ABSTRACT Imagine that you are given access to an AI chatbot that compellingly mimics the personality and speech of a deceased loved one. If you start having regular interactions with this “thanabot,” could this new relationship be a continuation of the relationship you had with your loved one? And could a relationship with a thanabot preserve or replicate the value of a close human relationship? To the first question, we argue that a relationship with a thanabot cannot be a true (...) continuation of your relationship with a deceased loved one, though it might support one’s continuing bonds with the dead. To the second question, we argue that, in and of themselves, relationships with thanabots cannot benefit us as much as rewarding and healthy intimate relationships with other humans, though we explain why it is difficult to make reliable comparative generalizations about the instrumental value of these relationships. (shrink)

It seems like a problem to say that love can be merited—its value is located in its transcendence of comparative judgments. However, we commonly make judgments about who is and is not worth loving. We deem certain romantic partners, friends, and family members as worth or not worth our loving time, attention, and effort. In this paper, I argue that love can be merited, and it is merited because of a person’s intrinsic valuable qualities. However, it is not the fact (...) that such qualities can be compared that is relevant. What is relevant is the fact that such qualities are gradable, and what it means for someone to merit love is that their qualities meet a threshold or standard of value for love. Moreover, love requires some amount of practical wisdom in discerning these thresholds and when someone meets or fails to meet them. This is important to recognize since we are creatures of finite love. We do not have the capacity to love everyone who is both worthy and unworthy of love. Given our finite capacities, I argue that making wise and discerning judgments about whom to love should be kept in mind when philosophizing about love. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Brad Hooker's “Does having deep personal relationships constitute an element of well‐being?” (2021). The paper begins with a discussion of the implications of disagreement about such issues. After raising some general questions for Hooker's account, the paper turns to the key elements in a deep personal relationship, according to Hooker: multi‐faceted understanding, and strong affection. The issue of impartiality is discussed, and it is claimed that Hooker's account is consistent with morality's being impartial. Some (...) possible interpretations of Hooker's overall project are offered, and the paper ends with a discussion of Hooker's suggestions that the affection in valuable personal relationships must be merited. (shrink)

A paper of Roger Crisp’s four years ago contained arguments that seemed to imply that having deep personal relationships does not constitute an element of well‐being. The lesson to draw from that paper of Crisp’s, according to a recent journal article of mine, is that one’s having a deep personal relationship does constitute an element of one’s well‐being on condition that one’s affection for the other person is merited. Crisp’s paper earlier in this issue of Ratio responds to my arguments. (...) Here I reply to new questions that Crisp poses or provokes. (shrink)

This paper argues that close personal relationships play an important role in our judgments about what is fair. I start with an explanation of leading theories of fairness, highlighting the potential for further work on the grounds of fairness. Next, I offer an account of close personal relationships as having the ability to generate legitimate and reasonable expectations of one or other party to a judgment about fairness, or both. I show how and when close personal relationships can ground fairness.

Mental states (beliefs, emotions, moods, desires, etc.) towards things can fit or fail to fit those things. Perhaps actions can fit or fail to fit the situations in which they are done. This paper explores whether having fitting mental states and doing fitting actions can constitute additions to a person’s well-being. The paper first discusses the desire-fulfilment theory of well-being. Then the paper considers hedonistic theories of well-being and criticises the recent proposal from Rossi and Tappolet that well-being consists only (...) in fitting happiness. Then the paper turns to the objective list theory of well-being and Badhwar’s Aristotelian theory. In this context, the paper considers Bruno-Niño’s recent argument for fitting attitudes as a part of well-being. Finally, the paper explores whether, on the objective list theory and Badhwar’s theory, doing fitting actions constitutes an element of well-being. The upshots are that fittingness is not an element of well-being according to some theories of well-being and that it is an element of well-being either contingently or necessarily according to other theories of well-being. (shrink)

Should political leaders have a right to privacy? Incursions by new and traditional media into the private lives of political leaders are commonplace. Are such incursions ethically justifiable? Prima facie, the question of ‘political privacy’ seems to involve a conflict between a politician's self-interest in retaining a protected private realm and citizens' public interest in having access to information about their representative's private life. Indeed, this is the structure that the debate has typically assumed. I challenge this orthodox view by (...) demonstrating that there is a public interest in political privacy grounded in the relationship between privacy and political judgement. I argue that the political privacy debate should be recast to recognise this conflict between two different strands of the public interest. This conflict presents a dilemma for democratic theory: in providing voters with private information relevant to the evaluation of political leaders' suitability for office and performance within it, we threaten to undermine the conditions necessary to attract candidates of judgement and for political leaders to judge well once in office. (shrink)

Flourishing is an increasingly common construct employed in the study of human wellbeing. But its appropriateness as a framework of wellbeing at certain stages of life is contested. In this paper, we consider to what extent it is possible for someone to flourish at the end of life. People with terminal illness often experience significant and protracted pain and suffering especially when they opt for treatments that prolong life. Certain aspects of human goods, however, that are plausibly constitutive of flourishing—such (...) as meaning and purpose, deep personal relationships, and character and virtue—can be uniquely realised when life is ending. We argue that there is a qualified sense in which one can flourish at the end of life but that one must make important modifications to the criteria implicit in conventional conceptions of flourishing. We close with a discussion of the empirical assessment of wellbeing at the end of life and explore the possibility of introducing a flourishing measure in palliative care practice. (shrink)