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Moorean Phenomena in Epistemic Logic

In Lev Dmitrievich Beklemishev, Valentin Goranko & Valentin Shehtman (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic 8. London, England: College Publications. pp. 178-199 (2010)

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  1. A Simple Logic of Concepts.Thomas F. Icard & Lawrence S. Moss - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (3):705-730.
    In Pietroski ( 2018 ) a simple representation language called SMPL is introduced, construed as a hypothesis about core conceptual structure. The present work is a study of this system from a logical perspective. In addition to establishing a completeness result and a complexity characterization for reasoning in the system, we also pinpoint its expressive limits, in particular showing that the fourth corner in the square of opposition (“ Some_not ”) eludes expression. We then study a seemingly small extension, called (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Logical Development of Pretense Imagination.Aybüke Özgün & Tom Schoonen - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-27.
    We propose a logic of imagination, based on simulated belief revision, that intends to uncover the logical patterns governing the development of imagination in pretense. Our system complements the currently prominent logics of imagination in that ours in particular formalises (1) the algorithm that specifies what goes on in between receiving a certain input for an imaginative episode and what is imagined in the resulting imagination, as well as (2) the goal-orientedness of imagination, by allowing the context to determine, what (...)
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  • Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.
    – We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural (...)
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  • Does Chance Undermine Would?Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):747-785.
    Counterfactual scepticism holds that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. The main argument for this view appeals to a ‘chance undermines would’ principle: if ψ would have some chance of not obtaining had ϕ obtained, then ϕ □→ ψ is false. This principle seems to follow from two fairly weak principles, namely, that ‘chance ensures could’ and that ϕ □→ ψ and ϕ ⋄→ ¬ ψ clash. Despite their initial plausibility, I show that these principles are independently problematic: given some modest (...)
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  • Dynamic Hyperintensional Belief Revision.Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):766-811.
    We propose a dynamic hyperintensional logic of belief revision for non-omniscient agents, reducing the logical omniscience phenomena affecting standard doxastic/epistemic logic as well as AGM belief revision theory. Our agents don’t know all a priori truths; their belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; and their belief update policies are such that logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. We model both plain and conditional belief, then focus on dynamic belief revision. The key idea we (...)
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  • Knowability Relative to Information.Peter Hawke & Franz Berto - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):1-33.
    We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...)
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  • Grading Modal Judgement.Nate Charlow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):769-807.
    This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgment. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgments of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgments of probability targeting a “proxy” proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief (...)
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  • A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.
    This chapter presents a new semantics for inductive empirical knowledge. The epistemic agent is represented concretely as a learner who processes new inputs through time and who forms new beliefs from those inputs by means of a concrete, computable learning program. The agent’s belief state is represented hyper-intensionally as a set of time-indexed sentences. Knowledge is interpreted as avoidance of error in the limit and as having converged to true belief from the present time onward. Familiar topics are re-examined within (...)
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  • (1 other version)Doxastic Logic.Michael Caie - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 499-541.
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  • Reasoning About Agent Types and the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever.Fenrong Liu & Yanjing Wang - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (1):123-161.
    In this paper, we first propose a simple formal language to specify types of agents in terms of necessary conditions for their announcements. Based on this language, types of agents are treated as ‘first-class citizens’ and studied extensively in various dynamic epistemic frameworks which are suitable for reasoning about knowledge and agent types via announcements and questions. To demonstrate our approach, we discuss various versions of Smullyan’s Knights and Knaves puzzles, including the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE) proposed by Boolos (...)
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Jaakko Hintikka. Springer.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  • On Being in an Undiscoverable Position.Wesley H. Holliday - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):33-40.
    The Paradox of the Surprise Examination has been a testing ground for a variety of frameworks in formal epistemology, from epistemic logic to probability theory to game theory and more. In this paper, I treat a related paradox, the Paradox of the Undiscoverable Position, as a test case for the possible-worlds style representation of epistemic states. I argue that the paradox can be solved in this framework, further illustrating the power of possible-worlds style modeling. The solution also illustrates an important (...)
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  • Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True.Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev - 2012 - Theoria 78 (2):93-114.
    Fitch showed that not every true proposition can be known in due time; in other words, that not every proposition is knowable. Moore showed that certain propositions cannot be consistently believed. A more recent dynamic phrasing of Moore-sentences is that not all propositions are known after their announcement, i.e., not every proposition is successful. Fitch's and Moore's results are related, as they equally apply to standard notions of knowledge and belief (S 5 and KD45, respectively). If we interpret ‘successful’ as (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Logical Development of Pretense Imagination.Aybüke Özgün & Tom Schoonen - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (6):2121-2147.
    We propose a logic of imagination, based on simulated belief revision, that intends to uncover the logical patterns governing the development of imagination in pretense. Our system complements the currently prominent logics of imagination in that ours in particular formalises (1) the algorithm that specifies what goes on in between receiving a certain input for an imaginative episode and what is imagined in the resulting imagination, as well as (2) the goal-orientedness of imagination, by allowing the context to determine, what (...)
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  • Reverse Public Announcement Operators on Expanded Models.Ryuichi Sebastian Haney - 2018 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 27 (3):205-224.
    Past public announcement operators have been defined in Hoshi and Yap :259–281, 2009) and Yap, to describe an agent’s knowledge before an announcement occurs. These operators rely on branching-time structures that do not mirror the traditional, relativization-based semantics of public announcement logic, and favor a historical reading of past announcements. In this paper, we introduce reverse public announcement operators that are interpreted on expanded models. Our model expansion adds accessibility links from an epistemic model \ to a filtrated submodel of (...)
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  • True lies.Thomas Ågotnes, Hans van Ditmarsch & Yanjing Wang - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4581-4615.
    A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Implicit and Explicit Beliefs.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):107-140.
    Epistemic logic with its possible worlds semantic model is a powerful framework that allows us to represent an agent’s information not only about propositional facts, but also about her own information. Nevertheless, agents represented in this framework are logically omniscient: their information is closed under logical consequence. This property, useful in some applications, is an unrealistic idealisation in some others. Many proposals to solve this problem focus on weakening the properties of the agent’s information, but some authors have argued that (...)
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  • Dynamic Consequence and Public Announcement.Andrés Cordón Franco, Hans van Ditmarsch & Angel Nepomuceno - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):659-679.
    In van Benthem (2008), van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as${\psi _1}, \ldots,{\psi _n}{ \models ^d}\phi \,{\rm{iff}}{ \models ^{pa}}[{\psi _1}] \ldots [{\psi _n}]\phi,$where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epistemic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional dynamic consequence relation$\models _{\rm{\Gamma }}^d$extending van Benthem’s proposal. It takes into account a set of background conditions Γ, inspired by Makinson (2003) wherein Makinson calls this reasoning ‘modulo’ a set Γ. In the (...)
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  • Modality, Semantics and Interpretations: The Second Asian Workshop on Philosophical Logic.Shier Ju, Hu Liu & Hiroakira Ono (eds.) - 2015 - Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
    This contributed volume includes both theoretical research on philosophical logic and its applications in artificial intelligence, mostly employing the concepts and techniques of modal logic. It collects selected papers presented at the Second Asia Workshop on Philosophical Logic, held in Guangzhou, China in 2014, as well as a number of invited papers by specialists in related fields. The contributions represent pioneering philosophical logic research in Asia.
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  • Inverse Images of Box Formulas in Modal Logic.Lloyd Humberstone - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (5):1031-1060.
    We investigate, for several modal logics but concentrating on KT, KD45, S4 and S5, the set of formulas B for which ${\square B}$ is provably equivalent to ${\square A}$ for a selected formula A (such as p, a sentence letter). In the exceptional case in which a modal logic is closed under the (‘cancellation’) rule taking us from ${\square C \leftrightarrow \square D}$ to ${C \leftrightarrow D}$ , there is only one formula B, to within equivalence, in this inverse image, (...)
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  • Information dynamics and uniform substitution.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard Iii - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):31-55.
    The picture of information acquisition as the elimination of possibilities has proven fruitful in many domains, serving as a foundation for formal models in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics. While the picture appears simple, its formalization in dynamic epistemic logic reveals subtleties: given a valid principle of information dynamics in the language of dynamic epistemic logic, substituting complex epistemic sentences for its atomic sentences may result in an invalid principle. In this article, we explore such failures of uniform substitution. (...)
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  • Generation and Selection of Abductive Explanations for Non-Omniscient Agents.Fernando Soler-Toscano & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2014 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 23 (2):141-168.
    Among the non-monotonic reasoning processes, abduction is one of the most important. Usually described as the process of looking for explanations, it has been recognized as one of the most commonly used in our daily activities. Still, the traditional definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution mention only theories and formulas, leaving agency out of the picture. Our work proposes a study of abductive reasoning from an epistemic and dynamic perspective. In the first part we explore syntactic definitions (...)
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  • Informational dynamics of epistemic possibility modals.Peter Hawke & Shane Steinert-Threlkeld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4309-4342.
    We investigate, in a logical setting, the expressivist proposal that assertion primarily functions to express and coordinate doxastic states and that ‘might’ fundamentally expresses lack of belief. We provide a formal model of an agent’s doxastic state and novel assertability conditions for an associated formal language. We thereby prove that an arbitrary assertion always succeeds in expressing a well-defined doxastic state, and propose a fully general and intuitive update operation as a model of an agent coming to accept an arbitrary (...)
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  • Syntactic awareness in logical dynamics.Davide Grossi & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4071-4105.
    The paper develops an interface between syntax-based logical models of awareness and dynamic epistemic logic. The framework is shown to be able to accommodate a variety of notions of awareness and knowledge, as well as their dynamics. This, it is argued, offers a natural formal environment for the analysis of epistemic phenomena typical of multi-agent information exchange, such as how agents become aware of relevant details, how they perform inferences and how they share their information within a group. Technically, the (...)
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  • Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):41-60.
    This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...)
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  • Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction.Johan van Benthem & Eric Pacuit - unknown
    The combination of logic and game theory provides a fine-grained perspective on information and interaction dynamics, a Theory of Play. In this paper we lay down the main components of such a theory, drawing on recent advances in the logical dynamics of actions, preferences, and information. We then show how this fine-grained perspective has already shed new light on the long-term dynamics of information exchange, as well as on the much-discussed question of extensive game rationality.
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  • Bimodal Logics with Contingency and Accident.Jie Fan - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):425-445.
    Contingency and accident are two important notions in philosophy and philosophical logic. Their meanings are so close that they are mixed up sometimes, in both daily life and academic research. This indicates that it is necessary to study them in a unified framework. However, there has been no logical research on them together. In this paper, we propose a language of a bimodal logic with these two concepts, investigate its model-theoretical properties such as expressivity and frame definability. We axiomatize this (...)
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  • Dynamic Epistemic Logic II: Logics of Information Change.Eric Pacuit - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):815-833.
    This is the second paper in a two-part series introducing logics for reasoning about the dynamics of knowledge and beliefs. Part I introduced different logical systems that can be used to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents. In this second paper, I show how to adapt these logical systems to reason about the knowledge and beliefs of a group of agents during the course of a social interaction or rational inquiry. Inference, communication and observation are (...)
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  • Public Announcements for Non-omniscient Agents.Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2013 - In Kamal Lodaya (ed.), Logic and Its Applications. Springer. pp. 220--232.
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