Tradicionalmente se considera que un acto akrático es moralmente peor que el acto que el agente decidió realizar en primer término. Contra esto, Arpaly acuña la expresión «akrasía inversa» para referirse a los actos akráticos que son moralmente mejores que el acto que elagente había decidido realizar previamente. El análisis del concepto de akrasía inversa hecho por Arpaly resulta insuficiente; lo desarrolla mayormente a través de ejemplos tan célebres como el de Huckleberry Finn. Aquí se analizan las razones por las (...) que los distintos ejemplos de akrasía inversa resultan problemáticos, llegando a problematizar el concepto mismo de akrasía inversa. Ilustrado por un nuevo ejemplo de akrasía inversa, se clarificará el concepto mismo y sus implicaciones éticas. (shrink)

Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...) these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. (shrink)

According to Kant, if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned. But Kant thinks that agents can be mistaken in their subjective determinations of their duties. That is, Kant thinks it is possible for an agent to believe that some action X is right even though it is an objective truth that X is not right; according to Kant, agents do not have infallible knowledge of right (...) and wrong. In this paper, I explore this doctrine in order to determine whether it is defensible. In particular, I confront the blameworthiness of acting contrary to fallible knowledge and the blamelessness of acting according to fallible judgment. (shrink)