The immanent approach adopted by most contemporary representatives of the Critical Theory tradition has generally the purpose of offering a foundation for social criticism that, without relying exclusively on explicit or factually accepted principles, avoids both the potential arbitrariness of subjective judgment and the appeal to transcendent criteria. However, this project has not yet paid much attention to the socio-epistemic elements related to the intersubjective praxis of criticism. Based on this concern, I intend to explore the possibility of immanent criticism (...) by using the epistemic category of dissonance. I will begin by showing how Davidson’s notion of irrationality can overcome the problematic separation between healthy and pathological behavior found in Festinger’s classical theory of cognitive dissonance and serve as an indicator of epistemic contradictions that can lead to social change. Thereafter, I will explain the link between these approaches and both Brandom’s inferential semantics and Honneth’s normative reconstruction. At the end of the first part, I expect to show an articulated picture of how dissonance can serve as a key for the analysis of inconsistencies present both in the belief systems and in the institutions and practices that constitute forms of life. In the second part, I will reconstruct three possible objections to this comprehensive approach in relation to the role of the individual in processes of social criticism and to the notions of progress and rationality that the approach adopts. I will analyze here what kind of meta-criterion is necessary to overcome the discomfort generated by the experience of dissonance so that it leads to social change. Taking up the Hegelian-Pragmatist idea of accumulation of experiences, I will argue that such a meta-criterion refers to the possibility of gathering and using available and non-endogenous socio-epistemic resources that allow reconfiguring the foundations of the questioned form of life. (shrink)

The immanent approach adopted by most contemporary representatives of the Critical Theory tradition has generally the purpose of offering a foundation for social criticism that, without relying exclusively on explicit or factually accepted principles, avoids both the potential arbitrariness of subjective judgment and the appeal to transcendent criteria. However, this project has not yet paid much attention to the socio-epistemic elements related to the intersubjective praxis of criticism. Based on this concern, I intend to explore the possibility of immanent criticism (...) by using the epistemic category of dissonance. I will begin by showing how Davidson’s notion of irrationality can overcome the problematic separation between healthy and pathological behavior found in Festinger’s classical theory of cognitive dissonance and serve as an indicator of epistemic contradictions that can lead to social change. Thereafter, I will explain the link between these approaches and both Brandom’s inferential semantics and Honneth’s normative reconstruction. At the end of the first part, I expect to show an articulated picture of how dissonance can serve as a key for the analysis of inconsistencies present both in the belief systems and in the institutions and practices that constitute forms of life. In the second part, I will reconstruct three possible objections to this comprehensive approach in relation to the role of the individual in processes of social criticism and to the notions of progress and rationality that the approach adopts. I will analyze here what kind of meta-criterion is necessary to overcome the discomfort generated by the experience of dissonance so that it leads to social change. Taking up the Hegelian-Pragmatist idea of accumulation of experiences, I will argue that such a meta-criterion refers to the possibility of gathering and using available and non-endogenous socio-epistemic resources that allow reconfiguring the foundations of the questioned form of life. (shrink)

This paper examines how the intercultural conception of human rights, fueled by the modes of reciprocal recognition associated with Hegel’s social philosophy, draws on traditional understandings of human dignity while avoiding the essentialism associated with those understandings. Part 1 summarizes core elements of an intercultural theory of human rights while addressing the general question of how that theory accommodates an understanding of the relationship of human dignity and human rights. Part 2 presents the intercultural approach as committed to a view (...) of human dignity focused on the intrinsic worth of individuals, but understood, not—with Kant—as an anthropologically inherent property, but as one forged in relations of intersubjective recognition. Part 3, critically engaging arguments of C Beitz and J Habermas, claims that an intercultural approach entails a status-based conception of human dignity, one that construes the latter, not as a metaphysically conceived inherent quality, but as a function of membership in a social order supportive of both liberal right claims and a republican commitment to rights systems generally. Drawing on the work of Hegel and critically engaging the position of A Sangiovanni, Part 4 construes human dignity in terms of a doctrine of human rights expressive of a common humanity, one understood, however, not as an essential attribute of human beings, but in terms of a globally realized legal-political order whose members are dispositionally committed to the worth of all members of the human community and the value of human community itself. Critically appropriating the work of H Arendt for the intercultural theory, Part 5 considers the centrality of actual politics to a dignitarian account of human rights. Part 6 construes human dignity, again with Kant, in terms of the principle of autonomy, but one understood, not abstractly, but—engaging Pico della Mirandola—as the fallibilistically conceived process of social learning on the part the members of the human community. Part 7 considers how the intercultural view, with the idea of social practice expressive of collective human agency, accommodates a concept of human dignity understood as the “foundation”—nuanced and variegated—of human rights. Part 8 details the specific normativity of an intercultural conception, asserting that despite and even because of its attention to the empirical realities of social, historical, and political life, that conception remains committed, as with essentialist views, to context-transcending norms capable of calling into question actual practices and policies. Here, recourse is had to a concept of recognition understood both as a principle of evaluation and as a social practice encompassing the activity of individuals and groups engaged in the discourse on human rights. (shrink)

Neste artigo eu pretendo apresentar a abordagem de Honneth acerca da liberdade social em Hegel do ponto de vista da eticidade. A pesquisa se concentra na Filosofia do Direito de Hegel e no Direito da Liberdade de Honneth enquanto dois pilares principais de análise. Em um primeiro momento, eu esboço alguns elementos da liberdade social como um terceiro tipo de liberdade pensada como alternativa aos modelos negativo e reflexivo; em um segundo momento proponho aportes metodológicos da liberdade social a partir (...) da reconstrução normativa em oposição às “versões kantianas da justiça”; em um terceiro momento apresento uma proposta de “componentes normativo-conceituais” da liberdade social de Hegel a partir da abordagem honnethiana. Na minha análise são três componentes fundamentais: o pressuposto ontológico da cossubjetividade; a tessitura dos processos sociais de reconhecimento mútuo; o componente institucional da vida ética. A tese central subjacente a esta reconstrução é que o indivíduo só vivencia a sua liberdade completa e plena nas relações sociais no interior de instituições justas. Sem isso, a liberdade padece de um déficit de eticidade. (shrink)

Este libro promete ser una contribución para el estudio de la teoría crítica en general y para el análisis de la historia de la Escuela de Frankfurt en particular. Todos los trabajos que están contenidos en este volumen hacen parte del amplio marco teórico de la teoría crítica de la sociedad. Muchos siguen las huellas de los fundadores de esta tendencia, mientras que otros se presentan como críticos de la misma y unos cuantos más tratan de vincular problemas y contextos (...) de relevancia a los conceptos más destacados que se empezaron a construir hace cien años en Frankfurt. Encontramos como buena excusa para su publicación precisamente el año centenario del Instituto de Investigación Social. Además, hemos creído conveniente organizar los materiales en secciones que van desde la historia de la Escuela de Frankfurt hasta la consideración de algunos interrogantes de actualidad motivados por el desarrollo de la teoría crítica. No obstante, con esto no pretendemos establecer límites absolutos de clasificación. Confesamos que nuestra forma de organizar los ensayos responde simplemente a criterios editoriales más que a cuestiones teóricas y conceptuales. Claramente las intersecciones entre los estudios aquí presentados son amplias y hacen que cada una de las propuestas pueda dialogar con las otras en función de sus evidentes parecidos de familia. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has been pivotal in critical theory in recent years. This paper discusses how two goals of a critical theory of recognition – to explain and to morally evaluate social change – are interrelated. In doing so, this paper draws the limits of the concept of struggles for recognition. It is argued that if a social movement can be deemed illegitimate, this movement can no longer be understood as struggling for recognition. This implies that the two goals (...) of a critical theory of recognition cannot be fulfilled simultaneously: a moral standard that distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate social struggles cannot distinguish between different types of struggles for recognition, but only between struggles for recognition and other types of social struggles. Drawing the limits of the concept of struggles for recognition in this way helps to better distinguish between different types of social struggle and contributes to a more precise understanding of what struggles for recognition entail. (shrink)

This study aims to investigate whether some of the Eurocentric and colonialist contents of Hegel's thought are open to criticism with elements of his own philosophy. First, I intend to show that some of these contents can be organized around the connection between ‘spirit’ and ‘progress’. I then construct an interpretation of Hegel's notion of spirit, based upon which I discuss its possibly pro-colonialist tendencies, arguing that disconnected from the philosophy of history it establishes a connection of autonomy and critique (...) crucial even for anti-colonialist thought. Furthermore, following Adorno's criticism of Hegel, I investigate the possibility of finding in the ‘progress in the consciousness of freedom’ an experiential dimension capable of capturing its regressive moments. This analysis then leads to a discussion of colonization in the reconstruction of capitalist society presented in the Philosophy of Right, which reveals an important discrepancy, so I argue, concerning the Eurocentrism of the Philosophy of History. Finally, I propose a comparison of Hegel's discussion of colonization with Marx's theory of ‘primitive accumulation’, and evaluate thereby the pertinence of Hegel's connection between imperialism and the critique of capitalism. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophers often take for granted that for political purposes all humans are to be considered of equal worth. The difficulty, as Bernard Williams observed, is to find an interpretation of this claim that does not collapse into absurdity or triviality. I show that the principal attempts to solve this problem all beg the question against an Aristotelian proponent of natural hierarchy. I then explore existing proposals for dissolving the problem of basic equality, whether by denying the need for (...) justification altogether or by reframing justification in either ostensive or coherentist fashion, showing that each fails to account for our sense that basic equality is objectively true. In response, I outline a Hegelian approach that treats the commitment to basic equality as a social fact that constrains philosophical reasoning in contemporary liberal democracies. By itself that might suggest complacent conservatism or cultural relativism, but I argue that practices and institutions that reflect and foster a commitment to basic equality have a distinct value in permitting reciprocal recognition and thereby enabling us to make a distinct class of normative claims on one another. This Hegelian resolution of the problem is dialectically superior to its rivals and therefore warrants further development. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article critically examines Axel Honneth’s account of social freedom by paying particular attention to the conceptual apparatus of normative reconstruction that is supposed to lend social freedom its explanatory force. More specifically, the article demonstrates, through an immanent critique, that Honneth is unable to follow through with his ambitious view of the capitalist market as an institutional expression of social freedom. Furthermore, Honneth’s inability to derive robust relations of cooperative solidarity from the actuality of contemporary liberal democratic ethical (...) life leads him to posit socialism as a regulative idea. Honneth’s idea of socialism risks succumbing to the very pitfalls that he continues to associate with neo-Kantian proceduralism. Such an aporia poses a particular challenge for Honneth’s attempt at advancing a persuasive neo-Hegelian alternative to neo-Kantian proceduralism. As a means of addressing this aporia, I suggest a possible strategy that Honneth could adopt to retrieve his historically informed and radically reformist conception of justice without unwittingly rendering socialism a purely regulative idea. Such a strategy involves re-Hegelianizing Honneth’s socialism and the idea of social freedom that it seeks to actualize. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice of recognition as (...) a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Axel Honneth deploys the categories of normal and pathological to explain contemporary society in organic terms. This article concerns itself with how these medical references function in Honneth's work to explain the social world, and what their political implications are. For Honneth, social normality is a normative resource, even if it is only accessible through the study of pathology. Socially accepted norms are taken to reflect legitimate principles, with the early Honneth taking pathology as an individual psychic suffering that (...) results from injustice, and the later Honneth taking pathology as an overextension of the logic of one social sphere into the terrain of another. The implications of Honneth's organic account of society are explored through the lens of a competing “French” account of the norm offered by Canguilhem and Foucault. These French thinkers view socially accepted norms not as reflecting legitimate principles, but as standardizing processes of normalization that stifle normativities that do not conform. It is suggested that Honneth's account of normativity must be articulated with Canguilhem's and Foucault's account of normalization. That said, through the course of the analysis, several unexpected continuities are discovered between these two different traditions. (shrink)

If reification is the projection of a false, thing-like appearance onto society, what is de-reifying critique supposed to reveal? After distinguishing between versions of reification based on a social ontology of will from those that think of the social as a normatively constituted domain, I argue that Lukács’ work on reification fudges this distinction through his account of class. I then turn to the debate between Schmitt and Kelsen, where the will-versus-norm issue is central. I argue that the consonance between (...) ideas about reification and will-based theories like Schmitt’s is superficial, as the latter relies on identification with authority for its account of normativity, making Kelsen’s ideas about normativity stemming from an orientation toward intersubjective process more convivial. I note, however, that norm-based accounts are less amenable to radical change than will-based ones, making the link between de- reification and radical politics less direct than is often thought. (shrink)

Artikkelissa tutkitaan kriittisesti Honnethin Gadamer -kritiikkiä kolmen eri historiatietoisuuden kautta, joista historiallisesti vaikuttunut tietoisuus edustaa korkeinta astetta ja samalla Gadamerin tarkoittamaa hermeneuttista kokemusta. Artikkeli esittelee aluksi, kuinka Honneth tulkitsee Gadamerin Truth and Method –teoksen esittävän kaksi virheellistä historian ymmärryksen traditiota; esineellistävän ja reflektiivis-holhoavan hermeneutiikan tradition. Gadamerille esineellistävä ymmärrys ja holhoava ymmärtäminen perustuvat molemmat sekä tiedolliselle että moraalirikkeelle, joissa tulkitsija kuvittelee paremmin ymmärtävänsä dialogikumppania ja historiaa, joko asettuen objektiivisesti historian ulkopuolelle tai puhtaasti omista lähtökohdistaan käsin. Honneth korostaa kuitenkin, että tällaisissa dialogin (...) vääristymissä on kyse ontologisen sosiaalisen kontekstin rakenteellisesta vääristymistä, eikä tiedollisesta tai moraalirikkeestä. Gadamerin hermeneutiikka on Honnethin mukaan kyvytön kuvaamaan modernin yhteiskunnan rakenteellisia ongelmia, jotka saavat yksilöt omaksumaan instrumentaalisia ja holhoavia näkökulmia. Ne mekanismit, jotka saavat aidot vastavuoroisen tunnustamisen ontologiset ennakkoehdot unohtumaan moderneilta subjekteilta, jäävät Gadamerin mallissa vaille selitystä. Toiseksi artikkeli analysoi Honnethin argumenttia, jonka mukaan Gadamerin historiallisesti vaikuttuneen tietoisuuden idea ei voi edustaa moraalin korkeinta astetta minä-sinä-dialogisuhteissa ja samalla historian ymmärtämisessä. Gadamerin historiallisesti vaikuttunut tietoisuus näyttää edistyneemmältä kahteen edelliseen hermeneutiikan traditioon nähden. Gadamer kritisoidessaan Kantin kunnioituksen käsitettä ja moraalin univeraalisuus-vaadetta ei kykene kehittelemään dialogisuhteille riittävää ’yleistyneen toisen’ ideaa. Honneth esittää, että historiallisesti vaikuttunutta tietoisuutta määrittävä radikaali avoimuus toista ja historiaa kohtaan ei voi toteutua ilman riittävästi kehittynyttä yleistyneen toisen jaettua näkökulmaa. Artikkelissa verrataankin Gadamerin Sensus communiksen ideaa Honnethin Mead-tulkintoihin – ikään kuin selvennykseksi, kuinka Gadamerin hermeneutiikasta näyttäisi uupuvan tällainen riittävä yleistyneen toisen idea. Tutkimuksen tuloksena esitetään Honnethin ajatus ”sosiaalisen kokemuksen hermeneutiikasta”, joka kääntää gadamerilaisen hermeneutiikan fokuksen tulkitsemaan yksilöiden implisiittisiä kokemuksia epäoikeudenmukaisuudesta ja moraaliloukkauksista ohitunnustamisen termein. Honnethin kritiikin voikin tiivistää argumenttiin, jonka mukaan Gadamerin hermeneutiikka on sokea arkielämän rakenteellisia epäoikeudenmukaisuuden muotoja ja moraaliloukkausten kokemuksia kohtaan. (shrink)

In this paper, I will analyze Axel Honneth’s theory against the background of some of the criticisms that Amy Allen levelled against it. His endeavor seems to partially compromise his ability to identify the domineering forms of power that the subject does not acknowledge consciously and affectively. I will argue that, despite some significant limitations, Honneth’s theory has become increasingly able to analyze social negativity since The struggle for recognition. Also, in both defending Honneth’s methodology and delimiting its scope, I (...) aim to contribute to the debate between two understandings of power: power as ‘domination’ and power as ‘constitution’. (shrink)