This paper traces the development of Quine's ontological ideas throughout his early logical work in the period before 1948. It shows that his ontological criterion critically depends on this work in logic. The use of quantifiers as logical primitives and the introduction of general variables in 1936, the search for adequate comprehension axioms, and problems with proper classes, all forced Quine to consider ontological questions. I also show that Quine's rejection of intensional entities goes back to his generalisation of Principia (...) Mathematica in 1932. (shrink)

We investigate the system TRC of untyped illative combinatory logic that is equiconsistent with New Foundations. We prove that various unstratified combinators do not exist in TRC.

In this paper, we rigorously prove the existence of type-level ordered pairs in Quine’s New Foundations with atoms, augmented by the axiom of infinity and the axiom of choice (NFU + Inf + AC). The proof uses the cardinal squaring principle; more precisely, its instance for the (infinite) universe (VCSP), which is a theorem of NFU + Inf + AC. Therefore, we have a justification for proposing a new axiomatic extension of NFU, in order to obtain type-level ordered pairs almost (...) from the beginning. This axiomatic extension is NFU + Inf + AC + VCSP, which is equivalent to NFU + Inf + AC, but easier to reason about. (shrink)

We show that, if non-uniform impredicative stratified comprehension is assumed, Feferman's theories of explicit mathematics are consistent with a strong power type axiom. This result answers a problem, raised by Jäger. The proof relies upon an interpretation into Quine's set theory NF with urelements.