Abstract This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this, some analogies arise with various Western strands?particularly James? ?pragmatism?, Dewey's ?instrumentalism?, Braithwaite's ?empiricism?, Wittgenstein's ?language games?, and process thinkers like Hartshorne and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Therav?da framework of sila (ethics/precepts), sam?dhi (meditation) and pañña (wisdom) are examined, together with Therav?da rituals. Despite some ?correspondence? approaches with regard to truth claim statements, e.g. vipassan? ?insight? and Abhidharma analysis, (...) a more profound functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the Mah?y?na. Apart from the basic and explicit Mah?y?na underpinning of up?ya, the M?dhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more ?absolutist? in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren faith traditions, and Dharmakirti's Vijñ?nav?da epistemology can also be tied into this functionalist setting. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the claim that early Buddhism could be interpreted as an empirical philosophy. Made in a time when verifiable foundations were thought to lend credence to a system of belief, the assertion served to differentiate Buddhism from a “mystical” Hinduism and even to give it a leg up over theistic religions. The position of this paper is that the Buddhist Empiricism Thesis is most certainly false. That position is arrived at via a (...) close examination of Buddhist means to knowledge and doctrinal content, which unfortunately entails taking only the most shallow view of a deep subject matter. This superficiality is no reflection on Buddhist belief, but rather is the necessary effect of refuting empirical claims for beliefs which are much more than merely “verifiable”. (shrink)