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Evolution, Consciousness, and the Internality of Mind

In P. Carruthers & A. Chamberlen (eds.), Evolution and the Human Mind: Modularity, Language and Meta-Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 276 (2000)

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  1. Modules and mindreaders.Matteo Mameli - 2001 - Biology and Philosophy 16 (3):377-93.
    There are many interesting empirical and theoretical issues concerning the evolution of cognition. Despite this, recent books on the topic concentrate on two problems. One is mental modularity. The other is what distinguishes human from non-human minds. While it is easy to understand why people are interested in human uniqueness, it is not clear why modularity is the centre of attention. Fodor (2000) has a nice argument for why people _should_ be interested in modularity.
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  • The Evolution of the Human Self: Tracing the Natural History of Self‐Awareness.Mark R. Leary & Nicole R. Buttermore - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (4):365-404.
    Previous discussions of the evolution of the self have diverged greatly in their estimates of the date at which the capacity for self-thought emerged, the factors that led self-reflection to evolve, and the nature of the evidence offered to support these disparate conclusions. Beginning with the assumption that human self-awareness involves a set of distinct cognitive abilities that evolved at different times to solve different adaptive problems, we trace the evolution of self-awareness from the common ancestor of humans and apes (...)
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  • Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism.Jim Hopkins - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-144.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
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