Kant's theory of the intuitive intellect has a broad and substantial role in the development and exposition of his critical philosophy. An emphasis on this theory's reception and appropriation on the part of the German idealists has tended to divert attention from Kant's own treatment of the topic. In this essay, I seek an adequate overview of the theory Kant advances in support of his critical enterprise. I examine the nature of the intuitive intellect's object; its epistemic relation to its (...) object; its mode of comprehension; the relationship between these cognitive elements; and I ask which minds Kant regards as intuitive intellects. (shrink)

This paper revisits Kant’s 1768 incongruent counterpart argument that space is absolute. Most commentators today dismiss Kant’s argument as begging the question against the relationalist. I argue that this dismissal is too quick, and that we have something to learn by considering what might have led him to argue as he does. My focus is on the role of geometrical intuitions and the extent to which they can provide defeasible warrant for claims about space. By “geometrical intuitions” I mean both (...) the geometrical intuitions of spatial figures in imagination as well as the claims that seem to directly follow from them. My focus includes uncovering the metaphysical assumptions that are implicated in those geometrical intuitions. Whether or not Kant’s argument ultimately succeeds, the role of geometrical intuitions is worth exploring. Moreover, Kant appeals to geometrical intuitions, and any adequate interpretation of Kant will have to take them into account. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.