizon of Ortega's anthropology, five nuclear metaphors are proposed: greed of the body, anguish of (...) circumstance, personal tear, personal knots, and personal expropriation. These are related to the neurobiological mechanisms of central sensitization, allostasis, and alteration of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. A personal recovery process based on therapeutic concord is proposed. The analysis of chronic pain and other complex health problems can benefit from philosophical methodologies such as clinical hermeneutics. (shrink)

Disease radically changes the life of many people and satisfies formal criteria for being a transformative experience. According to the influential philosophy of Paul, transformative experiences undermine traditional criteria for rational decision-making. Thus, the transformative experience of disease can challenge basic principles and rules in medical ethics, such as patient autonomy and informed consent. This article applies Paul’s theory of transformative experience and its expansion by Carel and Kidd to investigate the implications for medical ethics. It leads to the very (...) uncomfortable conclusion that disease involves transformative experiences in ways that can reduce people’s rational decision-making ability and undermine the basic principle of respect for autonomy and the moral rule of informed consent. While such cases are limited, they are crucial for medical ethics and health policy and deserve more attention and further scrutiny. (shrink)

The long ongoing and partly heated debate on the concept of disease has not led to any consensus on the status of this apparently essential concept for modern health care. The arguments range from claims that the disease concept is vague, slippery, elusive, or complex, and to statements that the concept is indefinable and unnecessary. The unsettled status of the concept of disease is challenging not only to health care where diagnosing, treating, and curing disease are core aims, but also (...) to the branch of philosophy that tries to clarify concepts. This article discusses three claims about the concept of disease: that it is vague, complex, and that it is indefinable. It investigates (a) what is meant by these claims (b) what their implications are, and (c) whether the claims are sound or not. It is argued that some of the arguments are flawed and miss important points about concept analysis. This does not mean, however, that disease is a clear concept with a crisp definition. It only rules out speculative claims that disease necessarily is vague, complex, and indefinable. It appears at least as hard to show that disease is indefinable as it is to define it. (shrink)

This is a review article of Elizabeth Barnes’ new book, Health Problems. In this article, I try to offer a sense of where this exciting sub-discipline of philosophy of medicine has got to. I do that in three ways. First, I make a few comments on the general idea that there are theories of health competing in the field of philosophy of medicine; second, I offer specific comments on the phenomenological approach; and finally, I comment on Barnes’ claim that health (...) is messy. I do not provide an overview of the book but a response to some of its themes. (shrink)

This article analyzes self-disconnection as a phenomenological characterization of a destructive disease such as Alzheimer’s. We want to show that, in the most extreme cases of its development, the patient sinks into emotional disengagement because of the destructive plasticity that affects them. This isolation implies an emotional challenge for family members who observe that their loved one becomes disconnected and that they cannot do anything to prevent it. However, family members seek to assist their loved one in their marginalization. The (...) scope of this accompaniment reveals the human experience of consolation as an intersubjective response to this disconnection. The analysis of this disconnection reveals, in a paradoxical way, the human need to put distance in the face of extreme suffering, and at the same time shows its limit. The anthropological analysis of the devices of actio per distans can offer transcendental support to the ethics of tenderness in the face of the experience of illness. (shrink)

The concepts of disease, illness and sickness capture fundamentally different aspects of phenomena related to human ailments and healthcare. The philosophy and theory of medicine are making manifold efforts to capture the essence and normative implications of these concepts. In parallel, socio-empirical studies on patients’ understanding of their situation have yielded a comprehensive body of knowledge regarding subjective perspectives on health-related statuses. Although both scientific fields provide varied valuable insights, they have not been strongly linked to each other. Therefore, the (...) article aims to scrutinise the normative-ethical implications of patient perspectives in building a bridge to the empirical ethics debates. Three potential fields of tension between the illness and the disease perspective are presented. Consequently, findings from empirical research examining patient perspectives on illness are displayed and the practical implications and associated ethical issues which arise are discussed. This leads to the conclusion that an explicit and elaborate empirical-ethical methodology is needed to deal appropriately with the complex interaction between patients’ views and the medico-professional view of disease. Kon’s four-stage model of normative-empirical collaboration is then applied against the background of empirical data on patient perceptions. Starting from this exemplary approach, the article suggests employing empirical-ethical frameworks for further research on the conceptual and normative issues, as they help to integrate perspectives from the philosophy of medicine with socio-empirical research. The combination of theoretical and empirical perspectives suggested contributes to a more nuanced discussion of the normative impact of patients’ actual understanding of illness. Further empirical research in this area would profit from explicitly considering potential ethical issues to avoid naturalistic fallacies or crypto-normative conclusions that may compromise healthcare practice. Vice versa, medico-theoretical debates could be enriched by integrating subjective views of those people who are immediately affected. (shrink)

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare's (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their interrelationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

David Thomasma called for the development of a medical ethics based squarely on the philosophy of medicine. He recognized, however, that widespread anti-essentialism presented a significant barrier to such an approach. The aim of this article is to introduce a theory that challenges these anti-essentialist objections. The notion of natural kinds presents a modest form of essentialism that can serve as the basis for a foundationalist philosophy of medicine. The notion of a natural kind is neither static nor reductionistic. Disease (...) can be understood as making necessary reference to living natural kinds without invoking the claim that diseases themselves are natural kinds. The idea that natural kinds have a natural disposition to flourish as the kinds of things that they are provides a telos to which to tether the notion of disease – an objective telos that is broader than mere survival and narrower than subjective choice. It is argued that while nosology is descriptive and may have therapeutic implications, disease classification is fundamentally explanatory. Sickness and illness, while referring to the same state of affairs, can be distinguished from disease phenomenologically. Scientific and diagnostic fallibility in making judgments about diseases do not diminish the objectivity of this notion of disease. Diseases are things, not kinds. Injury is a concept parallel to disease that also makes necessary reference to living natural kinds. These ideas provide a new possibility for the development of a philosophy of medicine with implications for medical ethics. (shrink)

Recovery is a commonly used concept in both professional and everyday contexts. Yet despite its extensive use, it has not drawn much philosophical attention. In this paper, I question the common understanding of recovery, show how the concept is inadequate, and introduce new and much needed terminology. I argue that recovery glosses over important distinctions and even misrepresents the process of moving away from malady as "going back" to a former state of health. It does not invite important nuances needed (...) to distinguish between biomedical, phenomenological, and social perspectives. In addition, I claim that there are many conditions where we are making use of the concept of recovery, although the person recovered from the condition in question, has not regained the same degree of soundness. I show how the concept of recovery leads to conceptual discrepancies that can result in worsening patients' conditions. To gain a fuller understanding, I propose to rethink the direction of the process in question. I define the process of moving away from malady as a move forward towards a new state of soundness. I also suggest three terms, corresponding to different perspectives, to describe this movement forward: 'curing', 'healing', and 'habilitating'. This new terminology provides a more nuanced understanding of the states of both malady and soundness and an attentiveness as to how they differ and relate. (shrink)

In considering the debate about the meaning of ‘disease’, the positions are generally presented as falling into two categories: naturalist, e.g., Boorse, and normativist, e.g., Engelhardt and many others. This division is too coarse, and obscures much of what is going on in this debate. I therefore propose that accounts of the meaning of ‘disease’ be assessed according to Hare’s (1997) taxonomy of evaluative terms. Such an analysis will allow us to better understand both individual positions and their inter-relationships. Most (...) importantly, it will show that it is unlikely that there is a single unique disease-concept at issue. Rather, different authors are, for the most part, considering different concepts. (shrink)

Demographical changes in high income counties will increase the need of health care services but reduce the number of people to provide them. Welfare technology is launched as an important measure to meet this challenge. As with all types of technologies we must explore its ethical challenges. A literature review reveals that welfare technology is a generic term for a heterogeneous group of technologies and there are few studies documenting their efficacy, effectiveness and efficiency. Many kinds of welfare technology break (...) with the traditional organization of health care. It introduces technology in new areas, such as in private homes, and it provides new functions, e.g. offering social stimuli and entertainment. At the same time welfare technology is developed for groups that traditionally have not been extensive technology users. This raises a series of ethical questions with regard to the development and use of welfare technologies, which are presented in this review. The main challenges identified are: (1) Alienation when advanced technology is used at home, (2) conflicting goals, as welfare technologies have many stakeholders with several ends, (3) respecting confidentiality and privacy when third-party actors are involved, (4) guaranteeing equal access and just distribution, and (5) handling conflicts between instrumental rationality and care in terms of respecting dignity and vulnerability. Addressing these issues is important for developing and implementing welfare technologies in a morally acceptable manner. (shrink)

This paper suggests the adoption of a ‘capability approach’ to key concepts in healthcare. Recent developments in theoretical approaches to concepts such as ‘health’ and ‘disease’ are discussed, and a trend identified of thinking of health as a matter of having the capability to cope with life’s demands. This approach is contrasted with the WHO definition of health and Boorse’s biostatistical account. We outline the ‘capability approach’, which has become standard in development ethics and economics, and show how existing work (...) in those areas can profitably be adapted to healthcare. Cases are used to illustrate the value of adopting a capability approach. (shrink)

My interest is in the application of Rawls’ principles of distributive justice to the allocation of health care. In developing an interpretation of those principles I encountered the problem I present below. Although this issue is problematic for Rawlsian theories, it also has implications for any distributive theory that measures the impact of health care distribution via the mechanism of incremental movements in health or its absence.

The clinical encounter begins with presentation of an illness experience; but throughout that encounter, something else is constructed from it – a symptom. The symptom is a particular interpretation of that experience, useful for certain purposes in particular contexts. The hermeneutics of medicine – the study of the interpretation of human experience in medical terms – has largely taken the process of symptom-construction to be transparent, focussing instead on how constellations of symptoms are interpreted as representative of particular conditions. This (...) paper examines the hermeneutical activity of symptom-construction more closely. I propose a fourfold account of the clinical function of symptoms: as theoretical entities; as tools for communication; as guides to palliative intervention; and as candidates for medical explanation or intervention. I also highlight roles they might play in illness experience. I use this framework to discuss four potential failures of symptom-interpretation: failure of symptom-type and symptom-token recognition; loss of the complete picture of illness experience through overwhelming emphasis on its symptomatic interpretation; and intersubjective feedback effects of symptom description altering the ill person’s own perceptions of their phenomenal experience. I conclude with some suggestions of potential remedies for failures in the process of symptom-construction. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine recent critiques of the debate about defining disease, which claim that its use of conceptual analysis embeds the problematic assumption that the concept is classically structured. These critiques suggest, instead, developing plural stipulative definitions. Although we substantially agree with these critiques, we resist their implication that no general definition of “disease” is possible. We offer an alternative, inductive argument that disease cannot be classically defined and that the best explanation for this is that the concept (...) is structured as a cluster. We further argue that we do not need to reject the possibility of defining the general concept “disease” to legitimate developing stipulative definitions of disease that are relative to particular purposes. A cluster definition of disease is compatible with contextually motivated definitions, which may be considered précisifications of the more general cluster concept. (shrink)

In line with recent proposals for experimental philosophy and philosophy of science in practice, we propose that the philosophy of medicine could benefit from incorporating empirical research, just as bioethics has. In this paper, we therefore take first steps towards the development of an empirical philosophy of medicine, that includes investigating practical and moral dimensions. This qualitative study gives insight into the views and experiences of a group of various medical professionals and patient representatives regarding the conceptualization of health and (...) disease concepts in practice and the possible problems that surround them. This includes clinical, epistemological, and ethical issues. We have conducted qualitative interviews with a broad range of participants (n = 17), working in various health-related disciplines, fields and organizations. From the interviews, we highlight several different practical functions of definitions of health and disease. Furthermore, we discuss 5 types of problematic situations that emerged from the interviews and analyze the underlying conceptual issues. By providing theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools, and by suggesting conceptual changes or adaptations, philosophers might be able to help solve some of these problems. This empirical-philosophical study contributes to a more pragmatic way of understanding the relevance of conceptualizing health and disease by connecting the participants’ views and experiences to the theoretical debate. Going back and forth between theory and practice will likely result in a more complex but hopefully also better and more fruitful understanding of health and disease concepts. (shrink)

The article provides historical and philosophical reconstruction of the emergence and development of the philosophy of psychiatry. The main cases of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry in the context of the development of the history of philosophical thought from antiquity to the present are demonstrated. The key points of interaction between philosophy and psychiatry from Antiquity to the middle of the twentieth century are revealed. The phenomenon of existential-phenomenological psychiatry is described as one of the first attempts of thorough interaction (...) between psychiatry and philosophy. Its main task is defined – to describe the experience of mental illness. Which is an important and necessary task to raise awareness of the impact of mental disorders on people's lives, attempts to reduce stigma. Describing this type of experience creates a unique window into understanding a person with a mental disorder, and illustrates the common and distinctive features of the experience of people with different psychiatric nosologies. These studies provide a deeper understanding of how mental pathology impoverishes a person's relationship with themselves and their community, with the subsequent use of the findings and humanization of psychiatric practice. The prerequisites for the emergence of modern philosophy of psychiatry, in particular the cognitive revolution, the development of philosophy of science, the development of analytical and continental philosophy, in particular phenomenology, existential philosophy, hermeneutics, are determined. The main directions of research in the philosophy of psychiatry are determined. Which are aimed at clarifying the meaning of terms related to mental illness and describing the phenomenon of mental illness itself, analyzing and clarifying those definitions that are directly used in clinical practice and the basis of psychiatric knowledge, as such, to highlight the prerequisites behind certain theoretical positions of psychiatry, to describe the nature of mental illness. (shrink)

Today, health systems around the world are under pressure to create greater value for patients and society [81, p. 1, 119]; increasing access, improving client orientation and responsiveness, reducing medical errors and safety, restraining utilization via managed care, and implementing priority allocation of resources for high-burden health problems are examples of strategies towards this end. The quality paradigm by virtue of its strategic consumer focus and its methods for achieving operational excellence has proved an effective approach for creating higher value (...) in many sectors. If applied in a deliberate and holistic manner, the quality paradigm can bring about a more cost-effective organization of the health systems. In this article, we apply quality concepts to healthcare in a conceptual format; we characterize the health system’s customers and outputs with their quality dimensions. The product of this effort is a blueprint for a customer-driven health system which identifies six types of customers, nine types of outputs and the associated operations. As a preliminary step, a new analysis and definition of health and disease is provided. Rethinking the structure of health system in this manner and the related conceptual model can guide medical research, health sciences education, and health services policy, and help the practitioner to integrate all modern trends in healthcare delivery. (shrink)

The “One Health” initiative promises to combine different health-related issues concerning humans and animals in an overarching concept and in related practices to the benefit of both humans and animals. Far from dismissing One Health, this paper nevertheless argues that different veterinary interventions are determined by social practices and connected expectations and are, thus, hardly compliant with only one single conceptualization of health, as the One Health concept suggests. One Health relies on a naturalistic understanding of health focusing on similar (...) bodies that show a similar etiology. However, logics, normativity, and practices exhibit differences when it comes to combatting infectious diseases, maintaining productivity of livestock animals or preventing companion animals from suffering. Therefore, drawing from Charles Rosenberg’s groundbreaking texts on framing disease, we suggest to conceive of health as dispersed in different frames. Thus, this paper proposes to interpret health as complex and multi-layered concept. We distinguish and introduce an objectivist, a functional, and a sentientistic frame of health. Instead of reducing the differential veterinary practices to one paradigmatic understanding, health is seen as a model case of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance. Different and distinct perspectives on veterinary medicine show sufficient overlapping that allows for a common conceptualization, but there is not one single underlying logic suitable to understand and ethically reflect all veterinary interventions. This differentiability promises to reduce moral stress in veterinary professionals since it allows the interpretation of various, seemingly contradicting practices as dependent on multi-layered and socially determined scopes of responsibility. (shrink)