The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited in scope – roughly, to intertheoretic reduction among empirical theories – (...) and informal in presentation – not least because a satisfying formal account of theories has yet to be offered. And despite the length, the treatment is still condensed; often corroborating and/or intuitively helpful detail has had to be consigned to footnotes or omitted. I approach the problem from within my own naturalistic realist philosophy of science and formal analysis of abstract hierarchy in theory. The sources for the former are [25], [29], [31], and [32] and those for the latter essentially [27] and [30]. Hierarchical notions played a significant role in the already published [34]. (shrink)

Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting, set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in achieving ontological and explanatory unification.

Space is a particular, the particular thing structuring our world. It has shape. And size. And reference to space and its properties is fundamental to physical explanation. This, in a nutshell, is Nerlich's position. Espousing it Nerlich marches against the tide of philosophical opinion which dominated the first half or more of this century.His arguments are laid out in a wholly enjoyable book: clearly and simply written, ‘meaty’ in argument and lucid in explanation. The book does not have the same (...) technical scope in theoretical physics as do its relevant companions. Rather, the book is a sustained argument aimed at establishing the theses with which I began and its content has been selected accordingly. But the clarity of presentation and consistency of argument recommend it as a major contribution to the field. It is especially to be recommended to the non-technical philosopher. And there is another important reason for commending it: much of the argumentation of the book is not to be found elsewhere, it fills an important gap in the field. I need hardly add that I find myself in sympathy with Nerlich's position. (shrink)

John Preston has contended that Paul Feyerabend retreated from his earlier commitment to realism and consciously embraced a ‘voluntarist’, social constructionist, idealism. Though there seems to be unmistakable subjective idealist statements in some of Feyerabend's writings, it will be argued that Feyerabend's idealistic period was short-lived, and that he returned to a form of realism in his later writings. Specifically, Feyerabend's distinction between theoretical/abstract and empirical/historical traditions of thought, when understood with Feyerabend's re evaluation of Bohr's philosophy of quantum physics (...) in mind, is most aptly interpreted as aprocess realist position. Preston, in interpreting Feyerabend as a voluntarist, social constructionist, subjective idealist, fails to distinguish the ever-present rhetorical and provocative statements of Feyerabend's from the core arguments being presented. (shrink)

Yoshida's explicit aim is to defend the standard empiricist model of reduction-bydeduction from recent attacks. Thus the treatment is limited in both scope and orientation.I shall argue that Yoshida does not succeed. The failure is both internal and external.